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This Article focuses upon two basic but under-explored questions: when does,
and when should, the state use the criminal justice apparatus to burden
individuals on account of theirfamilial status? We address the first question
in Part I by revealing a variety of laws permeating the criminaljustice system
that together form a string of 'family ties burdens" or laws that impose
punishment upon individuals on account of their familial status. The seven
burdens we train our attention upon are omissions liability for failure to
rescue, parental responsibility laws, incest, bigamy, adultery, nonpayment of
child support, and nonpayment ofparentalsupport.
Part II develops a framework for the normative assessment of these family
ties burdens. We first ask how these laws can properly be understood to be
"burdens." We then look at these sites synthetically and contextually to
uncover a pattern underlying most of these family ties burdens; namely, they
tend to promote voluntary caregiving relationships. We endeavor to explain
why this rationale is instructive and normatively attractivefor the design of
family ties burdens within a criminaljustice system committed to what we call
"liberal minimalism. " We conclude Part 11 by articulatingthe contours and
basis of a critical scrutiny that should attach to family ties burdens in the
criminaljustice system.
Finally, in Part III, we apply our proposedframework to see under which
conditions these burdens should be rejected, retained, or redrafted in terms
that are neutral to family status but are still capable of promoting and
vindicating voluntary caregivingrelationships.
INTRODUCTION

In 2005, Christina Madison watched while her new husband repeatedly
punched her four-year-old son in the stomach after the child refused to get
dressedfor school. Madison did nothing to stop her husbandfrom hitting the
child. The child eventually diedfrom internal bleeding as a result of a tear in
his intestine. Prosecutors charged Madison for her failure to act; she was
sentenced to twelve years in prison.1
I Justin

Boggs, Parents of Slain Victorville Child Receive Long Prison Terms, DAILY

PREss (Victorville, Cal.), Dec. 30, 2005, http://archive.vvdailypress.com/2005/
11 3595069729822.html. For examples of other recent cases where states prosecuted
mothers for failing to protect their children from harm inflicted by another, see also Steven
M. Ellis, Court Upholds Murder Conviction for Failing to Protect Son, METROPOLITAN
NEwS-ENTERPRISE (L. A.), Mar. 12, 2008, http://www.metnews.com/articles/2008/

rolo031208.htm (describing Sylvia Torres Rolon's conviction for second-degree murder
after she failed to protect her one-year-old child from her boyfriend's severe physical
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Stories like Christina Madison's abound. In the absence of her family
status, Christina's omission, or failure to rescue her child, would trigger no
criminal liability. But because of it, she faces a very significant sentence. In
this Article, we examine the various places in the American criminal justice
system where the law imposes burdens on defendants on account of their
familial status or familial connection to the crime. 2 Where do these burdens
exist? Why do we have them? What, if anything, is wrong with them? How
can they be reformed? These questions are at the heart of our project, a project
that picks up the story from where we left off a year ago.
Specifically, in a study we published last year,3 we examined how and
where the criminal justice system affirmatively privileges defendants who are
members of a state-sanctioned family unit. Our study uncovered a range of
what we called "family ties benefits." For example, many states exempt
family members who harbor fugitive relatives from prosecution; many states
exempt family members from testifying against each other even in serious
felony cases; and individuals who kill or rape family members are often
subject to less serious penalties than those who attack acquaintances or
strangers. 4 We argued that extending such benefits on the basis of family
status can incur serious but often obscured costs in the criminal justice system,
particularly in terms of gender equality, fairness across similarly situated
offenders, accurate outcomes, and crime prevention. 5 We suggested that more
careful design of such policies could help avoid some of the costs associated
'6
with "family ties benefits."
But standing alone, the picture painted in our last article is incomplete; in
this companion Article, we try to complete the picture. As mentioned above,
some forms of criminal liability are triggered because of one's familial status,
and for reasons that seem to have nothing to do with compensating for the
"family ties benefits" we have already identified. These crimes include
omissions liability for failing to rescue certain family members, parental
abuse); Bill Scanlon, Mom Guilty in Baby's Death, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), Dec.
22, 2007, http://m.rockymountainnews.com/news/2007/Dec/22/scared-mom-talks-babydeath-trial/ (describing the case of Molly Midyette, whose ten-week-old son died from
injuries inflicted by his father).
2 Although we use the phrase "American criminal justice system," there are actually
many criminal justice systems in the United States operating at the local, state, and federal
level under a host of laws, ordinances, principles and policies. Consequently, not all the
practices we describe exist around the country in every single system and we try to explain
how limited or pervasive the reach of each system is in the family ties burdens we examine.
3 See generally Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins & Ethan J. Leib, CriminalJustice and
the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 1147.
4 Id. at 1158-59, 1162-64, 1167-71; see also Jennifer M. Collins, Lady Madonna,

Children at Your Feet: The CriminalJustice System's Romanticization of the Parent-Child
Relationship, 93 IOwA L. REv. 131, 145-49 (2007).
1 Markel, Collins & Leib, supra note 3, at 1190-99.
6 Id. at 1201-25.
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responsibility laws imposing liability on parents because of crimes or misdeeds
committed by their children, and criminal liability for nonpayment of child or
parental support. 7 Defendants are also burdened on account of their family
status when they face prosecution for incest, adultery, or bigamy.8 In all seven
of these instances, in the absence of the particular familial status of the
defendant, the actions or omissions at issue would largely be ignored by the
criminal justice system or treated more leniently.
This Article analyzes these "family ties burdens" and asks whether they are
justifiable as is or if redesigned. Although scholars have considered these
burdens individually, part of our contribution here is viewing these burdens
synthetically and explaining what sense, if any, can be made of them when
viewed as a whole. Thus, in Part I, we survey the various sites in the criminal
justice system where defendants who are members of state-recognized families
face special burdens that are not visited upon individuals who are not members
of a state-recognized family unit.
We begin Part II by explaining why we have generally taken a "defendantcentered" perspective in thinking about the sites of family ties burdens, since
many "burdens" on defendants based on family status may, conversely, have
been established to benefit the family members of such defendants (and
potential defendants). 9 Focusing on family ties burdens from the defendant's
perspective helps raise awareness of why such burdens are normative yellow
flags. As we explain in Part 1I, family ties burdens have tremendous potential
to discriminate in ways we find unjustified.' 0 The rest of Part II constructs a
7 As we explain later, these family ties burdens might also be referred to as family ties
"duties," in the sense that particular obligations are imposed on individuals because of their
family relationships. See discussion infra Part II.C. We have chosen to use the term
"burdens" because we are focusing upon the state's decision to use the power of the
criminal law to induce compliance with those duties in the first instance and to penalize any
eventual non-compliance.
8 We recognize that this group of burdens may fall into a slightly different category than
omissions liability, parental responsibility laws, or nonpayment of child or parental support
because a desire to enforce a certain vision of public morality might motivate a state's
decision to utilize the power of criminal law. We think it is important to recognize,
however, that the state is promoting a certain vision of family within both categories of
burdens, in that it is essentially trying to foster an environment in which caregiving can
flourish, and we must consider whether the use of the criminal law in these contexts
effectively serves that goal. In addition, these two categories of burdens are linked in the
sense that the existence of a certain family relationship is a prerequisite for imposing
liability, and thus both categories warrant analysis under our framework.
I We acknowledge that some victims may feel that they, as well as defendants, have been
harmed by family ties burdens.
10 Consider the example of omissions liability. Absent a contract or other special
circumstances, a hypothetical Jill cannot rely upon the state to signal to her life partner
Denise that Denise is obligated by law to prevent harm to Jill. This pattern risks
marginalizing persons who consider themselves family members but are not recognized as
such by the state or other institutions. In this sense, targeting persons with unusual
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normative framework to explain under what circumstances burdening family
status might be justified. We highlight that the vast majority of the family ties
burdens implicate the caregiving function of families. For example, society
imposes liability on parents for their omissions to reinforce the notion of a
special obligation worthy of enforcement through the criminal justice system:
to care for their children by protecting them from harm. The same logic of
promoting caregiving plausibly motivates criminalization of nonpayment of
child and parental support and some of the other family ties burdens we discuss
in Part I. The problem is that promotion of caregiving is expressed through
family ties burdens in ways that are, at times, illiberal and insufficient.
This conclusion is underwritten by an underappreciated point about how the
criminal justice system allocates family ties burdens. Our research in Part I
shows that the criminal justice system tends to enforce family ties burdens
against those who have voluntarily chosen their caregiving role. 1 In other
words, state-imposed burdens tend to fall chiefly on those persons who have
voluntarily entered into a status relationship and enjoy the privileges associated
with that relationship, thus making it seem more just to require those persons
to carry some burdens in return. Building upon this internal coherence, we
argue that a voluntary caregiving orientation to burden allocation in the
criminal justice system is much more attractive than allocation on formal
familial status alone. Whatever one thinks of relational obligation within the
family divorced from ideas about consent or voluntarism, when it comes to
criminal justice design, liberal principles recommend a focus on voluntary
caregiving rather than an arbitrary status-based allocation of duties.
Indeed, a voluntarist approach to family ties burdens is expressive of and
consistent with a "liberal minimalist" orientation to criminal law legislation. It
is liberal in that it justifies additional interference into interpersonal
relationships through criminal sanctions only through a showing that
individuals have roughly consented to these extra obligations by their
antecedent conduct of joining or starting particular relationships. A voluntarist
approach is also liberal in a second sense in that it tries to carve out a large
space for personal freedom to operate in a way compatible with the personal
freedom of others. It is only with respect to these two notions (voluntarism
and respect for robust liberties) that we use the term "liberal" or "liberalism."
And it is minimalist in two ways too. First, we seek a narrow tailoring
between government objectives and the means used to advance those
objectives. Second, we seek to constrain the use of criminal law sanctions
when non-criminal measures are available and equally or nearly as effective in
realizing the substantial public interest in reducing the prohibited conduct.
Thus, even when the promotion of voluntary caregiving motivates the
treatment on account of familial status is an under-inclusive (and, at times, over-inclusive)
mechanism to distribute the criminal law's tangible and expressive benefits.
1 There are some exceptions - largely those associated with incest and obligations to
pay parental support - which we discuss. See discussion infra Part I.C.
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establishment of a family ties burden, such burdens are unjustified if there are
alternative and equally effective means of achieving the goal without resort to
the criminal justice system and its particular power to infringe upon citizens'
liberties.
With these principles in mind, Part III rethinks the family ties burdens we
identify in Part I, in light of the normative framework developed in Part II. We
hope to show why some of the burdens do not pass muster and how others can
be preserved in some form, if they are reconstructed to avoid the substantial
costs of using family status alone to distribute burdens. While we do not make
the constitutional claim that family status should be a suspect classification
worthy of strict scrutiny, we do believe that, as a policy matter, the government
should be skeptical of the use of family status. In other words, to use the
language of equal protection analysis without making the constitutional claim,
the objective of the government should be at least "important" and perhaps
"compelling," and the means adopted to pursue that objective should be
"narrowly tailored" to achieve that objective, looking especially to see if
alternative measures might be just as effective.
We also believe that
impairment of liberties (including those associated with sexual autonomy) by
pain of criminal sanction on the basis of family status needs to survive
12
heightened - if not strict - scrutiny as a matter of policy.
One important caveat: there are many wonderful studies on how the criminal
justice system causes devastation to families and communities, especially in
light of its mass incarceration practices. 13 There is no doubt that many
criminal law policies and practices disadvantage families in various ways - and
without attention to this sort of disparate impact on families, policy designers
risk tearing our social fabric at the seams. 14 We agree that this lens is critically
important in evaluating criminal justice policies. Nevertheless, this lens tends
to track indirect results of other policies. For example, although lengthy
sentences for minor drug crimes result in too many children growing up
without access to a parent, surely the primary objective behind drug sentencing
5
laws is not to separate children and their parents.1
Our focus here is different and has yet to be sufficiently addressed by the
community of scholars interested in how the criminal law pressures families.
Here, we examine those distinctively purposeful practices that consciously
12 We

recognize this stands at odds with current constitutional doctrine that permits

promiscuous use of severe criminal sanctions. See generally Sherry F. Colb, Freedomfrom
Incarceration: Why Is This Right Differentfrom All Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 781
(1994); Douglas Husak, The Criminal Law as Last Resort, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 207
(2004).
13 E.g., DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE: INCARCERATION AND FAMILY

LIFE INURBAN AMERICA 30-35 (2004).

See id.
15We recognize, however, that some judges might view these harsh drug laws as a
means by which they can separate children from parents involved with dangerous drugs for
14

the good of the child.
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target members of families for special burdens on account of their familial
status. Scholars have been successful in analyzing the effects of certain
criminal justice policies and practices on the family. 16 But, most scholars have
not recognized the panoply of laws expressly written to disadvantage persons
based on family status alone. It seems important and necessary to pause and
think through how and why our laws intentionally punish family status, and
how in some cases the underlying goals of such a choice might be better served
through other means. This Article hopes to clear that ground.
In defining our focus this way, we do not intend to suggest that the
particular liabilities addressed in this Article are necessarily guided by the
intent of hurting or burdening family life. Indeed, it may be that many burdens
on family status are "remedial" or intended to benefit family life even if they
penalize particular defendants on account of their familial status. But in this
context, it is worth remembering that at one time many laws disadvantaged
women, for example, in the name of "protecting" them. 17 Our purpose here is
to excavate the family ties burdens currently directly imposed by the criminal
justice system and to assess their desirability both now and as they could be.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF FAMILY STATUS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE BURDENS

Certain crimes permit prosecution of a defendant for conduct that would
otherwise be lawful in the absence of the defendant's familial connection to the
crime. Incest statutes generally proscribe sexual conduct even between
mature, consenting individuals, and other statutes impose criminal liability for
the nonpayment of child support, even though we do not ordinarily criminalize
a failure to satisfy a private debt. We focus on statutes for certain omissions
and parental responsibility liability, incest, bigamy, adultery, and nonpayment
of child and parental support. In all these examples, state-determined familial
status alters the blameworthiness the criminal justice system assigns to the
underlying conduct. 18 Although these examples are not necessarily exhaustive,
we believe they are the most frequently found examples of the criminal justice
system's decision to criminalize certain conduct on the basis of family status. 19
In what follows, we provide an overview of the doctrine associated with these

16E.g., BRAMAN, supra note 13, at 5.
'7 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973); LINDA K. KERBER, WOMEN OF

138-55 (1980).
'8 Statutes criminalizing polygamy raise similar problems as those prohibiting incest
between consenting and competent adults. In the absence of a marital connection to a third
person, X may marry Y. In states prohibiting polygamy, X may not marry Y on account of
the prior relationship X entered into with Z.
19 In addition to creating criminal liability, family status is used in some jurisdictions as a
basis for inferring a breach of trust that serves as an aggravating factor at sentencing. See,
e.g., R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, 740-41 (Can.) ("[T]he offence involved domestic
violence and a breach of the trust inherent in a spousal relationship. That aggravating factor
must be taken into account in the sentencing .... ).
THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA

20081

PUNISHING FAMILY STATUS

1335

family ties burdens. In Part III, we discuss and critique the rationales provided
for them.
A.

Omissions Liabilityfor Failureto Rescue

In June 2002, prosecutors charged Shavon Greene, a twenty-one-year-old
mother, with aggravated manslaughter after her boyfriend allegedly beat her
twenty-one-month-old daughter to death. The prosecutor did not allege
Greene was even present during the beating; instead, the prosecutor alleged
she had disregardedwarningsfrom a social services investigator not to leave
the child alone with her boyfriend. Greene eventually pled guilty to culpable
20
negligence.
At a high level of generality, the general rule in American criminal justice
(as well as tort law) systems is that citizens are under no obligation to rescue
each other. 2 1 In other words, even if the failure to help another person in
distress would constitute a moral failing, the criminal justice system does not
22
generally impose liability on those who keep on walking.
The exceptions to the general rule are well known. As the D.C. Circuit
famously stated in Jones v. United States:
There are at least four situations in which the failure to act may constitute
breach of a legal duty. One can be held criminally liable: first, where a
statute imposes a duty to care for another; second, where one stands in a
certain status relationship to another; third, where one has assumed a
contractual duty to care for another; and fourth, where one has voluntary
assumed the care of another and so secluded the helpless person as to
23
prevent others from rendering aid.
In addition, one bears liability if one created the conditions of the victim's peril
or if one bears responsibility for the cause of the conditions of peril to the
victim (for example, parents of children who pose peril to the victim). 24 There
are limits, however, to when liability will be imposed. First, liability will not
20 Diana Marrero & Shana Gruskin, Mom Arrested in Child's Death; Police: Woman

Ignored Danger by Leaving Daughter with Boyfriend, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale),

June 21, 2002, at lB. One of the fascinating aspects of this case is that the boyfriend was
eventually acquitted in the child's death, so only the mother's omission was punished.
Susannah Nesmith, 3 Years Later, Man Clearedin Baby's Death, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 11,
2006, at B4.
21 See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.2 (2d ed. 2003); David A.
Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An EmpiricalPerspective on the Duty to Rescue, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 653,655 (2006).
22 A very small number of states have adopted so-called "Good Samaritan" statutes,
imposing criminal liability in limited circumstances upon those who fail to rescue persons in
emergency situations. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519

(2002).
23

Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (footnotes omitted).
(4th ed. 2006).

24 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 115
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be imposed when rescue requires the defendant to make an undue sacrifice or
when the defendant cannot physically perform the rescue. 25 Second, no
liability is imposed unless "the defendant's failure to act... [is] accompanied
'26
by whatever mens rea the crime requires for its commission.
Of special interest here are the triggering conditions for omissions liability
based on family status. The relationship of spouse-to-spouse and parent-tochild are paradigmatic examples of status relationships in which one owes a
duty to rescue sufficient to trigger criminal responsibility (rather than mere tort
liability). 27 Thus, if a defendant "realizes (or culpably fails to realize) his wife
is in danger, realizes (or culpably fails to realize) that he can rescue her with
minimal risk and/or sacrifice, and realizes (or culpably fails to realize) that she
is his wife," then he can be criminally liable for homicide "if he is aware of the
existence of the three elements (wife's peril, his ability to rescue with low
risk/effort, and wife's identity). '28 In the parent-child context, parents have
been held criminally liable for neglect for failing to protect a child from being
sexually abused by another individual, 29 and for manslaughter for failing to
protect a child from fatal physical abuse inflicted by another. 30 These
prosecutions exemplify the family ties burden phenomenon in which persons
in certain family relationships are held accountable for harms to family
members even when another individual inflicted those harms.
Trying to understand who precisely faces omissions liability based on the
status of spouse or parent can be difficult since courts sometimes define these
categories with sensitivity to differing circumstances. With respect to spouses
or spouse-like relationships, courts have been leery of recognizing the

25

Id. at 113; see also State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780, 786 (N.C. 1982) (denying "that

parents have the legal duty to place themselves in danger of death or great bodily harm in
coming to the aid of their children"); Andrew Ashworth, The Scope of Criminal Liabilityfor
Omissions, 105 LAW Q. REv. 424, 432-33 (1989) (discussing the requirement that the rescue
must be an easy one).
26 Larry Alexander, Criminal Liability for Omissions: An Inventory of Issues, in
CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 121, 122 (Stephen Shute & A.

P. Simester eds., 2002); see, e.g., R. v. Conde, (1867) 10 Cox Crim. 547, 549 (Cent. Crim.

Ct.) (requiring a mens rea of "willfully" for conviction of murder and "negligently" for
conviction of manslaughter in a case involving parents whose child starved to death after
they did not give him food).
27 At common law, other status relationships could trigger a duty to rescue, such as the
duty of a ship captain to the passengers. See generally State v. Mally, 366 P.2d 868 (Mont.
1961); LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 6.2(a).
28 See Alexander, supra note 26, at 139.
29 E.g., Muehe v. State, 646 N.E.2d 980, 982 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); see also Michelle S.
Jacobs, Requiring Battered Women Die: Murder Liability for Mothers Under Failure to

Protect Statutes, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 579, 586-88 (1998).
30 E.g., Smith v. State, 408 N.E.2d 614, 616-17 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Schultz,
457 N.E.2d 336, 336-38 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982).
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obligation to rescue outside of marriage. 31 Although dating or being
paramours is generally not enough to trigger the duty to rescue, 32 some courts
recognize obligations between unmarried couples. 33 Where that has happened,
however, the liability can often be explained on alternative grounds, such as
situations where the long-term girlfriend caused the peril to the boyfriend and
thus is assigned a duty to rescue for having created the peril. 34 But drawing the
line can be difficult in other places too. Why should couples who married
within days of meeting each other have more legal obligations to each other
than unmarried couples who have lived together for ten years? Why should
heterosexual married couples have duties to rescue each other but not the longterm homosexual couples who are legally prevented from marrying in most
states? What should happen when there is a married couple who have lived
35
apart for years but are not formally divorced?
The murkiness is worse in the context of duties to rescue children. To be
sure, biological parental linkage is not required to create a duty and thus the
law places the same package of burdens on adoptive parents. 36 But courts are
divided over whether to extend duties to rescue to people who have not
expressly consented to assuming legal responsibility for a custodial role over
the children. 37 Further, just as biology may not be necessary to impose a duty
to rescue, perhaps there are circumstances where it is not sufficient: what if
biological parents have renounced or terminated their parental rights prior to or
after conception or birth of the child - think here of sperm or egg donors, or
surrogate mothers and the resulting children.
Importantly, consider the status relationships associated with grandparents,
cousins, uncles and aunts: all these individuals are never under a duty to rescue
their reciprocal relations, nor are siblings, regardless of whether the
31 See, e.g., People v. Beardsley, 113 N.W. 1128, 1131 (Mich. 1907) (setting aside the
manslaughter conviction of a married man whose mistress died after ingesting pills while in
his home).
32 Id.

33 E.g., State ex rel. Kuntz v. Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Court, 995 P.2d 951, 956 (Mont.
2000) (holding that there exists a legal duty to summon medical aid if the couple
cohabitate).
34 Id. at 956-58.

35 See Alexander, supra note 26, at 139.
36 See, e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF

PARENTING 48 (1993).

37 Compare State v. Miranda, 878 A.2d 1118, 1131 (Conn. 2005) (overruling the lower
court's conclusion that a live-in boyfriend had a duty to rescue his girlfriend's child because
it would be difficult to stop liability from extending to "other members of the extended
family, to longtime caregivers who are not related to either the parent or victim, to regular
babysitters, and to others with regular and extended relationships with the abusing parent
and the abused victim"), with Leet v. State, 595 So. 2d 959, 962-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (finding that the live-in boyfriend of a child's mother had a legal duty to the child to
prevent the mother's abuse after establishing a "family-like relationship").
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relationship is biological, adoptive, or step-sibling in nature. That said, it is
possible that any one of these people might be under a duty toward the victim
for other reasons: perhaps they have induced detrimental reliance, agreed to
care for the victim, created the perils, etc. 38 But around the country, it is
exceptionally rare to find duties to rescue based on familial status relationships
outside the context of spousal and parental relations.
B.

ParentalResponsibility Laws

In St. Clair Shores, Michigan, prosecutors charged Susan and Anthony
Provenzino with a misdemeanorfor failing to "exercise reasonable control"
over their sixteen-year-old son, Alex Provezino.39 Alex had committed a
number of crimes, including burglarizing churches and homes and attacking
his father with a golf club. Despite knowledge of some of his burglaries,the
Provenzinos supported Alex's release from juvenile custody, after which he
continued to commit crimes. The jury convicted the Provenzinos after fifteen
minutes of deliberation. The parents were each fined $100 and ordered to pay
40
$2,000 in court costs.
Parental responsibility laws command widespread attention among
politicians, courts, and academics. 41 In order to provide an avenue of
restitution for victims and greater deterrence to reduce the incidence of
juvenile crime, some jurisdictions impose criminal liability on parents for their
children's misbehavior. 42 Statutes criminalizing the parenting of those like the

38 E.g., Cornell v. State, 32 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 1947) (upholding a grandmother's

conviction for manslaughter by gross negligence based on facts independent of familial
status); see also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
31 Jill Smolowe, Parentingon Trial: A Couple Is Finedfor a Son 's Crimes, TIME, May
20, 1996, at 50, 50.
40 Id.; see also Pamela K. Graham, Note, Parental Responsibility Laws: Let the
PunishmentFit the Crime, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1719, 1740-41 (2000).
41 For a sampling of the attention parental responsibility laws have received and their
extended history, see generally Eve M. Brank et al., ParentalResponsibility Statutes: An
Organization and Policy Implications, 7 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1 (2005); Linda A. Chapin, Out
of Control? The Uses and Abuses of Parental Liability Laws to Control Juvenile
Delinquency in the United States, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 621 (1997); James Herbie
DiFonzo, ParentalResponsibilityfor Juvenile Crime, 80 OR. L. REV. 1 (2001); Susan S.
Kuo, A Little Privacy,Please:Should We Punish Parentsfor Teenage Sex?, 89 Ky. L.J. 135
(2000); Tammy Thurman, ParentalResponsibility Laws/Are They the Answer to Juvenile
Delinquency?, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 99 (2003); Leila Atassi, Parental-ResponsibilityLaw
Strikes a Chord: Maple Heights' Stance Draws Broad Response, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Apr. 30, 2006, at Bi.
42 More often, however, parents are targets via other avenues for the misdeeds of their
children: "statutory civil penalties for property damage caused by their children, eviction
from public housing if criminal activity has occurred in their homes, and increased exposure
to civil lawsuits filed by victims of youth violence." DiFonzo, supra note 41, at 3. A
survey of the civil liability regimes around the country can be found in Brank et al., supra
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Provenzinos have an extended history,43 and their popularity seems to ebb and
flow. 44 This Section provides an overview of the nature and scope of parental
45
responsibility laws in recent years and how courts have evaluated them.
To begin with, it is worth mentioning that most states have laws specifically
prohibiting any adults from endangering the welfare of a minor or contributing
to the delinquency of minors through specific affirmative actions that can be
viewed as proximate causes of the child's wrongdoing, such as knowingly
providing guns or alcohol to them. 46 These kinds of statutes are not only
ubiquitous, but longstanding, beginning at the latest in 1903.47 In some
instances these statutes may also target any person's omission that arises under
special circumstances, as opposed to affirmative acts, and sometimes these
statutes create liability resulting in fines or imprisonment without any specific
48
showing of fault required by the government.
In truth, parental responsibility laws might reasonably be seen to encompass
civil liability statutes, laws criminalizing the knowing contribution of an adult
to a minor's violation of truancy and curfew laws, or laws prohibiting a parent

note 41, at 19-25. For a discussion of the efforts to impose tort liability on parents for the
acts of their children, see Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, The Justice of Parental
Accountability: Hypothetical DisinterestedCitizens and Real Victims' Voices in the Debate
over Expanded ParentalLiability, 75 TEMP. L. REv. 375, 379-403 (2002). For a discussion
of the use of civil damages as a means to reduce juvenile delinquency, see Chapin, supra
note 41, at 629-38.
43See Jerry E. Tyler & Thomas W. Segady, ParentalLiability Laws: Rationale, Theory,
and Effectiveness, 37 Soc. Sci. J. 79, 79 (2000) (noting that the Massachusetts Stubborn
Child Law of 1646 authorized the imposition of fines on parents whose children were
caught stealing); see also Naomi R. Cahn, Pragmatic Questions About ParentalLiability
Statutes, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 399, 405-06 (noting that "[sitates have been enacting laws
holding parents criminally liable for the delinquent acts of their children for almost a
century," primarily through the enactment of statutes making it a criminal offense to
contribute to the delinquency of a minor). Cahn adds that parents were frequently
prosecuted in juvenile courts under these laws during the first half of the twentieth century.
Id. at 406-07.
44 See Leslie Joan Harris, An EmpiricalStudy of ParentalResponsibility Laws: Sending
Messages, But What Kind and to Whom?, 2006 UTAH L. REv. 5, 6-7.
41Given our focus on criminal law here, we note that unless otherwise specified, we will
use the term "parental responsibility laws" to refer to those laws imposing criminal
sanctions on parents in response to the misdeeds of the children under their supervision.
46 Audrey E. Stone & Rebecca J. Fialk, Criminalizing the Exposure of Children to
Family Violence: Breaking the Cycle ofAbuse, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 205, 213-22 (1997)
(listing and comparing statutes); see also Paul W. Schmidt, Note, Dangerous Children and
the Regulated Family: The Shifting Focus of Parental Responsibility Laws, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 667, 676 n.62 (1998).
41 Schmidt, supra note 46, at 675.

48 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6-3 (LexisNexis 1994).
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from providing a weapon to a child or sending a child to a brothel. 49 In this
Article, however, we restrict the term "parental responsibility laws" to the
category of criminal liability imposed upon family members based on a theory
of failure to supervise. This category is controversial because under a
generalized failure-to-supervise theory, the wrongdoing of the defendant's
child is enough to trigger liability subject, in most cases, to certain affirmative
50
defenses the parent may raise.
These parental responsibility laws are exemplified by an Oregon statute that
holds parents criminally liable of a misdemeanor if their child violates a
curfew law, truancy requirement, or commits an act bringing the child within
juvenile court jurisdiction. 51 The statute does not require a showing that the
parent specifically knew about or contributed to the child's violation or
criminal wrong. 52 A Cleveland suburb recently passed a similar ordinance
under which prosecutors can criminally charge parents based on the misdeeds
of their children; 53 a third offense under the statute can result in parents serving
180 days in jail.5 4 Although parents would be permitted to raise as a defense
that they had taken reasonable steps to control the child, an Ohio court recently
struck down the Cleveland ordinance because it was inconsistent with a state
statute requiring the person charged to commit an act or omission as a
predicate for culpability.5 5 The ordinance, however, was modeled on a similar
and highly publicized law in Silverton, Oregon. 56 According to Silverton's
Mayor, the law was successful at reducing juvenile crime because "[w]hen
their parents are being dragged into it, most kids ... realize they're not the
only ones who pay the price for their actions, and kids begin to take stock of
57
themselves."
Many of the "failing to supervise" laws are created at the municipality
level, 58 and thus, they are more difficult to survey and no accurate scholarly
estimates exist based on our research. 59 At the state level, it appears that only

49 OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 163.577(1)

(West 2003); see also Brank et al., supra note 41, at
10 (giving statutory examples from Georgia and Iowa).
50 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 2000).
51OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 163.577(1) (West 2003).
52 Id.
53 MAPLE HEIGHTS, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 648.20 (2008), invalidatedby Maple
Heights v. Ephraim, No. 90237, 2008 WL 4174861 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2008).
54 MAPLE HEIGHTS, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 698.02 (2008).
15

Ephraim,2008 WL 4174861, at *8.

See SILVERTON, OR., CRIMINAL CODE ch. 9.24 (1994).
57 Atassi, supra note 41 (quoting Mayor Hector) (discussing the Maple Heights
ordinance and comparing it to the Silverton ordinance).
56

58

See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-1301 (2006) (authorizing counties and cities to

establish ordinances based on the failure to supervise a child).
19 We have seen some estimates in the literature suggesting that in the last decade there
were about seventeen states with criminal parental responsibility laws, but these numbers
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Oregon and Louisiana have parental responsibility statutes that go beyond the
general delinquency statutes that apply to all adults.60 But various cities and
towns around the country have similar laws.61 And some have created unique
hybrid laws that both lower the mens rea required for the parent and define
conduct by a minor that would not be separately subject to criminal sanction as
evidence of "improper parenting. '62 Proposals to extend such liability are
63
regularly considered around the country.
Jurisdictions vary with respect to how courts greet these legislative efforts.
To be sure, there are relatively few reported cases considering the
constitutionality of these parental responsibility statutes. In addition to the
court that struck down the local Maple Heights ordinance, two state appellate
courts have also struck down parental responsibility statutes that rested upon
strict liability. In State v. Akers, 64 the New Hampshire Supreme Court struck
down a statute that imposed criminal liability on parents for a child's violation
of a recreational vehicle usage statute. 65 The court concluded the statute
violated the due process clause of the state constitution by imposing liability
solely because of an individual's status as a parent.66 Similarly, a New Jersey
appellate court struck down a town's parental responsibility ordinance under
the United States Constitution's Due Process Clause. 67 The court concluded
that the ordinance's presumption that repeated juvenile misconduct "was the

are misleading because some of the statutes cited are just general "contributing to the
delinquency of a minor" statutes, which require specific wrongful acts or omissions by the
adult and apply to all adults, not just parents or legal guardians. See Schmidt, supra note 46,
at 675-82.
60 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:92.2 (2004); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.577(1) (West

2003). The Louisiana statute makes it a crime for a parent, "through criminal negligence,"
to permit "the minor to associate with a person known by the parent" to be a gang member,
a convicted felon, or a drug dealer or user. § 14:92.2. The statute allows a parent to escape
liability if the parent seeks assistance from various agencies in modifying the child's
behavior or if the parent refers "the child to appropriate treatment or corrective facilities."
Id.
61 E.g., ELGIN, ILL., CITY CODE tit. 10, art. V, ch. 10.66 (1995); CORPUS CHRISTI, TEX.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 33, art. II, § 33-49 (2004); see also Peter Applebome, Parents
Face Consequences as Children's Misdeeds Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1996, at Al
(observing the proliferation of "dozens" of ordinances in towns near Chicago in the "last
two years").
62 E.g., ST. CLAIR SHORES, MICH., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch.

20.560 (2008); SALT LAKE

CITY, UTAH, CITY CODE tit. 11, ch. 11.60 (1995). See generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 13.4 (2d ed. 2003) (providing an overview of vicarious
liability).
63 See Schmidt, supra note 46, at 682 n. 102.
64 400 A.2d 38 (N.H. 1979).
65 Id. at 39.
66 See id. at 40.
67 Doe v. Trenton, 362 A.2d 1200, 1203 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
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result of parental action or inaction" could not be sustained based on the
information about the root causes of juvenile delinquency presented to the
68
court.

But not all courts have reached the same conclusion. The California
Supreme Court upheld a parental responsibility statute with criminal
penalties. 69 On its face, the statute seemed to be a straightforward attempt to
criminalize the act of contributing to a minor's delinquency, but a 1988
amendment to the statute provoked the constitutional challenge at issue. The
amendment read: "For purposes of this subdivision, a parent or legal guardian
to any person under the age of 18 years shall have the duty to exercise
reasonable care, supervision, protection, and control over their minor child. 70
The court rejected the complainants' challenge that the statute was
"unconstitutionally vague" and "overbroad." 71 Rejecting the vagueness
challenge, the court stated that requiring parents to exercise "reasonable care"
provided "sufficiently certain" guidance because it "incorporates the
definitions and the limits of parental duties that have long been a part of
California dependency law and tort law."'72 The court acknowledged that
"neither the amendment nor prior case law sets forth specific acts that a parent
must perform or avoid in order to fulfill the duty of supervision and control"
over minor children, 73 but the court shrugged off that obvious difficulty, stating
that "a statutory definition of 'perfect parenting' would be inflexible. 74
Instead, "law-abiding parents" should look to "the concept of reasonableness"
75
as their guide to statutory compliance.
Notwithstanding some courts' disapproval of parental responsibility statutes,
we anticipate that state and local legislatures will continue to explore
regulatory strategies to reduce juvenile misconduct, invariably burdening those
of a particular state-sanctioned family status. 76 And burdens they are.
Interestingly, these parental responsibility laws frequently create liability for
parents based solely on their status as a parent and the misconduct of their

68

Id. at 1203.

Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507, 508 (Cal. 1993).
CAL. PENAl CODE § 272(a)(2) (West 2008). The amendment was enacted in response
to the perception that California was in the throes of a "gang crisis." See Williams, 853 P.2d
at 510.
71Williams, 853 P.2d at 509. The complainants' privacy challenge was dropped over the
course of the litigation and thus was not ruled upon by the California Supreme Court. See
id. at 509 n.3. The court summarily rejected the overbreadth challenge. See id. at 516-17.
72 Id. at 511.
73 Id. at 512.
74 Id. at 513.
75Id.
76 See Harris, supra note 44, at 17. Harris's study of Oregon shows that about one-third
of the municipalities participating in the survey had parental responsibility laws but they
were rarely - if ever - enforced. Id. at 22-23.
69
70

2008]

PUNISHING FAMILY STATUS

1343

child alone, leaving the parent to plead their good parenting skills as an
affirmative defense rather than making the prosecution prove the absence of
77
good parenting as part of its case-in-chief.
C.

Incest

In 1997, Allen and PatriciaMuth were convicted of incest after they entered
into a sexual relationship and had four children. Allen and Patricia were
biological brother and sister, although they did not meet until Patricia was
eighteen because she had been in foster care since she was a baby. When
convicted, Allen was forty-five and Patriciawas thirty. Duringsentencing, the
judge stated, "I believe severe punishment is requiredin this case.... I think
they have to be separated. It's the only way to prevent them from having
intercoursein the future. "78 The judge then sentenced Allen to eightyears and
Patriciato five years in prison.79 Their parentalrights to at least one of their
80
children were also terminated because of the incestuous relationship.
Incest laws, which prohibit both sexual relations and marriage within certain
kinship relations, reflect an enduring sexual taboo. 81 Perhaps surprisingly,
incest was not a crime at English common law,8 2 and it is not even today a
punishable offense in all American jurisdictions.8 3 It is also another example
of a situation where criminal liability may attach to a person only on account
of familial status. 84 The elements of incest are usually: (a) sexual relations
between persons having a particular prohibited level of consanguinity (or
17 See

Schmidt, supra note 46, at 684 (citing OR. REV.
an example).

STAT. §

163.577(3)-(4) (1995) as

78 Jeff Jacoby, Hypocrisy on Adult Consent, BOSTON GLOBE,

Aug. 28, 2005, at C1I

(quoting sentencing judge).
79 Id.

80 Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 811 (7th Cir. 2005).

81 See Courtney Megan Cahill, Same Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the
Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family Discourse and the
Incest Taboo, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1543, 1546 (2005) ("[T]he very term 'incest' is a powerful
way to provoke an almost visceral disgust toward any relationship to which it is
compared.").
82 People v. Baker, 442 P.2d 675, 677-78 (Cal. 1968); State v. Scion Barefoot, 31 S.C.L.
(1 Rich.) 209, 228-29 (S.C. 1845) (stating that at English common law, incest did not void a
marriage but made it voidable); Graham Hughes, The Crime of Incest, 55 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 322, 323-25 (1964).
83 There are three states in which adult consensual consanguineous pairings are not

prohibited: Rhode Island, Ohio, and New Jersey. Note, Inbred Obscurity: Improving Incest
Laws in the Shadow of the "Sexual Family," 119 HARV. L. REv. 2464, 2469-70 (2006)
[hereinafter Note, Inbred Obscurity].
84 States can also prohibit marriage between various pairings of relatives through their
domestic relations statutes, even if they do not attach criminal penalties to the relationship.
See Margaret M. Mahoney, A Legal Definition of the Stepfamily: The Example of Incest
Regulation, 8 BYU J. PuB. L. 21, 27 (1993). We focus here on criminal statutes.
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affinity through adoption or marriage); and (b) the defendant's awareness of
85
that relationship.
While prohibitions of incest are usually general, in theory they can be
grouped into three different categories: regulation of sex between adults,
regulation of sex between an adult and a minor, and regulation of sex between
minors. Most jurisdictions are unlikely to make these distinctions; indeed,
under most incest statutes, it is irrelevant whether the participants jointly
consent to the sexual activity.8 6 The issue of consent bears further mention. In
87
most states, lack of consent is not an articulated element of the incest charge,
which, in theory, renders victims vulnerable to prosecution under statutes
lacking specificity. Where joint consent exists, as in the Muth case, both
in drafting raises a
parties may still be held criminally liable.8 8 This crudeness
9
series of normative questions addressed in Part III.8
In the United States, all states but Rhode Island have criminal prohibitions
on at least some consanguineous relations between family members who are
not the so-called "conjugal couple" (i.e., something like spouses), although
states vary in terms of what relationships are prohibited. 90 For example, all
states that have criminal incest statutes ban sexual relationships between
biological parents and their children, regardless of the child's age, 9 1 but not all
92
incest statutes prohibit sex between adult step-children and their step-parents.
All states with incest statutes also ban sexual relationships between
consanguineous siblings and most ban relationships between aunts and uncles
and their nephews and nieces. 93 Regarding cousins, there is even more
94
divergence: only eight states criminalize sexual contact between first cousins,
but twenty-five states prohibit marriage between them.95 Some states also
extend their prohibitions beyond blood relationships, criminalizing sex

85 41 AM. JUR. 2D Incest § 11 n.2 (2008). The defendant's awareness relates to his
knowledge of the relationship, not his knowledge of the law that punishes incest.
86 Note, Inbred Obscurity, supra note 83, at 2465 ("The criminal incest laws in the vast
majority of states apply to [consensual] incest as well by making the crime distinct from the
crime of rape.").
87 1 AM. JUR. 2DIncest § 14 (2008).
88

Id.

89 See infra Part III.C.
90 See Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 337, 348-49

(2004) (compiling the various state laws on incest). Ohio targets only parental figures for
criminal liability for incest, and New Jersey does not penalize parties to incest when both
are eighteen or older. Note, Inbred Obscurity, supra note 83, at 2469-70.
91 McDonnell, supra note 90, at 349.
92 See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 670 N.W.2d 802, 813 (Neb. Ct. App. 2003).
93 McDonnell, supra note 90, at 348-49.
94 See id.
95 Id.
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between step-parents and step-children, and some states treat adopted children
96
the same as biological children for purposes of incest prohibitions.
D.

Bigamy

In 1953, Marlyne Hammon's father and dozens of other men in her
community were arrestedand sent to jail on charges ofpolygamy. Although
her father was released shortly thereafter, the family corresponded in secret
and continued to live apart because they feared furtherprosecution. Now an
adult, Hammon is involved in a polygamous relationship and advocatesfor the
97
decriminalizationofpolygamy.
Bigamy laws in the United States, broadly stated, prohibit an individual
from entering into multiple and simultaneous marriages when the first spouse
98
is still alive and the initial marriage relationship has not been terminated.
Criminal laws prohibiting polygamy are nearly universal around the country, 99
and with a few exceptions in certain geographic communities, they are
regularly enforced. 00 As we discuss in Part III, these prohibitions raise
substantial questions about the proper scope of the criminal law and its
relationship to issues of family status. 1°1

96

See id.

97 Elise Soukup, Polygamists, Unite!; They Used to Live Quietly, But Now
They're Making Noise, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20, 2006, at 52, 52.
98 11 Am. JUR. 2D Bigamy § 1 (2008). Interestingly, some states do not require X to
actually marry Y in order to be guilty of bigamy; extramarital cohabitation suffices to trigger
liability. Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous
Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 308 n.158 (2004). Some states also
punish the single person who knowingly marries the spouse of another person. 11 Am. JUR.
2D Bigamy § 1 (2008). This type of legislation is not quite a conventional family ties burden
because the state is not treating defendant X any differently on account of X's family status
or connection; rather, it is because of X's would-be spouse's existing family connection.

Thus, unlike the family ties burdens discussed in this Article, which focus on impositions of
liability or enhancements on account of a defendant's familial status, this kind of legislation
is formally quite different. That is not to say such legislation does not raise its own (quite
similar) problems, but we are focused on those statutes that place burdens on persons
because of their familial status.
9 We use the term "bigamy" to refer to the criminal laws prohibiting the practice of
polygamy, or taking on more than one spouse, regardless of gender. For a collection of
bigamy statutes, see Emens, supra note 98, at 290 n.5 1.
100 See, e.g., Kirk Johnson & Gretel C. Kovach, Daughterof Sect Leader Gets Additional
Protection, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2008, at A16 (discussing the conviction of Fundamentalist
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints sect leader, Warren Jeffs).
101For our particular purpose, we are focused on adultery laws that operate in
jurisdictions where fornication (defined as sexual relations between non-married partners) is
not prohibited. To the extent that jurisdictions impinge on all consensual sexual relations
outside marriage between mature individuals, there is no specific family ties burden, but it
goes without saying that our liberal commitments would trigger hostility to such laws,
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Adultery

In 2004, John R. Bushey Jr., the former town attorney of Luray, Virginia,
was charged with adultery after his paramourreported the misconduct to the
police when the affair terminated. Bushey eventually pled guilty and was
sentenced to twenty hours of community service. Along with twenty-three
other states, Virginia can prosecute a husband or wife for having consensual
102
sex outside marriage.
10 3
Adultery laws, at least in jurisdictions without fornication statutes,
prohibit a married individual from engaging in extramarital sex,
notwithstanding that such sexual relations would not otherwise be subjected to
legal sanction. 10 4 Perhaps because of adultery's pervasiveness, 0 5 a majority of
states no longer regulate extramarital relations, 0 6 even though large majorities
of Americans continue to view adultery as immoral. 0 7 Regardless of the cause
of adultery's relative demise as a crime, we recognize that most jurisdictions
08
do not actively prosecute or punish this misconduct anymore. 1
Although one might be tempted to dismiss the significance of adultery laws
today, we are loathe to do so in light of the continued enforcement in certain
jurisdictions, 10 9 especially in the military. 110 Indeed, although civilian courts

which persist in various forms in ten states and the District of Columbia. See Emens, supra
note 98, at 290 n.49 (collecting statutes).
112 Jonathan Turley, Of Lust and the Law, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2004, at B1.
103 See supra note 101.

104 2 AM. JUR 2D Adultery & Fornication § 4 (2008). Some jurisdictions retain laws
punishing an unmarried person for engaging in sexual relations with a married person. See
Emens, supra note 98, at 290 n.49. Our analysis is restricted to laws punishing married
persons who engage in extramarital sex.
"I See Emens, supra note 98, at 299 n.107 (citing a 1994 National Health and Social
Life Survey reporting that thirty-five percent of American married men and twenty percent
of American married women have adulterous sex).
106 See id. at 290 n.49 (collecting the statutes of twenty-three states plus the District of
Columbia that continue to criminalize adultery).
107 Lynn D. Wardle, ParentalInfidelity and the "No-Harm" Rule in Custody Litigation,
52 CATH. UNIV. L. REv. 81, 95 n.57 (2002) ("According to the Washington
Post/Kaiser/Harvard Survey Project in 1998, eighty-eight percent of Americans believe that
adultery is immoral, while only eleven percent find it morally acceptable.").
108 See Martin J. Siegel, For Better orfor Worse: Adultery, Crime & the Constitution, 30
J. FAM. L. 45, 45 n.5, 53 nn.54-57 (1991), for a general history of the criminal treatment of
adultery in America since the time of the colonists.
109 See John F. Kelly, Virginia Adultery Case Roils Divorce Industry: Conviction Draws
Attention to Little-UsedLaw, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2003, at B 1; John F. Kelly, Virginia Man
Challenges State's Adultery Law; A CL U Joins Appeal, Cites Privacy Issue, WASH. POST,
Feb. 26, 2004, at B8.
110 See Melissa Ash Haggard, Adultery: A Comparison of Military Law and State Law
and the Controversy This Causes Under Our Constitution and Criminal Justice System, 37
BRANDEIS L.J. 469, 469-70, 476-77 (1998); James M. Winner, Beds with Sheets but No
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have generally seen a decrease in adultery prosecutions, there has been a
steady source of such prosecution in military courts, often traced to the
integration of women into the armed forces in the late 1970s. l l During the
Clinton-Lewinsky scandal, many members of the armed forces were especially
critical of their Commander-in-Chief, who could have faced a court-martial on
12
adultery-related charges if he had been a mere service member.
Additionally, although someone might not be prosecuted for the crime of
adultery, the fact that the criminal laws remain on the books has real
consequences in civil contexts other than the military, such as child custody,
adoption, and employment. 1 3 Moreover, there is an odd discrimination
resulting from adultery laws that only apply to heterosexual couples, which
needs some articulation and evaluation. 114 It goes without saying that as
applied to the defendant who is married, adultery laws are a clear and
conventional family ties burden.
F.

Nonpayment of Child Support

In 1997, an Anchorage, Alaska father was sentenced to five days in prison
andfive years probationfor failing to pay almost $98,000 in child support.1"5
A government official stated: "Our job is to collect money for children.
Parents need to realize there are penaltiesfor ignoring their children. ",116

Covers: The Right to Privacy and the Military's Regulation of Adultery, 31 LoY. L.A. L.
REv. 1073, 1073-74 (1998).
...See generally C. Quince Hopkins, Rank Matters but Should Marriage?: Adultery,
Fraternization,and Honor in the Military, 9 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 177 (1999) (analyzing
criminal regulation of sexual infidelity in both the military and civilian contexts); Military
Gets New Rules on Adultery: It's Still a Crime, but Not All Cases Will Be Prosecuted,CHI.

TRIB., July 29, 1998, at C1.
112 See, e.g., Bradley Graham, Military Leaders Worry Privately About Impact; Some

Troops Offended by Double Standard,WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1998, at A10.
"3 Cf Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted

by

"Unenforced" Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 103, 110 (2000) (arguing that
even unenforced laws are not harmless because they create a criminal class).
114 Outside of Massachusetts and Connecticut, same-sex marriage is illegal in the United
States, and thus adultery laws apply as a class only against those who are married, i.e.,
heterosexuals. Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at Al. In light of the recent events surrounding Proposition 8 in
California, the status of same-sex marriage is still unresolved in that state, most especially
for the 18,000 same-sex couples who were legally married before the passage of Proposition
8.

Bob Egelko, Anti-gay Marriage Group Steps Up for Prop. 8, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 11,

2008, at B-2. Few proponents of adultery laws purport to have this discrimination in mind,
but in fact they are likely the result of a cultural erasure of the existence of a gay and lesbian
monogamous community.
115Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of Alaska, Parent Sentenced for Failure
to Pay Child Support (Feb. 9, 1999), http://www.csed.state.ak.us./PressReleases/fisher.html.
116 Id.
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Ordinarily, the failure to pay a debt to a non-governmental entity (like a
local utilities provider) is not a criminal act;1 17 an aggrieved party is forced to
pursue civil remedies to obtain redress. 118 In contrast, failure to pay child
support is a crime. For example, the Child Support Recovery Act1 19 (amended
in 1998 as the Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act) 120 makes it a federal crime to
owe more than $5,000 in child support or to be in arrears longer than one year
if the child lives in a different state than the delinquent parent. 121 In addition,
many states statutorily criminalize a parent's failure to pay child support. 122
This statutory regime demonstrates yet another way in which family status can
turn an otherwise non-criminal act into a criminal one.
G.

Nonpayment ofParentalSupport

The last area we explore here is a variant of the family ties burden
sometimes called filial responsibility laws. 123 These laws, as their name
"1 Obviously, the failure to pay tax liabilities to the government is criminal.
But
generally private parties cannot generally the criminal justice system to enforce debts
outside the child support context. See Ronald K. Henry, Child Support at a Crossroads:
When the Real World Intrudes upon Academics and Advocates, 33 FAM. L.Q. 235, 240
(1999).

118See

id.;

Posting

of

Nate

Oman

to

Concurring

Opinions,

http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/05/debt-statusand.html (May 25, 2007,
12:34).
"1

18 U.S.C. § 228 (2000).

Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act, Pub. L. No. 105-187, 112 Stat. 618 (1998).
121 Id.
122 SCOTT SUSSMAN & COREY MATHER, CENTER ON FATHERS, FAMILIES, AND
120

PUBLIC

(2003),
www.cffpp.org/publications/pdfs/crimstat.pdf. States have also tried a number of other
measures to enforce child support orders, from garnishing wages to suspending drivers'
licenses to booting cars. Solangel Maldonado, Deadbeat or Deadbroke: Redefining Child
Support for Poor Fathers, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991, 1000 (2006); see also Jennifer
Goulah, Comment, The Cart Before the Horse: Michigan Jumps the Gun in Jailing
Deadbeat Dads, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 479, 486 (2006) (describing how some states
post "wanted" posters of deadbeat dads and others send birthday cards, reminding parents of
their child's birthday and urging them to pay).
123 For background information and history on filial responsibility laws, see generally
Ann Britton, America's Best Kept Secret: An Adult Child's Duty to Support Aged Parents,
26 CAL. W. L. REV. 351 (1990); Shannon Frank Edelstone, Filial Responsibility: Can the
Legal Duty to Support Our Parents Be Effectively Enforced?, 36 FAM. L.Q. 501 (2002);
Seymour Moskowitz, FilialResponsibility Statutes: Legal and Policy Considerations,9 J.L.
& POL'Y 709 (2001); Matthew Pakula, A FederalFilial Responsibility Statute: A Uniform
Tool to Help Combat the Wave of Indigent Elderly, 39 FAM. L.Q. 859 (2005); Andrea
Rickles-Jordan, FilialResponsibility: A Survey Across Time and Oceans, 9 MARQ. ELDER'S
ADVISOR 183 (2007); Katie Wise, Caringfor Our Parents in an Aging World: Sharing
Public and Private Responsibility for the Elderly, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 563
(2002).
POLICY, CRIMINAL STATUTES FOR NON-PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT BY STATE 1
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suggests, require adult children with means to provide care or support to their
indigent parents. But filial responsibility is actually a bit of a misnomer; many
of the very statutes establishing-these obligations to parents also encompass the
obligation to materially support spouses and children as well. 124 Most of the
thirty states that have filial responsibility statutes authorize only civil
actions. 125 Nonetheless, twelve states currently authorize courts to levy a
criminal sanction upon adult children who fail to provide adequate care for
their parents. 126 It bears mention that since the 1970s, the vast majority of state
statutes requiring adult children to support their elderly and indigent parents
27
have been enforced rarely or not at all, especially in the criminal context. 1
As to the mechanics of these statutes, California's language is typical:
"[E]very adult child who, having the ability so to do, fails to provide necessary
food, clothing, shelter, or medical attendance for an indigent parent, is guilty of
a misdemeanor."'' 28 Massachusetts, like some other states, adds a proviso that
such liability will not attach to a person who was not supported by parents as a
minor, or to a person who, "being one of two or more children, has made
proper and reasonable contribution toward the support of such parent. 1 29 Our
analysis in Part III will focus on the requirement to support parents under these
0
laws.13
Having here canvassed the numerous ways family status is burdened in the
criminal justice system, we turn to developing a normative framework to
assess these various family ties burdens.
II.

A FRAMEWORK

FOR ANALYZING FAMILY TIES BURDENS

In the previous Part, we identified some practices we characterize as family
ties burdens. Here, we present a normative framework for analyzing whether
and how such burdens can be justified. First, we explain why we adopt a
defendant-centered perspective despite the fact that when other perspectives
are introduced, family ties burdens could be viewed as bringing benefits to the
family as an institution or to particular family members other than the
defendant. Then, we revisit some of the normative costs of family ties benefits
that we adumbrated and explored in our companion article to see if any retain
applicability in this new context of family ties burdens. Finally, we highlight
the voluntary caregiving feature we see in the structure of many family ties
burdens, a feature which can serve as a guide for scrutinizing burdens more
generally, especially within a criminal law framework informed by what we
124 See Moskowitz, supra note 123, at 713-14.

125See Rickles-Jordan, supra note 123, at 199.
126See id. at 199 n.136.

127See Terrance A. Kline, A Rational Role for Filial Responsibility Laws in Modern
Society?, 26 FAM. L.Q. 195, 196 (1992).
128 CAL. PENAL CODE § 270c (West 2008)
129 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 273, § 20 (2007).

130 See infra Part III.G.
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call a "liberal minimalist" approach (which bears some resemblance to a form
of equal protection analysis at the legislative rather than judicial level). This
approach includes analysis of how much liberty is infringed upon, whether the
government's interest in the infringement is compelling or important, and how
narrowly tailored the law is to address the underlying interest. Our
"minimalism" is a way of cashing out a form of narrow tailoring, for it
underwrites a general skepticism about using criminal law methods to
accomplish goals that can be achieved without the threat to liberties common
in criminal laws. Informed by these principles, we offer a potential structure of
normative analysis for laws creating criminal liability predicated on the
defendant's family status.
A.

A Defendant-CenteredPerspective,Among Others

In analyzing family ties burdens, we claim the defendant is being treated
differently, on account of some action or inaction, because of his family status.
In this Section we explain our choice to use a defendant-centered perspective
and try to contextualize that choice among the other perspectives one could
adopt.
1. The Defendant as the Object of Punitive Coercion
In examining family ties burdens the way we have in Part I, we are clearly
looking at the nature of the wrongdoing from the defendant's perspective. The
conduct rules at the core of this Article are aimed at defendants - and it seems
necessary to analyze those conduct rules on their own terms. After all, it is the
defendants who are coerced in the name of state punishment, and the criminal
justice system's coercive nature is its most important feature demanding
justification.
But there is, of course, much more to say on the matter and other
perspectives can be taken. Family ties burdens might also be viewed as
burdens on or benefits to others: victims, other family members, the state, or
society at large.
2. Family Members as the Object of Harm
In some cases, the burden imposed on the defendant also burdens those it is
allegedly supposed to help. For example, a woman whose ex-spouse is jailed
for failure to pay child support may object that this burden imposes a terrible
hardship on her family by reducing the ability of her children's father to play
any kind of meaningful role in their lives. Thus, many of the practices we have
described in Part I powerfully affect family interests beyond those of the
defendant. Consider how punishment of someone for failing to supervise,
rescue, or support a family member might impair that person's future ability or
willingness to supervise, rescue, or support a family member. 13' The nature

131 See

infra Part III.B.2.
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and intensity of the punishment for the offender may have serious detrimental
effects on the very family members initially harmed by the defendant's
antecedent failure to satisfy his duty. The same is true, at least in certain
conditions, when we punish offenders for bigamy, incest, or adultery.
Incarcerating or fining offenders of these laws may impair their capacity to
care for and support their families.
Undoubtedly, no legislator enacts these family ties burdens with the
intention of inflicting harm on innocent family members. Yet to the extent the
harms to innocent third parties are foreseeable, it is the legislators' obligation
to weigh these costs in the balance of deciding whether and how to insert
family ties burdens in the criminal justice system.
3.

Burdens as Devices for Promoting "Family Life and Values"

Another alternative prism arises when we view these laws from the ex ante
perspective rather than the ex post one. In other words, we might consider
whether someone within the family - or "the family" as a social institution could be described as benefiting from the laws creating the "family ties
burden." From this view, what appears to be a penalty on familial status in an
individual case after the fact could have been created as part of a strategy
designed to confer larger benefits to the social institution of the family as a
whole.
For instance, the recent criminalization of nonpayment of child support
looks like a "family ties burden" in the sense defined earlier. That is because,
as a general matter, failure to pay debt does not warrant criminal punishment.
Indeed other legal mechanisms exist to help debtors, most prominently,
bankruptcy. But now, failure to pay child support, which is a form of debt, is a
basis in many jurisdictions for criminal punishment. 132 Thus, failures to meet
some kinds of intra-familial financial obligations are now penalized much
more harshly than failures to meet other financial obligations.
Characterizing these practices as "burdens" on the particular defendant
might be mistaken if we alter the lens through which we are looking at the
problem. If we move from an ex post perspective focused on the defendant to
an ex ante perspective focused on the institution of the family, the offender in
question might have agreed with having these family ties burdens as laws if he
assessed them impartially, that is, if he did not know whether he would end up
being the target of these laws later. He might agree with them if he believed
that these family ties burdens were important to promote a certain vision of
family life within society. Thus, from the ex ante position, criminalizing
failures to rescue, failures to supervise, or failures to support, and banning
incest, adultery, or bigamy may be aimed at (and to some, justified by) keeping
certain kinds of families together to perform the work associated with a certain
kind of idealized family life. If this is the purpose, the policy of criminalizing
nonpayment of child support might provide a benefit, at least ex ante, to both
132 See

discussion supra Part I.F.
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the offender and the institution of the family. Imposing the penalty on the
offender for his violation of these laws is simply the way to ensure that people
do not defect from what they would have agreed to earlier as reasonable and
rational persons working in concert with each other to secure the conditions for
33
human flourishing. 1
4.

Burdens as Devices to Serve Goals Beyond Family Promotion

Family ties burdens might have other rationales too - aside from simply
promoting a particular vision of family life. First, the various burdens placed
on offenders may reflect imperfect or indirect choices of decision makers to
enhance distinctive criminal justice goals such as deterrence or retribution. For
example, if a state were to have heightened penalties for certain incestuous
encounters compared to other sexual assaults, it might be a method to
34
overcome the difficulty of getting incest victims to report the assaults. 1
Alternatively, the state legislature may be using the criminal justice system
to communicate that when one commits a crime against certain family
members, one is even more worthy of reproach and condemnation. 35 In this
respect, the penalties might be thought to advance the criminal justice system's
norm-projection purposes, by demonstrating society's deep values. For
example, attacking or neglecting family members is worse than attacking or
neglecting non-family members because of the additional breach of trust that a
136
If
caregiver signals when opting into a relationship of caregiving.
heightened penalties attach in the context of crimes against victims with whom
one has opted into a relationship of caregiving, then those penalties might be
justifiable because the offensive action or failure to support, supervise, or
rescue with respect to that particular victim is worse: when you hurt or fail to
protect someone whom you have already signaled to society that you will care
for, then one might plausibly say an extra wrong (a breach of trust based on
implicit or explicit promise) has been committed. That wrong is not only a
wrong against a particular victim, remediable by compensation. Rather, the
wrong has a different texture because the wrongdoer has lulled the public into
a false sense of security from which they fail to help the person in question.

133 Cf JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 10-15 (rev. ed. 1999).

134 This strategy draws on the insight that heightened penalties are a plausible way of
achieving greater deterrence in certain contexts where there is less likelihood of a victim
coming forward. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76
J. POL. ECON. 169, 180 (1968); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages:
An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REv. 869, 888 (1998).
135 See, e.g., R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, 740-41 (Can.) (discussing the breach of

trust associated with violence against one's spouse as an aggravating factor).
136But see Jennifer M. Collins, Crime and Parenthood: The Uneasy Case for
Prosecuting Negligent Parents, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 807, 820 (2006) (discussing a study
showing that in practice, parents who lose children through negligent conduct are often
treated more leniently than unrelated caregivers who cause death).
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A distinct but related idea is that these apparent penalties serve other
legitimate social goals of the state that have little to do with deterrence or norm
projection or even the vitality of family life. According to this view, penalties
imposed on the basis of familial connections to the crime might serve other
purposes that directly benefit the state. For instance, the legislature might
believe that imposing impediments to even consensual incest between adult
siblings is important to reduce the prospects of increased social expenditures
on food stamps and medical care, because the legislators assume that
incestuous relationships will produce offspring who are more likely to require
subsidized medical support.1 37 Again, we will have to weigh very carefully
these purported benefits in any one instance: if they serve compelling or
important interests, perhaps discrimination on the basis of family status is
justifiable. But these compelling interests cannot be assessed in the abstract
and must be pursued in the specific context of each burden, an analysis we
begin to undertake in the next Part.
5.

Burdens in Relation to Family Ties Benefits

We obviously do not deny that the laws creating what we call family ties
burdens lend themselves to examination from a variety of perspectives. There
is something about these family ties burdens, however, that requires more
caution than typically extended in discussion of any one of these laws in
isolation, and in isolation from the benefits the criminal justice system extends
to defendants based on family status. Moreover, in light of the fact that our
previous work looked at the benefits extended to defendants based on family
status, 138 we do not think there is something inherently biased when we look at
the burdens placed on family ties. To our minds, then, the inquiry at the core
of this Article is important - when are family ties burdens justified in creating
distinctively criminalliability?
One answer to this question would look at these burdens in relation to the
various benefits and privileges afforded on account of family ties; it might be
thought that the burdens "balance out" this discriminatory treatment pervasive
within the criminal justice system, just as, perhaps, family ties benefits may be
a form of compensation for the havoc the criminal justice system indirectly
wreaks upon families. 13 9 But balance itself requires further justification to
explain why there is a need to have any family ties benefits or burdens at all.

"IAs discussed in Part II.C, one can design policies to accommodate these concerns in
several ways.
138We looked at familial status defenses, pretrial release, exemptions from prosecution
for harboring fugitives, testimonial privileges, prison accommodations, and sentencing
practices. See generallyMarkel, Collins & Leib, supra note 3.
139 In our forthcoming book, see supra note K, we discuss how these benefits and
burdens might interact and what we learn about how we value family when we look at the
various benefits and burdens together.
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After all, there would be reciprocity or balance in the absence of both family
ties benefits and family ties burdens.
The better approach, we think, sees family ties benefits or burdens or both as
serving some "protective" role of a particular notion of family and its
associated caregiving responsibilities. But this protective role itself needs
further elaboration. Consider the following: how exactly do sentencing
discounts for those with family ties and responsibilities, a benefit we examined
in our framework last year, 140 rest consistently with criminalizing polygamy,
adultery, or incest? At first glance, the benefit and burden seem to be in
tension - why would we make allowances based on family ties in one place
and then punish based on family ties in the other?
But there may be an identifiable logic here. The former - sentencing
discounts based on familial obligations - is arguably protective of family
caregiving functions ex post. The others can be deemed "protective" of such
caregiving functions from an ex ante perspective - before any person knows he
is going to commit that crime. This is because some might plausibly view
incest, adultery, or polygamy (or any of the other family ties burdens) as
endangering the caregiving functions associated with the traditional family
unit. On this view, these family ties burdens and benefits work in tandem to
signal that society cares deeply about promoting particular conceptions of
family even when they interfere with other norms informing the construction
of an attractive and effective criminal justice system.
While this explanation sounds plausible, it suffers from the randomness of
choice as to when to adopt an ex ante perspective and when to adopt an ex post
perspective. It is arbitrary because it chooses to justify the practices by
selecting an ex post focus on benefits and an ex ante focus on burdens without
any further explanation of why such a choice is justifiable. The problem is that
the protective function could arguably be promoted by selecting an ex ante
view of benefits and an ex post view of burdens. But that would require a
radical re-orientation of the rules we have.
To illustrate: when taking an ex ante perspective on family ties benefits, one
might think that if a state decided it will not give sentencing discounts based
on family ties and responsibilities, then that would create extra deterrence with
those parents sensitive to the signals the criminal law is emitting. The same
rationale attaches to spousal testimonial immunities or exemptions from
prosecution for harboring fugitives. In those situations, ex ante, people might
think they will forbear from crime so as not to put their loved ones in jeopardy
of having to testify against them or house them when they are fugitives.
Forbearing from wrongdoing could be a way to demonstrate how they care
about each other because it avoids putting the family members in a tough spot
later on, a spot where they have to choose between kinship obligations and
citizen obligations. Moreover, because the ex ante view means that family
members consider themselves as members of a family of a victim as well, they
140

See Markel, Collins & Leib, supra note 3, at 1171-78.
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may be prone to taking a more impartial view about what the better rules are.
Examined ex ante, most of the family ties benefits should be jettisoned when
they interfere with particular criminal justice objectives they otherwise value.
All this would be an argument for getting rid of family ties benefits.
By contrast, when examining family ties burdens from the defendant's ex
post point of view, the defendant will strenuously argue that punishment for
the family ties burdens will actually serve to interfere with caregiving roles
served (or potentially served) by the defendant - especially when they strip
resources (time, liberty, and money) from the defendant that might otherwise
be allocated toward caregiving functions.
The preceding discussion shows only that legislators need not have
necessarily adopted an ex post view of family ties benefits and an ex ante view
of family ties burdens. Moreover, since legislatures and scholars have not
looked at these benefits and burdens systematically as designed to be offsetting, critical and independent analysis is warranted.
B.

Revisiting the Costs ofFamily Ties Benefits

When we analyzed family ties benefits in our companion article, we
scrutinized the plausible justifications for securing the state's aid to help the
family. 14 1 There, we highlighted how critical it is to appreciate how the family
both molds the individual and reduces the state's burdens. 142 We recognize
that the institution of the family helps create and fashion our individual
identities, our "historical," 143 "constitutive,"' 144 or "situated"'145 selves that
depend heavily on our families and our familial associations for survival and
sustenance. 146 Moreover, since the state cannot or will not live in accordance
with what Plato's Republic idealizes for the "guardian class" - no private
families with all children being held in common 147 - the state recognizes the
benefits of keeping families together and solvent. This is a crude way of
thinking about the matter, to be sure. But it has a grain of truth; the state
simply cannot afford to provide all the services families routinely provide
relatively efficiently and effectively, so it "subcontracts" such work to the
family and "pays" it accordingly with special protection. Families cannot

141

Id. at 1187-90.

142 Id. at

1188.

143See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS
16 (1993).
144 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L.
REv. 959, 961 (1992).
145 See MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE

200 (1999); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage,81 VA.

L. REv. 2045, 2050 (1995).
146 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78

N.Y.U. L. REv. 144, 174 (2003).
147See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 158 (G. R. F. Ferrari ed., Tom Griffith trans., 2000).
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provide caregiving services completely for free, and can rightfully demand that
the state subsidize the hard work of helping children "take their place as
responsible, self-governing members of society. 1' 48 The state helps itself
when it subcontracts cheaply the "formative project of fostering the capacities
for democratic and personal self-government" 149 and leaves it in generally
reliable hands.
Despite the recognition the family's caregiving role properly warrants, and
the risk of irrelevance and illegitimacy that states incur when they fail to treat
persons as constituted selves, we ultimately concluded that general arguments
rooted in communitarian political theory were insufficient to underwrite
special treatment of the family in the criminaljustice system. 150 In particular,
we noted how these benefits on account of familial status cause risks of
inequality, gender bias, inaccuracy, and more crime. 151 Consequently, we
expressed hesitation and skepticism toward the benefits distributed on the basis
of family status throughout the criminal justice system.15 2 It is, after all, a
basic liberal principle that punishment must be meted out fairly and accurately,
153
without fear or favor for those of different statuses.
The reasons for our skepticism toward the distribution of family ties benefits
inform our approach to thinking about family ties burdens. Specifically, we
must address whether and to what degree the normative considerations we
identified earlier in connection with families ties benefits - patriarchal
domination and gender bias, inaccuracy, inequality, and crime-creation - apply
in the context of family ties burdens. But because we are also looking at the
creation of criminal liability (as opposed to exemptions or benefits), we must
also say more about the liberal minimalism that informs our view of the proper
construction of criminal liability in a liberal democracy.
Let us begin with the framework used for assessing family ties benefits and
how it translates to the context of burdens. One can see relatively quickly that
two of these considerations - crime-creation and inaccuracy - are mostly
inapplicable in the context of family ties burdens. In other words, unlike
family ties benefits, family ties burdens rarely trigger concerns that they will
create more misconduct or impede the accurate prosecution of the guilty and

148 Linda C. McClain, Care as a Public Value: Linking Responsibility, Resources, and
Republicanism, 76 CmI.-KENT L. REv. 1673, 1674 (2001).

149 Linda C. McClain, Negotiating Gender and (Freeand Equal) Citizenship: The Place

of Associations, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 1569, 1569 (2004); see also MARTHA ALBERTSON
FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH, at xviii (2004). Although space constraints prevent us

from giving the subtle and important work of McClain and Fineman their due, we think it
important to give a flavor of this form of argument.
50 See Markel, Collins & Leib, supra note 3, at 1226-27.
'5'

Id. at 1190-1200.

152 Id. at 1190.

113 id. at 1195-98.
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the exoneration of the innocent.1 54 Although it may be possible that these two
costs will be implicated by a hypothetical burden which we have not identified
here, we do not see them as generally applicable in the case of burdens and do
not think it would be appropriate to criticize family ties burdens along these
55
dimensions, as was justified generally in the case of family ties benefits.'
Two of the normative considerations we identified earlier do seem generally
relevant when analyzing family ties burdens: inequality (and its relationship to
56
morally arbitrary discrimination) and the related issue of gender bias.'
Notice that although inequality and gendered effects of a neutrally-drawn
criminal justice regulation would not come within the ambit of our discussion
- for family ties burdens as we define them must facially discriminate against
family status - they are normatively relevant in judging the viability of any
particular burden drawn on the basis of family status. So even though
omissions liability, bigamy, and nonpayment of child support law are, for
example, written in gender neutral terms, once they are identified as facially
discriminatory against family members, it is appropriate to ask under our
model whether they have effects that reinforce gender stereotypes.
1.

Inequality and Discrimination

In many contexts, family ties burdens risk treating similar conduct unequally
- and affirmative discrimination against the family is hard to justify. For
example, incest prohibitions affecting consensual sexual relations among
adults restrict liberties that would otherwise be unregulated and generally
protected.' 57 Nonpayment of debt becomes a criminal offense in the context of
child support while it remains a civil action in most others.' 58 Although it is
obvious that through the exaction of burdens we are often seeking to protect
vulnerable potential victims, the tool of punishing otherwise noncriminal
conduct on the basis of familial status alone is surely worth scrutinizing more
154 That is not entirely accurate. In cases where family ties burdens are liability-creating
statutes on the basis of status - such as bigamy, incest, or nonpayment of child support they are creating a new class of criminals: persons without family status engaged in this
conduct would not be criminals. But this kind of criminogenesis is different from the way
in which some of the family ties benefits created incentives to perpetrate misconduct that
would be punishable regardless of the familial connection or status of the defendant. Id. at
1199-1200.
There is also a plausible story to tell in which these burdens increase systematic
inaccuracy in the criminal justice system. Because proving the elements of these crimes
will often turn family members against one another, it may be harder to achieve truth-telling
by relevant players, increasing judicial error rates. Yet this is not the sort of inaccuracy we
generally had in mind last year; we were not talking about systemic inaccuracy. Id. at 1193-

95.
155Id. at 1193-95, 1199-1200.
156Id. at 1190-93, 1195-98.
151 See supra Part I.C.

158 See supra Part I.F.
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carefully, since it implicates norms of equality and nondiscrimination that a
criminal justice system within a constitutional democracy should embrace. 159
As a general matter, we tend to think that targeting familial status is
generally both an over-inclusive and under-inclusive approach to achieving
sound policy objectives. It may make sense for the criminal justice system to
protect our most vulnerable members of society, but many types of citizens are
vulnerable, and targeting the state-defined family is not a sufficiently narrowly
tailored means to achieve that objective. Nothing about estranged family
members, for example, necessarily renders them especially vulnerable to one
another to justify the imposition of special burdens upon offenders and
potential offenders. Thus, family ties burdens could be overbroad if they
penalized, say, estranged siblings with duties to rescue, support, or supervise.
By contrast, many vulnerable citizens warrant protections the criminal law
currently and irrationally renders unavailable, such as the families of same-sex
couples.1 60 Family ties burdens that do not protect people who would agree to
such protection and such burdens ex ante should be reconfigured to promote
the underlying value of voluntary caregiving relationships.
2. Gender Bias, Heteronormativity, and Repronormativity
Imposing a burden or penalty on an individual in the criminal justice system
solely on the basis of family ties enmeshes the state in a normative dispute
over who counts as family and who does not - and in what the family should
be doing, namely, procreating.
The position the state takes is not merely conventional; it also threatens to
promote a discriminatory and gendered set of policies. Large numbers of
persons who might (justifiably, in our view) see themselves as entitled to
benefit from the imposition of family ties burdens are excluded. When the
state makes choices regarding families, it risks marginalizing persons who
consider themselves family members but are not recognized as such by the
state. In this sense, use of the family as traditionally delineated is an underinclusive (and at times, over-inclusive) mechanism to distribute the tangible
and expressive benefits conferred by the criminal law when it targets persons
with unusual treatment on account of familial status. Although same-sex
coupling is the most obvious example of family-like private ordering that is
often excluded by the criminal law's family ties burdens (triggering the
concern generally labeled "heteronormativity"), 16l grandparents and other

159 See generally Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1421 (2004) (suggesting
that grants of mercy are problematic from the perspective of equal liberty under law).
'10 See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
16l On "heteronormativity," see, for example, Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativityand
FederalTax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REv. 129, 133 (1998).
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relatives routinely create homes that fall outside the criminal law's design for
162
family ties burdens as well.
Several of the family ties burdens also express a clear policy to promote
163
procreation - an orientation some scholars have termed "repronormativity."
To the extent the criminal justice system is engaged in penalizing citizens
criminally to further its repronormative agenda, we think that calls for especial
justification. On the other hand, it is plausible that some family ties burdens
are a useful counterbalance to repronormativity; although the state promotes
having children, the burdens mitigate the effects of subsidizing procreation
through tax and civil policies.
Finally, in certain circumstances, family ties burdens are used in ways that
reinforce gender stereotypes. Although routinely drafted today in genderneutral terms, many statutes imposing family ties burdens raise questions about
gender relations more broadly; and once a family ties burden is identified, it
seems fair game to analyze whether the burden is contributing to gender bias
more systematically.
C.

Uncovering a Structure of Family Ties Burdens: Voluntary Caregiving

Five of the seven family ties burdens we find in the law - omissions liability
for failure to rescue, parental responsibility laws, bigamy, adultery and
nonpayment of child support - reflect a pattern that, to our mind, has not been
sufficiently emphasized. This pattern suggests an internal structure we find
helpful in rethinking family ties burdens in our criminal justice system.
. Specifically, these five burdens occur in the context of relationships
that
have a voluntary or "opt-in" nature, meaning that the individual who faces the
burden imposed by the criminal justice system has consensually entered into
the relationship that serves as the basis of liability for committing or forbearing
from actions that would otherwise be lawful. This is not the case with most
incest statutes which prohibit certain conduct based on relations that are both
voluntarily and involuntarily created, 164 nor is it the case with filial
responsibility statutes, which attach liability to persons who did not consent to
the relationship - though there is, perhaps, some reason to marginalize this

162See generally Laura T. Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.

1 (2005) (suggesting that caregiving performed outside of traditional family contexts can
work to subvert family law's discriminatory ideologies).
163See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and

Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 184 (2001); Martha T. McCluskey, Caringfor Workers,
55 ME. L. REV. 313, 315 (2003); Symposium, The Structures of Care Work, 76 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1389 (2001); cf Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 68
(2002) (acknowledging that "women face social pressures to be mothers"); Sasha Roseneil,
Why We Should Care About Friends: An Argument for Queering the Care Imaginary in
Social Policy, 3 Soc. POL'Y & Soc'' 409, 411 (2004) (rethinking the focus of reproduction

within the heterosexual family as the most significant productive activity and space).
164 See supra Part I.C.
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example in light of the relatively trivial level of enforcement. 65 But the
dominant family ties burdens are imposed on defendants in two kinds of
relationships: spouse-to-spouse and parent-to-child.
Although we do not see this pattern as itself authoritative, we do think it is
illuminating in various ways. First, when family ties burdens are limited to
voluntary relationships, we find the imposition of these burdens more
attractive. The voluntary nature of these obligations takes some of the bite out
of the charge of discrimination: if parties freely choose relationships that
trigger liability after fair notice, liability on the basis of family status seems
more defensible, at least as long as the penalty is proportionate to the
wrongdoing and the reason for imposing the burden can withstand critical
66
scrutiny of the sort we describe below.1
There is a basic trade-off going on: if one wishes to benefit from the ways in
which society privileges building family relationships through institutions of
distributive justice, then one needs to be aware that greater burdens may be
imposed to ensure the discharge of one's caregiving responsibilities.
Moreover, in light of the fact that society confers so much leeway, particularly
to parents, in how persons treat spouses and children, there is a reason to create
a floor of obligations to rescue, support, and supervise. By contrast, extending
family ties benefits only to those who have opted into relationships of
caregiving seems to discriminate more against those who are deprived of the
opportunity to develop those relationships of caregiving in the first place. In
other words, not everyone can choose (or wants to choose) to marry or
procreate - and those who do not make this choice should generally not be
treated disfavorably by the criminal justice system.
To be sure, voluntary relations can be fuzzy at the margins: have we really
chosen our in-laws even if they have not chosen us? Have we really chosen to
have children, when a pregnancy is the result of failed birth control methods?
Still, we think the relatively easy cases of spousal and parent-child
relationships help expose an important insight about appropriate burden
distribution: burdens generally seem more palatable in the context of voluntary
relationships of caregiving.
Additionally, the special obligations some family ties burdens impose can be
understood in terms of signaling theory.' 67 On this view, family ties burdens
are imposed on people who have voluntarily entered into and maintained a
relationship because by their consent to that relationship they are signaling to
others that they are going to be "first responders"; society can then trust them
to look after the people with whom they have created a covenant of caregiving.

165 See supra Part I.G.
166See Larry Alexander, Consent, Punishment, and Proportionality,15 PHIL. & PUB.

AFF. 178, 178 (1986).

167Cf Eic POSNER, LAW AND SociAL NoRMs 24 (2000) (discussing how an actor's
willingness to bear certain costs or consequences can be a way of "establishing or
preserving one's reputation").
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The germ of this idea appears in duty-to-rescue law. Generally, in the absence
of a contractual basis, one has no duty to rescue other people. 168 But as we
explained in Part I, there are widely acknowledged exceptions to this no-duty
principle.' 69 For instance, if Alice is walking by the beach and sees Charlie
drowning, and then waves off Bob, who was also on his way to rescue Charlie,
Alice is then under a special obligation to rescue Charlie. She cannot just walk
away at that point absent a special justification such as a new threat to her
life. 170 The actions of marrying or parenting can be interpreted to create
similar statements about responsibility. When a person enters into a covenant
of care in the form of marriage or parenting, one message that decision signals
to society is that she will be a "first responder" to the person with whom she is
covenanting when that person is in danger.
There is also the notion that those who volunteer to take on the obligations
of a spouse or parent have signaled their willingness to create a relationship of
trust to care for and support the other spouse or child. When someone fails to
rescue, support, or supervise (in the case of minors), there is a breach of that
trust relationship, a breach in which the state has an especial interest since the
state has been effectively waved back by the person opting into the caregiving
1 71
relationship.
It follows, we believe, that if voluntariness matters, then a "family ties
burden" should not be placed on someone who has had a familial status
imposed upon him. Consider siblings: almost no child freely chooses whether
or not to have a sibling; that decision is generally left up to his parents. Given
our particular lens into this issue, it is unsurprising that the law ordinarily does
not impose special obligations upon an individual to take risks on a sibling's
behalf.1 72 Other family relations fall into the same category. Almost no one
freely chooses whether or not to have an aunt, uncle, or cousin, and when
people do take on an unrelated aunt or uncle, the law generally ignores that
73

status. 1

By this logic, it seems clear that some family relationships are involuntary in
the sense that they were not deliberately entered into by the relevant parties.
Filial responsibility laws, which place burdens on adult children to support

See, e.g., Williams v. State, 664 P.2d 137, 139 (Cal. 1983) ("As a rule, one has no
duty [under tort law] to come to the aid of another."); 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER,
168

JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS 874 (3d ed. 2007); LAFAVE, supra note 21, at § 6.2(a).
169 See supra Part I.A.

170 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.

171The metaphor here reaches a bit too far since admittedly the state does not closely
supervise adults, ready to step in at any point as part of its own duty to rescue or support.

Nonetheless, with every marriage or choice to parent, the actors are explicitly or implicitly
stating their intention to care for and support the other person in the relationship.
172

Cf LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 6.2(a)(1) (listing parent/child, ship captain/seaman, and

employer/employee as the most common personal relationships with affirmative duties).
173 Cf id.
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their parents in their dotage, 174 are an example of a family ties burden that is at
odds with the general vein of promoting voluntary caregiving relationships.
That is because children never consented to their relationship with their
parents. Indeed, maybe 75that is why there is so little enforcement in the case of
1
this family ties burden.
The more difficult question is whether there are family relationships that
are, in fact, truly voluntary. At first blush, the most obvious example of a
voluntary relationship would seem to be that of spouses - it is certainly true for
most cultures in this country that no one is forced to marry, and individuals
may freely choose their own partners. 176 To be sure, some human trafficking

victims are coerced into marriage, but that is legal wrongdoing, not an instance
of what we think to be exemplifying marriage's modem nature.17 7 Although
some have argued that social and economic forces render marriage
compulsory, 178 we think such conclusions are generally unpersuasive.

The

strong social and economic pressure to marry does not vitiate the voluntariness
that renders people's decisions their own for the purpose of being responsible
to take on burdens and benefits. Of course, some government policies and
social norms prevent an individual from marrying a person of his or her choice,
and that, to our mind, is an undue intrusion of the state, since it denies
opportunities and expressive benefits on grounds we find morally irrelevant.
As to the parent-child relationship, we see this relationship as generally a
voluntary one, despite whatever pressures exist to reproduce. 179 A mother who
does not wish to parent is legally free to be abstinent or use very reliable birth
control methods - and she may terminate her pregnancy or place a child up for
180
adoption. To be sure, there are complications with this general observation.
174 See supra Part

I.G.

175 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
176 For disturbing counter-examples, consider the allegations made against Warren Jeffs,
who was charged with forcing young girls into marriages with older men, some of whom
were closely related to the brides. See, e.g., John Dougherty, Polygamist Is Indicted in
Assault of a Child, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2008, at A14; John Dougherty & Kirk Johnson,
Sect Leader Is Convicted as an Accomplice to Rape, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A18.
177 See generally HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (2000)

(charting changes in law and its effects on the American institution of marriage).
171See, e.g., Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage,and Lesbian Liberation, 75 TEMP.
L. REV. 709, 777-800 (2002).
179 See Andrews, supra note 42, at 415 ("[P]arents, generally speaking, have made a
choice to parent.
This choice, in most cases, represents voluntary action ....
").
Repronormativity is a real issue and underwrites skepticism about some of the family ties
burdens that seem drawn with a vision about reproduction in mind. See sources cited supra
note 163. Still, we do not think repronormativity implicates the voluntariness of the choice
to procreate for the purposes of burdeningthat choice.
"S0 Some have argued that women have little freedom to reject society's expectations that
they will choose to mother. See, e.g., BARTHOLET, supra note 36, at 35 ("Women are taught
from birth that their identities are inextricably linked with their capacity for pregnancy and
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For example, fathers have long been forced by courts to parent against their
will in the sense that they are subject to child support obligations even if they
take affirmative steps to avoid fatherhood. 181 Still, for the most part, these
complications are indicative of the exceptions, not the general case. Most
parents want and choose to have children. This is not to say the laws that
attach to parents as family ties burdens are always justified. Rather, the fact
that these relationships are usually voluntary helps us understand the
underlying structure of burden allocation by the criminal justice system.
D.

Overcoming Family Status Through a Focus on Voluntary Caregiving

Notwithstanding the ambiguities that might attach in particular situations
regarding whether a familial relationship is voluntary, using voluntariness
rather than familial status as a basis for distributing obligations is initially quite
attractive. Indeed, using voluntariness as a criterion helps us solve the underand over-inclusive problem that family status alone triggers. Importantly, it
allows us to encompass those who view themselves as obligated to others
through their own choices and actions regardless of the delineations of an
"acceptable" family established by the state. Thus, same-sex partners,
unmarried heterosexual partners, grandparents caring for extended family
members and even platonic or polyamorous friends living together in a
committed caregiving relationship are all engaged in voluntary relationships.
They may both want and warrant the protections and expressive benefits of
burdens solely allocated on the basis of family ties in our current policy
environment.
Yet how can one go about limiting the extension of such burdens that the
state is expected to prosecute with its criminal justice resources? Can a child
choose his third closest friend from kindergarten as the person to whom he
owes a special obligation of protection? If he does, should scarce criminal
justice resources be used to reinforce that obligation? We need answers for
both who decides and by what criteria a particular relationship should be
deemed a voluntary relationship in which the party is willing to assume
obligations toward another and for which the law is willing to intervene.
Moreover, we also need answers to whether an obligation can be imposed even
in the absence of a voluntary relationship.
childbirth and that this capacity is inextricably linked with mothering."); Robson, supra note
178, at 814. Others may perceive a religious obligation to procreate and parent despite their
desire otherwise.
181See Ethan J. Leib, A Man's Right to Choose: Men Deserve Voice in Abortion
Decision, 28 LEGAL TIMEs 60, 60 (2005) [hereinafter Leib, Man's Right]. Although it is
undoubtedly true that most "deadbeat" fathers are not individuals who had children against
their will, in the sense that they attempted to use birth control, had semen stolen from them
in a sexual act without vaginal penetration, or were encouraged in sexual situations by
partners that were dishonest about their fertility status. It is still likely true that many fathers
have support obligations to children they affirmatively would have chosen not to have were
the reproductive freedom choice solely within their discretion.
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In our view, voluntariness as a stand-alone criterion is insufficient for
assessing whether it is just and attractive to impose or enhance criminal
penalties on the basis of a particular relationship. When assessing criminal
liability, we suggest that voluntariness be used in conjunction with whether the
relationship included an obligation of some form of caregiving. Our sense is
that many sorts of people assume these caregiving roles and not all of them are
familial in nature. Roommates, for example, might choose to adopt an ethos of
mutual care over a period of time. If that relationship is freely entered into and
maintained by individuals capable of informed and intelligent consent, 182 we
do not see why they should not be able to enter into the compacts of care
similar to the ones that presumptively characterize spousal or parental
relationships.18 3 But they should not necessarily be required to adopt all the
obligations the law ascribes to parents either. One roommate may only choose
to undertake a duty to perform easy rescues while the other might undertake
obligations of financial support and a duty to rescue. Friends or roommates
should be able and encouraged to create obligations that are capable of both
being scaled in size or intensity and enforced through threat of criminal
sanction in some cases.
If we are going to recognize caregiving
responsibilities through the criminal law, they should not be restricted to ones
that are familial.
That said, we do think there are meaningful differences between a spousal or
parental duty of care and the additional covenants of care we are prepared to
recognize. One's familial status qua spouse or parent may be presumptively
used to establish that the relationship involves voluntarism, where such a
presumption would not be justifiable in the case of roommates. After all, the
act of marriage in our society is usually the product of individual choice; and
the same goes for the choice to have and raise children, generally speaking. In
contrast, the presumption in other relationships would not automatically attach.
In the end, then, familial status would be neither necessary nor sufficient to
justify a family ties burden. For, in our scheme, even a parent might be able to
rebut assignments of family ties burdens by terminating his parental rights and
obligations, such as when the child lives far away with grandparents as his
permanent and legal guardians.
That raises the question of whether voluntary assumptions of responsibility
can be terminated. We think they should be terminable under certain
conditions, depending on the context. In the context of married couples,
divorce would be the appropriate way to opt out of the special duties of
marriage. In the parent-child context, termination of parental rights would be
the appropriate way to opt out of the special duties of parenthood. But it is not

182 The age of the person matters as does the mental competence; we can imagine
excluding from criminal liability those whose competence was below a minimum standard.
183We use "compacts" instead of contracts, because we do not think there must be
bilateral exchange or consideration to make the declaration of intent to care for another
legally binding in this context.
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obvious to us that these potentially costly signaling mechanisms should be the
only ways to break the covenants that trigger the special responsibilities of
voluntary caregiving. Although for the average dyad (whether parent-child or
spouse-spouse), the legal opt-out might not be unduly burdensome, there might
be cases when it seems unfair to require divorce or termination. Perhaps in
exceptional circumstances parties to these special relationships ought to be
able to show they should be deemed "equitably" divorced or terminated for the
purposes of the family ties burdens. One way to determine the bona fides of
these claimants is to see whether they have tried to capture family ties benefits
through either the criminal or the civil system (say, by claiming a dependent
for tax purposes). In such situations, we can envision the rare case when
parties should be saved the pain and cost of an official divorce or termination.
Spousal relationships, however, should not be treated the same as parents'
obligations toward their children. After all, minor children cannot avoid their
own vulnerability. 184 Thus, although letting spouses opt out in their adulthood
does not generally offend a sense of fair play, letting parents ditch their
vulnerable children without their consent (for minors can not really consent by
law) violates the most basic tenets of what many think parents owe their
children.18 5 But that is just another way of specifying why allowing parental
opt-out without termination should be even rarer than allowing spousal opt-out
without divorce.
Nevertheless, just because it should be rare does not mean it must be
categorically proscribed. Indeed, if we are right that voluntary caregiving
underwrites and furnishes justifications for status-based burdens in the criminal
justice system, we should seek ways to narrowly tailor the family ties burdens
to capture only the right kinds of offenders. If we had to give up our children
to good friends for several years because of illness or incapacitation, for
example, the scope of criminally enforceable parental duties would have to be
adjusted though not necessarily eliminated. If a child visits the parent in
prison, it is not wrong to continue to assign the parent an obligation to perform
an easy rescue just because the parent is not the primary caregiver anymore.
On the other hand, the fact that the parent is in prison may be a good basis for
not assigning criminal liability on the basis of nonpayment of support if the
parent has no income or wealth to provide for the child's support.
For most relationships outside of child-rearing, however, we think a registry
could be created in which people opt in and opt out of relationships of

184 One of us has written that an opt-out should be available to fathers before birth under

certain circumstances. See Leib, Man's Right, supra note 181, at 61.

But this is a very

special case, and it presumes a lack of consent on the part of the father of ever entering the
relationship of father-child. Id. Obviously, different concerns are presented when an adult
consents to care for a child and then attempts to withdraw such consent.
185For a provocative discussion of what parents owe their children (which also explains
why parents cannot opt out), see Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as
Fiduciaries,81 VA. L. REv. 2401, 2402 (1995).
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caregiving so long as they provide notice to and secure consent from the
affected parties. 186 This strategy would allow adults to select a discrete
number of additional persons eligible for receiving the adult's responsibility.
If unrelated roommates wanted to sign up they could do so (or create such
compacts as a prerequisite for living with another adult), signaling
commitments of care. If adult children wanted to signal their willingness to
shoulder burdens to care for their parents, then that87would be an option, rather
1
than the requirement it is under a few states' rules.
In short, adopting a voluntarist approach to burden distribution in the
criminal justice system harmonizes well with what we think the system appears
to seek for itself, albeit imperfectly. Moreover, it might provide for a better
intellectual fit with the competing interests of promoting freedom and
autonomy, which are thought by some to undergird the no-duty-to-rescue
pattern of law.' 88 Additionally, the difficulties associated with the under- and
over-inclusive nature of family status can be remedied in large measure by the
use of a registry where one can declare who counts within one's sphere of
accepted responsibility for the purpose of some of the crimes discussed here.
This would strengthen voluntary assumptions of caregiving responsibilities (of
which the family is sometimes a great example) rather than rely upon
inflexible categories based upon antiquarian notions of status.
E.

BringingIt Together: How to Scrutinize a Family Ties Burden

In light of all these various considerations, we propose that family ties
burdens - whether the ones we described in Part I, or some others that might
be contemplated - undergo scrutiny, using a set of normative speed-bumps
designed to track our discussion here. Our general approach is that special
criminal justice burdens based on familial status alone require justification.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, just as we exhibited a tendency to be skeptical toward
particular benefits afforded to the family in the criminal justice system in our
article last year, 189 we are also inclined to protect individuals from burdens
186

For more details on how one such registry could function, see, for example, David L.

Chambers, For the Best of Friends and for Lovers of All Sorts, A Status Other than
Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1347, 1348 (2001). Vermont and Hawaii already have
"reciprocal beneficiary" statutes that cover some of this territory. See HAW. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 572C-1 to -7 (LexisNexis 2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1301-1306 (2002). The
state could create a legal registry to signal who is in one's circle of care, what obligations
one has assumed, and what exposure such information should have to the public beyond law
enforcement.
187 See supra Part I.G.

188See, e.g., Marin Roger Scordato, Understandingthe Absence of a Duty to Reasonably
Rescue in American Tort Law, 82 TUL. L. REv. 1447, 1452-55 (2008). We may disagree

with the no-duty-to-rescue pattern for other reasons, but if we are to have it and its
exceptions as they are, the doctrine should at least be operationalized in a way that better
promotes the underlying interests.
"89 See generally Markel, Collins & Leib, supra note 3.
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based simply on familial status. Because we are sensitive to the caregiving
contributions that might stand in need of protection from the state, however,
we believe that some of the concerns people might have about abandoning
family ties burdens can be addressed through careful drafting that substitutes
attentiveness to voluntary relationships of caregiving in the place of familial
status alone. Thus, our skepticism toward family ties burdens does not entail
eliminating all such burdens. Instead, we propose that such burdens undergo a
searching inquiry framed by what we will call here a "liberal minimalist"
paradigm.
What is liberal minimalism? A liberal minimalist approach to criminal
liability is reflective of two basic, though not uncontested, values. With
respect to the word liberal, we are relying on its roots to connect to a particular
notion of when it is appropriate to use family status as an element of a criminal
law.
Specifically, we deem a burden to pass muster under our first
"liberalism" concern if the relationship which serves as the basis for a family
ties burden is one the defendant freely created through her choice. The consent
is not always explicitly extended, but it may, in some cases, be reasonably
inferred in light of the other options available to the offender. Beyond this first
basic liberal concern, there is also a need for some showing that the
relationship is one of caregiving. Without this additional element, we risk
allowing the criminal justice system's apparatus to be co-opted by mere
contract. 190
A second and more general liberal concern is that a justice system must
allocate liberty to citizens consistent with other persons' liberty, putting the
burden of justification on those who would limit individual liberty.' 91 For this
reason, in designing laws that target family status, one must assess the liberty
interest at stake and how important it is.

190 We should note that one can be a "liberal" with regard to the criminal justice system meaning here, concerned with consent - but status-oriented in other areas of the law, such as
family law and civil law. More importantly, to adopt a moral theory about obligation that is
non-liberal in the context of family and other close relationships does not decide the
question about how the related legal system should be designed. In thinking of institutional
design, the choice about how much to build off voluntarism and how much to build off
relational obligations is very much contingent on context. See Ethan J. Leib, Responsibility
and Social/PoliticalChoices About Choice Or, One Way to Be a True Non-Voluntarist, 25

LAW & PHIL. 453, 456 (2006). For more on building a moral theory of obligation
relationally rather than from consent, see Samuel Scheffler, Relationships and
Responsibilities,26 PHIL. &PUB. AFF. 189, 195-96 (1997).
191See RAWLS, supra note 133, at 220 ("Each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for
all."); JOHN STUART MILL, The Subjection of Women, in 21 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN
STUART MILL: ESSAYS ON EQUALITY, LAW, AND EDUCATION 259, 262 (John M. Robson ed.,
1984) ("[T]he burthen [sic] of proof is supposed to be with those who are against liberty

[and] who contend for any restriction or prohibition....
favour of freedom ....

).

The Lipriori presumption is in
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With respect to minimalism in criminal law (an area of justice that is very
closely connected with liberty interests on account of its power of coercion and
incarceration), we ask if the government has an important or compelling
objective it is trying to achieve through the use of the family ties burden. This
purpose analysis is obviously fraught with controversy, and so in many
situations we usually stipulate to the objective's importance in order to assess
the means used to pursue the ends. This means analysis involves two kinds of
questions: First, has the government narrowly tailored the criminal sanction to
its putative objectives to avoid over- or under-inclusiveness? Second, is there
good reason to believe that use of a family ties burden via criminal sanction is
justified if and when other alternatives (education, advertising, regulation, tort,
92
or contract) could be equally effective in achieving the state's objective?'
These questions are important because criminal sanctions that use coercion to
limit liberty are especially costly to both the state and to the offender, and are
subject to error and abuse. For those reasons, we support a principle of
pragmatic frugality both in the drafting of criminal legislation and the amount
of punishment imposed. Punishment should be no more severe than necessary
to achieve the legislature's reasonable interests, and the legislature should
forbear from coercion through criminal sanction when possible. At a relatively
high level of abstraction, this is a principle (also connected to proportionality)
that theorists of many stripes can embrace. 193 While there is much more that
can be said about both these notions of liberalism and minimalism, 194 we do
not wish to stray too far from our subject at hand.
As applied to our project on the use of family status to create criminal
liability, we think the liberal minimalist agenda, coupled with the concerns
about discrimination and gender bias alluded to earlier, 195 trigger a set of
questions for the normative review of the family ties burdens we discussed in
Part I. These questions are similar (though not identical) to the ones asked by

192 The phrase "equally effective" is important. As the criminal law involves powers of

norm expression, we must carefully assess whether non-criminal alternatives including
social norms carry similar expressive force.
193 Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth
Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REv. 571, 576 (2005);
Youngjae Lee, The ConstitutionalRight Against Excessive Punishment,91 VA. L. REv. 677,
709 (2005); Alice Ristroph, Proportionalityas a Principleof Limited Government, 55 DUKE
L.J. 263, 270 (2005).

194 See Husak, supra note 12, at 207 (stating that a condition of minimalist theory is the
use of criminal law as a last resort); Nils Jareborg, Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima
Ratio), 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 524 (2005). See generally DOUGLAS HusAK,
OVERCRIMNALIZATION (2008) (offering a set of constraints designed to slow the growth of
the criminal law).
'95 See supra Part II.B.2.
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courts in liberal democracies when they review legislation alleged to impair a
196
fundamental liberty or to rely on a suspect basis for classification.
We must determine as a threshold matter whether the state is in fact
targeting a defendant for prosecution (or enhanced punishment) based on his
family status. 197 But in the case of the seven burdens discussed in Part I, we
can readily conclude that family status is relevant and necessary for the
liability the defendant faces. Thus, when it comes to the application of the
framework in Part III, we will dispense with this threshold question and instead
focus on the rest of the framework developed here, as follows.
First, does the burden fall only on persons who have voluntarily created a
relationship of care? Second, does the burden impinge on some liberty that
should be recognized as deserving of protection in a liberal society? Third, are
the laws drafted in such a way as to be narrowly tailored to the governmental
objectives? Fourth, are there non-criminal measures that could be equally
effective in achieving the governmental objectives, assuming the governmental
objectives were sufficiently compelling or important to be vindicated through
law? Finally, in what ways do the existing family ties burdens contribute to
concerns about gender, inequality, and discrimination?
This kind of scrutiny will not, to be sure, resolve all questions. Inevitably
disputes about the strength of competing claims will persist - and means
testing will implicate empirical evidence, which is often indeterminate or
simply non-existent. But, as we hope we achieved in our systematic inquiry
into family ties benefits, 198 we hope to do some important work in helping to
clarify the problems under consideration and alerting lawyers, policymakers,
and judges to some of the potentially hidden costs of family ties burdens in the
criminal justice system.

1II.

APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK TO FAMILY TIES BURDENS

In this Part, we undertake some analysis of the various family ties burdens
identified in Part I. As we acknowledged at the very beginning, each of the
burdens we have identified requires its own long-form analysis, taking account
of its particularized context and its systemic effects on the justice system and
relevant family members. Accordingly, all we endeavor to do in this Part is
furnish a basis for how our framework contributes to a more comprehensive

See, e.g., Sauv6 v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, 520-21,
2002 SCC 68 (Can.) (analyzing felon disenfranchisement law by examining the legitimacy
of the law's objective and the proportionality of the means used to achieve the objective).
197 If the burden was not imposed on individuals based on their family status, it is not a
family ties burden in the sense we mean, even if the policy ends up substantially hurting
those with families. Here we refer the reader to our earlier stated conviction that most
problems that have a disparate impact on families are best regarded as problems that need to
be addressed in the criminal justice system generally, regardless of whom they affect. See
supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
198 Markel, Collins & Leib, supra note 3.
196
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accounting in thinking through each family ties burden. Our framework
recommends caution about the bulk of the family ties burdens we have
identified and urges creativity in redesigning these burdens to make them less
discriminatory.
A.

Omissions Liabilityfor Failureto Rescue

The question of omissions liability for failure to rescue is a difficult one, and
the analysis seems to vary according to the kind of family status relationship at
issue.
1.

Parental Duties to Rescue Children

Let us begin with the most common scenario where we see liability
imposed: prosecutions of parents who fail to protect their children. 199 What are
the rationales for imposing criminally-sanctioned obligations on parents to
rescue their children when the children are imperiled and when the parents can
easily rescue them? Imposing liability on parents for failing to protect their
children seems to vindicate a compelling state interest: the need to protect
children from harm. 200 It is in this scenario that our concerns about fostering
the caregiving capacity of individuals reach their zenith. This concern for
protecting children from harm, however, seems to require that anyone with the
chance to make an easy rescue should be under such an obligation. After all,
young children are often helpless to protect themselves from harm;
responsibility must seem to fall on the shoulders of those adults in the position
to be a child's only lifeline. But this is not how the laws of rescue are drafted
201
as a general matter.
So the objective of restricting the duty to rescue a child to her custodial
figure has to do, at least in part, with an expressive function about the kind of
commitment made by a parent to the world regarding the child. The law seems
to be saying that parents who have voluntarily chosen to retain the benefits
conferred by the parent-child relationship should endure some burdens in
return, and ensuring the safety of a child entrusted to the parent's care
represents the most fundamental of reasonable burdens. When a person opts to
have children, the parent is signaling to others that the parent will be a first
responder.
In this respect, imposing a duty to rescue is analogous to the imposition of
liability on those people who have "waved away" others. 20 2 The goal, of
course, is not to tie an albatross around the neck of every parent. Omissions

199See supra Part I.A.
200

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) ("[T]he family itself is not

beyond regulation in the public interest .... [T]he state has a wide range of power for
limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare . ").
201See supra Part I.A.
202See supra Part I.C.
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liability does not create a responsibility to rescue against unreasonable risks.20 3
It operates only to ensure that when a parent is in a reasonable position to
20 4
protect the child from imminent harm, the parent takes those measures.
a.

Voluntary Caregiving and Liberty Interests

In the case of having children, it is fair to conclude in most circumstances
that imposing obligations to rescue one's children (defined as minors for whom
one has legal custody) is consistent with voluntary caregiving, though the
question of what justifies a status-based duty to rescue is a bit more
complicated than what grounds the duty in a spouse-like relation. Some
parents might resist the ascription of voluntariness to their actions or to the
results of their actions. 20 5 As a general matter, however, we view the risk of
pregnancy as a risk people voluntarily assume when they engage in sexual
relations, even when using birth control. The question is whether the risk of
pregnancy should also be conflated with the risk of being conscripted into
parental obligations that are vindicated through the criminal law.
If women have exclusive control over the decision to abort or give the baby
up for adoption, that makes the inference more compelling that mothers who
raise children should bear responsibility for caring for the child, at least as far
as the criminal law is concerned. To be sure, the absence of either of these
alternatives would undermine the moral basis for ascribing a burden of care on
a person. So too would it be inappropriate to establish omissions liability on
sperm or egg donors who make clear that they are renouncing future interests
to those accepting the sperm or eggs.
As to men: if men who have taken reasonable precautions in terms of birth
control - or who have reasonably relied on express precautions taken by the
woman - lack control over the choice to abort or give the baby up for adoption,
then it is inaccurate to say that they are consenting to the obligations associated
with parenting, unless there is some other way they can categorically renounce
their parental rights and obligations. Thus, if one biological parent objects to
becoming a parent over the wishes of the other parent, it might be a basis for
releasing the objecting parent from the family ties burden. 20 6 But in the
203

LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 6.2.

204

Id.

For example, a man may volunteer to have sex but not consent to have a child from
that sex. See Sherry F. Colb, When Oral Sex Results in a Pregnancy: Can Men Ever Escape
205

Paternity Obligations?, FfNDLAW,

Mar.

9,

2005,

http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/

20050309.html. Or one may claim, under the circumstances of rape or stolen sperm, that he
did not even volunteer to have procreative sex. See Leib, Man's Right, supra note 181, at
60.
206 One's response here hinges on whether one believes a person who takes precautions
against pregnancy still assumes the risk of being commandeered into parenting by the state
and the other partner. It might be a remote but foreseeable risk, thus the question then is

whether it is just to impose this consequence on the person. Perhaps one should be able to
insure against the risk, though it raises moral hazard issues. Professor Collins is of the view
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absence of such evidence, it is not unreasonable to place a burden on parents
who, through biology or adoption, assume this caregiving role. Indeed, to the
extent there are borderline cases, the default should be to burden the parent,
which may operate to help the vulnerable child and be a substantial ex ante
benefit.
Might the consent argument founder if we ask whether parents specifically
consented to taking care of a child with illnesses or behavioral problems? The
consent still exists so long as there is a procedure by which parents can
terminate their parental rights to the state through voluntary relinquishment.
Still, because not all children live with their biological parents,20 7 the use of
traditional family status to limit omissions liability is a problem. A child could
reside with another relative, such as a grandparent, a family friend, or a foster
family, to name just a few possible permutations. 20 8 Alternatively, as we
explain below, there may be homosexual couples or gay and straight persons
involved in polyamorous contexts who care for the child, but their parenting
status may not be jointly recognized by the state. 20 9 There is also the difficult
question about the caregiving responsibilities that occur outside the home in
schools, religious institutions, and sports leagues. 2 10 In all these sites, adults
and adolescents with supervisory roles play an increasingly important role in
the rearing of children. 21' Therefore, limiting omissions liability to biological
parents and their children has the potential to be under-inclusive, in that it does
not recognize non-traditional caregiving relationships.
Using only an opt-in registry system of the sort described in Part II seems
unsatisfactory when it comes to duties to rescue children. Parents should be
presumptively required to rescue and care for their children who are after all
without resources to avoid their own vulnerability and cannot sufficiently
protect themselves from harm through other means. However, the underinclusiveness (and in certain circumstances, over-inclusiveness) of biological
parentage necessitates a test that focuses on something other than biological
parenthood in the context of duties to rescue children: does the individual in
that a man should be on the hook unless his sperm was effectively purloined through
deception or coercion. Professors Leib and Markel think a man should not be
commandeered into parenting obligations by the criminal law's apparatus if he takes due
care prior to and during sex. Leib and Markel believe, for example, if the male discusses the
issue with his partner in advance of sexual relations, and they agree to use reliable birth
control methods, then if birth control fails the man will not be responsible for more than his
fair share of an abortion.
207 June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertaintyat the Coreof Family
Identity, 65 LA. L. REv. 1295, 1330 (2005).
208 Indeed, the child at issue in Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1962),
resided with a family friend at the time of his death. Id. at 309.
209 See infra Part III.A. 1.c.

210 See generally Laura Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833
(2007) (arguing that much of childhood takes place in spaces outside the home).
211 Id. at 843-44.
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question stand in the position of a primary caregiver to the child? If the
answer to this multi-factored question is yes, 2 12 then that individual can face
liability for failure to rescue on an omissions liability theory absent any
relevant and compelling excuse or justification. 213 It is important to note that
more than one individual could fall into this category - for example, the
mother, father, and grandparent of the child, assuming they all live in the same
home. This test would also avoid the over-inclusiveness problem of relying
solely on biology. There might be situations where a biological parent has
parental rights terminated, and in those situations, we think (and the law
concurs) there should be no duty to rescue under the criminal law.
Several options exist for dealing with under- and over-inclusiveness and the
use of presumptions or registries. First, one could entirely decouple omissions
liability in this context from parental status entirely. While we do not embrace
this position, we recognize that if we abolished the established linkage between
parental status and omissions liability, that would serve as a default rule that
might spur use of the registry and at the same time de-center the role of parents
in our quest to ensure the safety of children. Under this rule, family units may
choose to require an opt-in as a precondition for hiring nannies and babysitters;
private associations such as neighborhood groups or churches might require
opt-ins of members to signal that this is an especially caring community. The
registry would effectively create an easier method than exists now to facilitate
a private ordering regime that the state could monitor for purposes of
prosecuting omissions cases.
Alternatively, one could abolish the link between omissions liability and
status, and instead simply require all primary caregivers (regardless of status)
to face omissions liability.2 14 This second option creates a baseline where
liability for all primary caregivers is created (as opposed to a baseline of no
liability for anyone in the first situation); it would also preserve an opt-in
registry for others. Although we generally like this approach, there are some
212 In establishing the criteria to answer this question, legislators, prosecutors, or courts
may want to consider a variety of factors including: co-residence between defendant and
minor; whether the defendant provides financial support to the child; and whether the
defendant has formally terminated parental rights, or instead made statements to the public
or the government regarding the relationship for purposes such as taxes or other government
benefits. On the features that generally trigger legal recognition of parenthood, see David
D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and
Social Conceptions of Parenthood,54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 132-43 (Supp. 2006).
213 The other aspects of the omissions liability doctrine should attach; for example, the

rescue has to be one that is actually achievable and does not pose undue risks to the rescuer.
LAFAVE, supra note 21, §6.2(c).
214 Cf Carol Sanger, A Case for Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1311, 1311-12

(2006) (discussing marriages based on contract law, as opposed to status-based statutes);
Edward A. Zelinsky, DeregulatingMarriage: The Pro-MarriageCase for Abolishing Civil
Marriage, 27 CARDoZO L. REV. 1161, 1164 (2006) (stating that eliminating marriage as a

legal construct would make the status of parties as married or unmarried legally irrelevant).
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difficulties with it. One downside is that requiring a duty to rescue by all
primary caregivers may risk over-inclusiveness, thus dissuading persons from
becoming primary caregivers. Further, it would create some degree of
vagueness because the tests for determining who is a primary caregiver will be
hard to apply in some borderline cases.
A third option is another hybrid approach to reduce problems of underinclusiveness. This option would, first, retain the status-based duty for parents
as a strong presumption that is rebutted only with the termination of parental
rights. Second, it would impose potential omissions liability on all other
primary caregivers. Third, it would create an opt-in registry for all others. Our
own view is that this third option is probably the most feasible and attractive in
part because it involves only an incremental adjustment from the current
practice of most jurisdictions. There is not much difference between the
second and third option, but the presumption of parent-based duties to rescue
makes it arguably cheaper to administer the third option from a social cost
perspective. There is also less need to worry about chilling effects, since under
this regime parents would generally have responsibility for children, whatever
the status of other primary caregivers.
A fourth option is to require all persons to make easy rescues regardless of
parental status. This option violates a thick commitment to voluntarism,
perhaps, but it might be said that the compelling interest underlying the goal saving vulnerable lives through actions that pose little to no risk to the rescuer
- justifies the infringement.
Here we note that such infringements on
voluntarism occur in other contexts where the stakes are high, such as the
lesser evils defense in criminal law,215 compulsory vaccinations, 2 16 and
conscription for armed services. 21 7 And as a practical matter, this option
reflects the prevailing norm by which most persons actually do undertake
"easy rescues." 218
Even if we can agree on the scope of duty attaching to parents and others
regarding obligations to rescue minor children, we must also consider whether
such obligations persist with children who are no longer minors. Should their
primary caregivers still owe them a duty to rescue? If we take the fourth
approach - by which we impose general duties to rescue - then the answer is
yes. But two of us (Leib and Markel) believe that if we take any of the three
approaches that focus on the relationship between adult caregivers and
children, then it makes sense to recognize that adult children typically stand in
a different position than minor children: they can both utilize a registry system
and have more options available to remove themselves from a dangerous

215 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985).
216

Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905).

217 Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 854-55
(1984).
218 See Hyman, supra note 21, at 656.
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situation. 219 In addition, the dynamics of the relationship may be very different
with an adult child. It may seem justifiable for parents to wish to sever a
relationship with a child who has committed a heinous crime, or even
victimized his parents, for example, whereas we would not allow parents of a
minor child to walk away from their obligations to that child because of the
child's misconduct unless they were prepared to terminate their parental rights.
On the other hand, if an adult child were ill or incapacitated in some way, it
does not seem unfair to require that the parental status-based or caregiverbased duty to rescue should persist into adulthood. Professor Collins, by
contrast, believes the parental duty to rescue one's child should persist into
adulthood unless the parent has terminated his or her rights on grounds such as
having been victimized by the child's criminal activity.
b.

Minimalism and Means Analysis

As to whether there are equally effective non-criminal alternatives available
to the imposition of omissions liability, there are several options worth
considering. Many people would say that a parent's love and the social norms
about being a Good Samaritan would mean that any legal remedy is
unnecessary. But we often have criminal sanctions prohibiting or requiring
conduct that would otherwise be obvious and attractive to most people; thus,
the criminal law and its concomitant sanction may be used to deny a
defendant's claim that he was denied fair notice of how he was expected to act
220
in a situation where the polity would find his conduct worthy of reproach.
Still, couldn't a tort remedy enunciate the same requirement of responsible
behavior here? It might, but chances are that it will be less effective. First,
relying on the tort remedy here may be insufficient when there might not be a
plaintiff to bring a claim against a parent who fails to rescue a child. Second,
the parent might be judgment proof, which would on the margins give those
parents inadequate incentives to monitor or maintain the care of their children.
Thus, the criminal sanction here may serve both to educate the public about the
219 We leave aside for now whether the age of majority for this purpose should be
dropped from eighteen to a lower age, such as sixteen.
220 There is a problem with this rationale: it might be said about any norm of responsible

behavior; there really is not a single unified theoretical account that adequately explains
what the boundaries of criminal law are. See Antony Duff, Theories of Criminal Law, in
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward Zalta ed., Fall ed. 2008),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112008/entries/criminal-law/.
Still, that most spouses
will comply is not a good reason to do without the law. Will the law "crowd" out otherwise
trust-based conduct, as some have suggested? It is hard to see how it would, even if there is
some value in compliance outside the law. For a discussion of the "crowding" thesis and its
rejection, see Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries,86 WASH. U. L. REv. (forthcoming Feb.
2009) (manuscript at 59-64, on file with author), and see also Frank Cross, Law and Trust,
93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1545 (2005) ("Whatever the intuitive appeal of the claims that
legalization undermines trust, they cannot be sustained once they are subjected to scrutiny
and empirical testing.").
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obligation parents have toward children and to effectively punish parents for
failing to live up to the obligations that accompany the raising of children.
When a parent fails to rescue a child under the restrictive conditions that make
one eligible for criminal sanction, the parent is making a condemnable choice
and is worthy of punishment for that breach of trust described above. The
criminal sanction also is appropriate to ensure that parents do not skimp on
their responsibilities because they know they might not be attractive tort
defendants under existing law.
c.

Gender, Inequality, and Discrimination

Even if omissions liability based on a parent's failure to rescue passes both
our voluntariness and means tests, we need to acknowledge that imposing
liability on a parent for failing to protect his child has the potential to
perpetuate inequality and discrimination. In those jurisdictions where certain
groups are prohibited from marriage and adoption, failure-to-rescue laws
facially discriminate against families headed by homosexual couples or
polyamorous unions.
For example, imagine a state that does not permit homosexual couples to
adopt. 221 Adult X might nonetheless formally adopt a child, but X's longstanding partner, Y, who may have informally taken on a parental role to the
minor, will not be under the duty to rescue the child absent some contract or
other basis for omissions liability as discussed in Part 1.222 While this rule
discriminates against Y on the basis of Y's lack of state-recognized family
status, the person who is harmed or left at risk by this discrimination is the
minor child. 223 This is just one way in which state rules based on family status
22 4
can risk arbitrary and unintended harms against children.
Because protecting minors from harm in the context of "easy rescues" is a
compelling interest of the state, even a state that does not grant homosexual
couples adoption rights should make available a registry by which individuals
may volunteer to take on a duty to rescue. Getting "registered" might be a prerequisite that adoption agencies require of couples like X and Y to ensure that
the minor child is in a secure home. If Y were not willing to register, that
221 Mississippi prohibits "[a]doption by couples of the same gender." MISS. CODE ANN. §
93-17-3(5) (West 2007). Florida goes further and prohibits all "homosexual[s]" from

adopting, whether coupled or not. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 2005). However,
about half the states now "permit same-sex couples to raise children together through
second-parent adoptions or through entry into marriage or a marriage-like union." Meyer,
supra note 212, at 135.
222See supra Part I.A.

223That is not to deny that ex ante Y may feel denigrated on the basis of sexual
orientation discrimination.
224 Of course, some traditionalists might argue that children are harmed when entrusted
to the care of homosexual couples or those in polyamorous unions. E.g., Press Release,
Christian Inst., Blair's Gay Adoption Plans Will Harm Children (May 7, 2002),
http://www.christian.org.uk/pressreleases/2002/may-7_2002.htm.
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might be a good information-forcing device relevant to X's choice to adopt the
minor individually or to continue in a relationship with Y. But in cases like
this, where Y cannot "enjoy" the burden of omissions liability through a default
rule that establishes a status-based relationship of obligation, we recognize that
the class of Y-like persons may think that they are being unfairly burdened by
the criminal justice system, while not deriving any of the legal benefits
currently afforded to other parents both inside and outside the criminal justice
system.
In addition to concerns about inequality and discrimination, we are also
worried about how prosecutorial practices regarding omissions statutes are
used in a way that may perpetuate gender stereotypes. 225 The first concern is
that focusing on voluntarily undertaken caregiving relationships might have a
chilling effect that exacerbates gender inequalities operating in the current
caregiving practices. In her recent article, Professor Melissa Murray observed
that allowing nonparental caregivers to have rights or authority over a child
might deter parents from structuring care networks comprised of nonparental
caregivers. 226 In a comment to us, Professor Murray suggests the same
concerns might attend a policy that extends criminal liability to those who
voluntarily provide care. This would further insulate families and caregiving
within the private sphere, emphasizing caregiving as a "private" (and
227
presumably, more female) responsibility.
With respect, we think most parents, male and female, would be pleased to
know that more caregivers for their children could face omissions liability
because that would redound to the benefit and safety of their children. Indeed,
to the extent that people are aware of broader omissions liability, it might make
them more inclined to separate from their children under certain conditions and
view caregiving as a task for the government or non-governmental
organizations. 228 In other words, while we understand Professor Murray's

The fact that a mother is charged in the failure-to-protect scenario is a powerful
example of the "mother-blaming" phenomenon that affects not only our legal institutions,
225

but also our cultural norms about parenting. As Professor Becker states, "mothers are
expected to be much better and more powerful parents than fathers, always putting their
children's needs above their own and protecting their children from all harm." Mary E.
Becker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive Families: Social Support Systems,
Custody Outcomes, and Liabilityfor the Acts of Others, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 13,
15 (1995); see also JANE SwIGART, THE MYTH OF THE BAD MOTHER: THE EMOTIONAL
REALITIES OF MOTHERING

6 (1991); Naomi Cahn, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and

the Dilemmas of Criminalization,49 DEPAUL L. REV. 817, 822 (2000).
226 See Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Refraining the Legal Understandingof
Caregivingand Caregivers,94 VA. L. REv. 385,450 (2008).
227 We are grateful to Professor Murray for alerting us to this point.
228 Cf Carol Sanger, Separatingfrom Children, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 375, 441 (1996)
(discussing the role law has played in changing attitudes towards mother-child separations
over time); Erik Eckholm, Older Children Abandoned Under Law for Babies, N.Y. TIMES,
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concerns in the context of the extension of rights or benefits to non-parental
caregivers, we think that in the context of obligations to children by nonparental caregivers this deterrent effect is unlikely to be realized, except to the
extent that some non-parental caregivers might be worried about their exposure
to criminal omissions liability. But even in this context, this anxiety is
misplaced since it is likely that omissions liability would already attach based
on some of the other traditional bases for omissions liability discussed in Part
1.229

The second gender-related worry is that prosecutions based on omissions
liability disproportionately target women. Indeed, women are more likely to
bear the brunt of such prosecutions simply because they are more often the
custodial parent. 230 Further, women are commonly thought to be held by the
public to a higher standard of care in child rearing. 231 Naomi Cahn has argued:
"Cultural middle-class norms expect all women to be primarily responsible for
their children. The criminal justice system supports this norm by criminalizing
the abusive and neglectful behavior of parents, penalizing mothers particularly
232
harshly."
We also cannot ignore the linkage between prosecutions for failing to
protect a child and domestic violence. It is important to acknowledge that in
many cases where children are being battered, a parent (usually the mother)
may be the victim of battering as well. 233 To be sure, in particular situations it
might be a male father who is battered, and our approach to omissions liability
does not hinge on the precise identity of the defendant qua mother. But the
general point here is that the adult victims of violence may have few available
options, from their perspective, to remove their children from an abusive
situation.234 They may (correctly) perceive that attempts to leave will escalate
the violence. 235 Additionally, they may have no economic options in terms of

Oct. 3, 2008, at A21 (showing parents abandoning children well past infancy when they are
promised immunity from prosecution for neglect).
229 See supra Part I.A.

230 See Nancy S. Erickson, Battered Mothers of Battered Children: Using Our
Knowledge of Battered Women to Defend Them Against Charges of Failure to Act, in IA
CURRENT PERSPECTIVES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES: CHILDREN AND

FAMILIES: ABUSE AND ENDANGERMENT 197, 199 (Sandra Anderson Garcia & Robert Batey
eds., 1991).
231 See sources cited supra note 225.

Cahn, supra note 225, at 822.
233 See Bernardine Dohrn, Bad Mothers, Good Mothers, and the State: Children on the
Margins, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 3 (1995) (discussing domestic violence and
child abuse as strong predictors of each other).
234 Cf Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 2003) (disapproving of a city
agency's practice of removing children from a custodial parent based on a parental failure to
prevent the child from witnessing domestic violence).
235 See Becker, supra note 225, at 19.
232
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being able to find housing or a job that will provide sufficient income to
236
support a family.
These issues are weighty and important, and thus, we need to consider
practical options to help mitigate the potential disparate impact of omissions
liability. As a policy matter we should partner any attempts to hold parents
accountable for their failure to protect with efforts to make it more viable for
battered spouses to leave abusive partners - for example by ensuring adequate
funding for shelters, job training, and child care resources. 237 The question
remains, however, whether the existence of domestic violence should preclude
prosecuting the parent for failing to protect the child.
Supporters of
prosecutions of passive parents argue that even a parent's status as a victim of
domestic violence cannot categorically excuse a failure to prevent the abuse of
a child.238 Even though abuse may have weakened the mother physically or
mentally, unless she is "literally a hostage," she still has options to protect her
child that are not available to the child itself; young children, after all, are
utterly defenseless and completely dependent upon adults for their
239
protection.
In cases involving domestic violence where prosecution may be appropriate
because the parent did have some protective options, there should be strict
limitations on when the state can seek to impose liability. First, the focus
needs to be on the easy rescue; we should limit omissions liability to those
circumstances where a parent had prior knowledge of past abuse and had the
practical opportunity to seek help, such as access to a telephone to contact law
enforcement authorities.2 40 Second, parents who fail to protect in a case
involving a fatality should only face the same homicide charge as the actual
killer if they had the same, or worse, mens rea. Otherwise, a lesser, and
perhaps non-homicide, charge is appropriate to reflect the reduced
culpability.2 41 Third, in some cases, no conviction is appropriate if the
defendant had no easy rescue to make based on her own circumstances and
diminished capacity as a battered spouse.

236 Id. at 18.
237

See id. at 31-32 (urging the provision of stronger "safety nets" for women in abusive

situations); Linda Gordon, Feminism and Social Control: The Case of Child Abuse and
Neglect, in WHAT is FEMINISM? 63, 69 (Juliet Mitchell & Ann Oakley eds., 1986).
23 Becker, supra note 225, at 32 (arguing that regardless of abuse, mothers should still
be held responsible for their abuse or neglect of their children and for failing to protect their
children from others' abuse and neglect). Becker further argues that "we must also change
other parts of the social and legal system to make it easier for women to escape abusive
households with their children." Id.
239 See id. at 21.

240 Id. ("The assumption should be that the adult who was not literally a hostage - not
literally coerced at every available second - could have acted to end abuse.").
241 There may be some cases where the more passive parent is just as culpable as the
actual abuser, by providing active encouragement, a weapon, or the like.
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Another option legislatures should consider is adopting a statutory scheme
that recognizes the defendant's omission as a crime, distinct and separate from
a failure to rescue. A separate statutory scheme would better reflect the idea
that there is a meaningful moral distinction between actually inflicting the fatal
blows and, for example, making the mistake of leaving a child alone with an
individual who has been abusive in the past.
2.

Spousal Obligations to Rescue Each Other

Regarding spouses, the following analysis both calls for refinement and
tracks the discussion above. The state's interests in penalizing a failure to
rescue between spouses are: (a) saving human lives in danger; and (b)
affirming the significance of marital obligations.
The problem with the first interest is that the means used here - spousal
obligations to rescue, policed through the criminal law - is woefully underinclusive. The second objective, by contrast, makes more sense. While the
obligation to undertake "easy rescues" is not specifically articulated in many
wedding vows, it reasonably falls under the language often used in those
vows.2 42 Thus, it makes sense to impose the duty to rescue on those who
become vulnerable after they have already made commitments to serve as
caregivers.
The notion undergirding the legal obligation here is that spouses who have
voluntarily chosen to obtain the benefits conferred by marriage should endure
some burdens in return, and facilitating the safety of a spouse is a reasonable
burden. When a person opts to marry, the spouse is signaling to others that she
or he will be a first responder. In this respect, imposing a duty to rescue is
analogous to the imposition of liability on those people who have "waved
away" others. 243 Just as with children, the goal here is not to tie an albatross
around the neck of every spouse. Omissions liability here simply punishes the
breach of trust which marriage creates between the parties to the marriage and
those in the political community around them.
Our normative framework in conjunction with this family ties burden
applies in a similar way as parental duties to rescue children. Even more so
than with children, spouses have already evidenced a strong commitment to
take care of each other, and the duty to undertake an easy rescue is easily
included in that commitment. With respect to minimalism, as with children,
the need to create a spousal obligation seems redundant. While romantic love
may seem to render a legal requirement unnecessary, again, criminal law is
sometimes used to prohibit or require conduct that would otherwise be obvious
and attractive to most people. Finally, as with children, here too reliance on
tort remedies as a substitute seems unhelpful. There might not be a plaintiff to
242 See, e.g., Nina Callaway, Your Wedding Vows: Samples of Wedding Vow Wording,
ABOUT.CoM,

http://weddings.about.com/cs/bridesandgrooms/a/vowwording.htm

traditional wording of vows promising mutual care).
243 See supra Part I.C.

(showing
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bring a claim against a spouse who fails to rescue another spouse (though one
is more likely in this context than in the child context). Moreover, the spouse
might be judgment proof in a civil case involving money damages, and
knowledge of one's inability to pay may marginally encourage spouses to have
inadequate incentives to rescue. Criminal sanctions here may serve to both
educate the public about the obligation spouses have toward each other and to
244
effectively punish spouses for their failure to live up to this obligation.
Any potential prosecution of a person for failing to protect his or her spouse
from harm also has a potentially discriminatory impact: it treats differently
those who cannot, or who choose not to, enter a spousal relationship
sanctioned by the state.245 For example, in most states these laws currently do
not allow homosexual couples to take the same comfort in knowing that
omissions liability is parceled out in a non-discriminatory fashion. One way to
see how this is discrimination is through analogy: if omissions liability were
distributed on the basis of race, such that whites had a duty to rescue their
spouses, but blacks did not, it would clearly send a message devaluing the
spouses of black people. The same is true by restricting omissions liability to
the few family status relationships recognized by the state. Why should a
heterosexual man have an obligation to protect his spouse from harm while a
gay man in a similarly meaningful and voluntary partnership does not when he
and his partner reside in a jurisdiction without same-sex marriage or civil
unions? 246 In both instances, imposing liability serves the same valuable
functions: increasing safety and promoting an ethos of caregiving relations
triggered by voluntary choices. Thus, limiting omissions liability to those in a
state-sanctioned relationship seems plainly under-inclusive - it leaves out those

244 See discussion supra Part III.A.2.

245 See, e.g., People v. Beardsley, 113 N.W. 1128, 1131 (Mich. 1907).

Indeed, some

states have recognized that limiting liability to formal legal relationships would be plainly
under-inclusive. Leet v. State, 595 So. 2d 959, 963 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (concluding
that the live-in boyfriend of a child's mother owed a legal duty to the child to prevent abuse
by the mother after establishing a "family-like relationship" for an extended and indefinite
period); State v. Caton, 739 N.E.2d 1176, 1181 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) ("Whether a person
stands in loco parentis is a factual question. The term does not signify a formal
investiture .... (citation omitted)). We believe all states need to move in this direction and
we have proposed a clear mechanism by which they could do so. See supra Part II.D.
246 In light of the extent of discrimination against gay individuals in this country, we
think it far too risky to hope that courts in all states would extend the same protections and
obligations to individuals in a homosexual relationship. As a point of comparison, states are
split about whether to allow same-sex partners to recover in tort for wrongful death or
infliction of emotional distress, even in those states with domestic partnership laws. D.
KELLY WEISBERG

& SUSAN

MATERIALS 404 (3d ed. 2006).
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who cannot get married because of a plainly troubling moral choice made by
247
the state.
For the most part, we do not have much problem with marriage being an
over-inclusive obligation because divorce is an option by which the obligation
can be terminated. But because marriage is an under-inclusive basis for
imposing omissions liability, we think several options should be explored.
One solution would be to decouple omissions liability from marriage
248
altogether, and instead ask parties to any relationship to register sua sponte.
This would treat all persons the same and without favor. But defaulting to a
rule of no duty-to-rescue in marriage could act like a penalty default rule. On
the one hand, it would probably encourage more people outside of marriage to
think about whom they wish to rescue. On the other hand, it might also add
needless costs associated with persons who by virtue of marriage would
already be willing to undertake a duty to rescue. A better solution, based on
reducing the social costs of the scheme, would be to require duties to rescue in
marriages and to create a registry for all others who want to participate in a
"compact of care" such that they have a duty to perform easy rescues.
Marriages would simply have the implicit term of duty to rescue built into
them and others outside marriage (including those in polyamourous
relationships) could opt into it. This would also allow persons to insist on
seeing evidence of opt-in by another person before they decide to jointly
acquire property, cohabit, or perform caregiving tasks for one another.
Let us be clear: we are not certain that it is good policy to have all these
omissions liabilities in the criminal law. That our normative framework
enables us to justify some forms of imposing liability, if better designed than
they are currently, does not mean that our normative framework requires these
omissions liabilities. But, if we are to have them at all, they must be rendered
consistent with our justificatory apparatus.
247 We note that some civil union laws, such as Vermont's, offer same-sex couples the
same panoply of rights and responsibilities that exist with heterosexual marriages. See VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2002). However, discrimination persists against those involved
in voluntary and committed polyamorous relationships or in non-sexual unions who
nonetheless seek to enter covenants of care with each other. Cf Ethan J. Leib, Friendship &
the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631, 633 (2007) [hereinafter Leib, Friendship](stating that while
other relationships are recognized and protected by the law, friendships receive no such
recogntion); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 191
(2007) (arguing that a failure to recognize friendship impedes the elimination of statesupported gender role expectations).
248 By decoupling omissions liability and marriage, we do not run the risk of punishing a
purely private breach of contract through criminal law. Since there is no bilateral exchange
or consideration with our omissions registry, but only a declaration to the state with binding
consequences, the state may decide to punish those who make false claims to the state, or
those who lull the state's agents into complacency vis-A-vis a particular person. The lulling

notion, of course, applies only to those few situations where the state already has reason to
be mindful of the vulnerability of a particular person.
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Duties to Rescue in Other Relationships

Some might raise concerns that we are too focused on spouses and parents
as paradigmatic relationships. The concern would be that we are reifying the
sexual family or marriage as the normative ideal for adult interactions. We
respectfully disagree. Indeed the point of our registry system is to obviate this
concern entirely. People who are not married but "act" as though they are do
not have to register, but they may choose to do so; or just one may decide to do
so for the other partner since the registry is a place of declaring one's own
assumption of obligation. The registry is not predicated on norms of
reciprocity, nor does it require contractual formalities. To be sure, our slight
preference for assigning duties to rescue in the context of marriage and
custodial parenting is responsive to what we think of as the specific features of
caregiving written into the "scripts" of marriage and parenting, but no one
should be forced into those roles.
What is more, people should be free to, and encouraged to, assume these
obligations outside the scripts of marriage and parenting. The registry
discussed in Part II permits siblings, cousins, roommates, or friends to enter
into compacts of care, but the idea is not to require it through the criminal law
outside voluntary choices or the specific circumstances of the parent-child or
spousal relationship. Indeed, we would resist any state's attempt to impose a
legally enforceable relationship of caregiving or a duty to rescue on those
persons outside the parent-child or spousal context as we simply cannot say
these relationships have been entered into voluntarily - no one chooses their
siblings or cousins. In the context of platonic roommates, imposing a duty of
care through the criminal law would be a drastic restructuring of the traditional
boundaries of that relationship. On the other hand, we certainly believe that
individuals should be able to choose a legally enforceable relationship of
caregiving through the use of a registry. This allows individuals to signal their
249
commitment both to each other and to those around them.
It is, of course, possible that very few individuals will choose to register why would they voluntarily assume the risk of a legal liability that they
currently do not face? But if that is the outcome, we are no worse off than we
are now, as these individuals do not currently face liability. If, on the other
hand, some individuals do choose to undertake an obligation to rescue, the
benefits that decision conveys in terms of promoting safety and promoting an
ethos of care and compassion certainly seem worth the effort. We can also

249 Professor Leib has some sympathy with the idea that voluntary friendships can trigger

substantial legal duties. See Leib, Friendship, supra note 247, at 633. Few of these
envisioned duties for friendship are criminally punishable upon breach but, admittedly,
some are. Leib's approach to friendship - and his resistance to registries in that context - is,
in some ways, inconsistent with the approach taken here. Id. at 662-67. To the extent that
the approaches differ, Leib is willing to concede that the use of a registry for substantial
criminal law liability may be the better way to allocate friendship's burdens. But the private
civil law is another story.
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imagine the state incentivizing such registrations through small tax breaks or
norm entrepreneurs (private employers or faith groups) that mobilize "opt in
days" to foster solidarity among members of their communities. And because
relationships ebb and flow, we could imagine the registry would permit people
to withdraw from these compacts of caregiving if notice is given to the affected
parties.
Allowing more private-ordering in the context of criminal law regulation
(with sufficient attention to third-party harms) is also consistent with the
suggestions we make later in the contexts of incest, bigamy, and adultery.
B.

ParentalResponsibilityLaws

When adults have committed an affirmative act contributing to a minor's
delinquency with a culpable state of mind, the traditional core requirements for
a crime have been satisfied. 250 Moreover in those situations where the laws
speak to a general obligation by all adults to forbear from contributing to a
minor's truancy or curfew violation or criminal misconduct, there is no
specific family ties burden. But as we saw in Part I, some states and
municipalities have created criminal liability for parents when their children
commit misconduct based on nothing more than a failure-to-supervise
251
theory.
Discussions of these laws suggest several reasons for their passage: (a) they
are thought to reduce crime; (b) they are viewed as vehicles to project norms of
parental conduct by instructing parents to monitor their children carefully and
to remain actively involved in parenting; and (c) they are regarded as an
252
avenue of restitution to victims for the harms committed by the minors.
Despite these plausible justifications, we view these laws as normatively
troublesome and think they should be jettisoned for the reasons articulated
below.
For purposes of argument, we stipulate that the state has a compelling
interest in the reduction of crime, the proper instruction of parental obligations
in supervising minor children, and in ensuring adequate compensation to
victims of crime. However, we are not of the view that the state claiming to
pursue these objectives has shown that the means used are appropriately
tailored to these ends, especially if other non-criminal alternatives are available
and equally effective.
To begin with, if the goal is to reduce crime, why not require all adults who
are in supervisory positions, even if temporarily, to prevent the crime and/or
report it if prevention fails? It does not make sense to restrict failure-tosupervise laws to parents for the sake of reducing crime. The second
argument, restricting the reach of these laws to parents, makes more sense if
the state's goal is to instruct parents to be involved in raising their children and
250 DRESSLER, supra note 24, at 91.
251 See supra Part I.B.
252 See sources cited supra note 41.
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to act diligently in the supervision of their children. But if that is the case, then
it is not clear why mandatory parenting classes, public advertising, civil
recovery statutes, and a showing of an affirmative culpable act or omission by
the parent would be insufficient. The use of strict liability and a criminal
sanction are unnecessary and have problematic effects. As to the adequate
compensation of victims, every state has a civil recovery statute or tort in place
by which victims can seek compensation from parents for harms perpetrated by
their minors. 253 The criminal sanction is redundant in that respect.
1. Voluntary Caregiving and Liberty Interests
Admittedly, these laws attach obligations only to the person who voluntarily
creates a relationship (i.e., the parent, not the child). In that respect, these laws
are consistent with one aspect of liberalism. However, because these laws
create strict criminal liability by punishing parents without proof of an
affirmative action (or choice to commit an action), they fail to respect a
reasonable liberty-maximizing rule that warrants condemnation and
punishment only for defendants who have performed a voluntary action or
omission with a culpable mind. To visit the full weight and condemnation of a
criminal sanction upon an individual for an action by another person beyond
his or her control is antithetical to the spirit of liberty and to a liberalism that
respects individuals as individuals.
A plausibly fair interpretation of the failure-to-supervise theory requires
proof that the parents could reasonably have done something to prevent the
minor's misconduct and chose not to. But the statutes as drafted, which hold
parents criminally and strictly liable for the misconduct of their children, lead
to absurd results in some situations. For instance, parents could be liable for
prosecution when they themselves were the victims of the minor's misconduct.
To be sure, some jurisdictions allow this or other reasons (e.g., the parent acted
reasonably in the situation) as an affirmative defense, 254 but the absence of
reasonableness by the defendant should be part of the government's case-inchief, not a burden allocated to the defense in a criminal case.
2. Minimalism and Means Analysis
As suggested above, we think imposing criminal liability is misplaced in the
absence of a blameworthy state of mind and a wrongful action or omission by
the caregiver in question. If a parent acted with something approaching at least
criminal negligence, we could better understand the impetus to punish the
parent with a light sanction. But imposing criminal responsibility on a strict
liability theory does not seem to promote more effective caregiving than a
negligence standard. Rather, it would only chill the underlying activity of
raising or adopting children or foster children and/or force parents to take
unreasonable steps in monitoring their children. This would undermine the
253 Brank et al., supra note 41, at 3.
254 E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-1301 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:92:2 (2004).
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very point of trying to cultivate and support voluntary caregiving relationships
through family ties burdens.
Here is a concrete example: imagine a parent goes out on a date and leaves a
fourteen-year-old alone in the house with unsecured firearms and an unlocked
liquor cabinet, when the parent knows the child has attempted to play with the
guns and drink liquor on prior occasions. If the fourteen-year-old proceeds to
get drunk and use the parent's gun to shoot the neighbor's car, the parent has
been reckless, or at a minimum, criminally negligent by "failing to exercise
reasonable control" over the child.255 Imposing liability in this scenario will
signal both to this particular caregiver, and other caregivers in the community,
that they must supervise their children more vigilantly.
But imagine instead that the child buys the gun on his own with his money
from an after-school job and shoots the neighbor's car on the way home from
school, despite repeated admonitions by the parents to stay away from guns
and people with guns. Under an ordinance like the one passed in Silverton,
Oregon and other jurisdictions, parents could face prosecution on a strict
liability theory because their child had been charged with a crime. 256 But such
a prosecution would have little impact in terms of promoting better caregiving
in situations like the one that gave rise to the misconduct in our second
hypothetical - there is very little caregiving the parent could have done that
would have prevented the crime in question. Perhaps the parent could prevent
the child from earning extra money or going to school independently, but
children who are determined to find trouble can do it notwithstanding all
reasonable efforts by parents.
The consequences of parental responsibility laws warrant consideration too.
To the extent criminal law successfully projects norms about correct values,
the strict liability standard in some parental responsibility laws will deter
people from becoming foster parents, adoptive parents of teenagers, or on the
margins, parents of their own biological children. That is not the signal
regarding the promotion of caregiving that society should emit. Moreover, to
the extent these statutes impose liability on persons who do not choose a
culpable act or omission, the criminal justice system loses its capacity to
257
harness cooperation by citizens elsewhere in the law.
As to restitution, there is no reason why a civil tort remedy against the
parents (or the minor) would not suffice in providing an avenue of repair to the
harms caused by a minor. After the children themselves, parents are likely the
255 DiFonzo, supra note 41, at 59 n.261 (listing state statutes which use language similar

to "failing to exercise reasonable control").
256 See supra notes 51-57.

257 Cf Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful,
Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145, 149-50 (2008) (explaining that
when the criminal law tracks a community's notion of justice, the law earns moral
credibility and the ability to shape societal norms); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley,
The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 482 (1997) (same).
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next cheapest cost avoider, and so pinning parents with obligations under civil
recovery statutes gives parents a strong incentive to monitor their children
closely and provide compensation to victims. 258 To be sure, there is the
possibility - as there was above - of parents being judgment proof and of there
being no available plaintiff to sue. If parents were reasonably away during the
minor's misconduct - if, for example, the child goes on a supervised school
trip with teachers - then quite generally, the assumption that parents are the
next least cost avoider may be misplaced. In any event, under the parental
liability laws we discuss, the defendant is not being forced merely to pay for
harm. The defendant is being condemned through criminal punishment for
someone else's wrongdoing even if the defendant was non-culpably unaware
of, and did not participate in, the wrongdoing, and even if the defendant
instructed the wrongdoer that such misconduct was forbidden.
To be sure, we allow vicarious liability elsewhere in the criminal justice
system, for example, in the crime of conspiracy. Co-conspirators have been
permissibly held liable for substantive crimes committed by another member
of the conspiracy under the Pinkerton doctrine, 5 9 even if not present at the
scene of the crime or aware of the crime's commission. 260 These efforts are
controversial and have been substantially criticized. 261 But the parental
responsibility laws differ significantly from the Pinkerton scenario. To impose
liability under Pinkerton, the defendant must have committed the act of joining
a conspiracy, and the additional crime by the co-conspirator must be
262
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and be reasonably foreseeable.
In a recent article, Professor Kreit excavates the constitutional foundations for
Pinkerton, noting that many courts have acknowledged the Pinkerton criteria
to be due process requirements. 263 If Pinkerton establishes a floor to the
negligence rule in the context of vicarious liability for conspiracy, then why
doesn't the negligence rule operate in other cases of criminal vicarious
liability, such as felony murder, 264 or for our purposes, parental responsibility
laws?
Putting the constitutional issue aside, we do well to consider whether these
laws are likely to be effective at reducing the incidence of crime by minors.
Professor Dan Filler suggests that such statutes could be effective if the

258 Brank et al., supra note 41, at 3 ("All of the states have some form of civil parental
liability."); Chapin, supra note 41, at 633-34 (discussing the compensation and deterrence
rationales of civil liability statutes).
259 United States v. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946).
260 See Alex Kreit, Vicarious Criminal Liability and the Constitutional Dimensions of
Pinkerton, 57 AM. U. L. REv. 585, 590 (2008).
See, e.g., Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back from an Ever
Expanding, Ever More TroublingArea, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 6-7 (1992).
262 Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647-48.
261

263
264

Kreit, supranote 260, at 598-605.
See DRESSLER, supra note 24, at 556-6 1.
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consequences for violation were sufficiently severe and certain, although of
course we might not be willing to live with such high stakes. 265 For example,
if parents whose children threw an alcohol-filled party for their friends faced a
felony conviction and a lengthy prison term, most reasonable parents, Filler
argues, would quickly "lock up the booze and perhaps install a nanny-cam to
monitor the house." 266 We think they might take even more drastic measures put their children on lock-down. Moreover, to be effective, the government
would have to enforce these laws more often. Athough these statutes are on
the books in a number of jurisdictions, criminal prosecutions remain extremely
rare. 267 The laws receive most of their attention through media coverage of
those prosecutions, such as the St. Clair prosecution discussed in Part 1.268
But even if these statutes could be made effective, would it be appropriate to
use them? As previously articulated, other alternatives might better achieve
the goals sought by parental responsibility laws. But it is also important to
question the assumptions associated with these laws. Support for parental
responsibility statutes is motivated in part by the belief that "poor parenting" is
a root cause of much of the juvenile crime in this country. As one family
outreach worker exclaimed: "We have an adult problem, not a children
problem .... If we can get our adults together, the children will naturally fall
in line. '269 One commentator has suggested that, "[t]he rationale behind the
parental liability laws - punishing the parents to reduce acts of juvenile
delinquency by their children - must be based upon a series of interconnected
assumptions": first, that the nature of the child's behavior is directly - if not
primarily - caused by the quality of the parenting in the household; second,
that we can somehow create a "universal model of adequate parenting," which
all parents can and should adopt regardless of their circumstances; and third,

265See

Posting

of

Dan

M.

Filler

to

www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/07/strictliabilit.html

Concurring

Opinions,

(July 6, 2006, 11:30).

There apparently have been few recent empirical studies assessing the effectiveness of these
laws. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE JUSTICE
REFORM INITIATIVE INTHE STATES 1994-1996, http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/pubs/reform/ch2_d.html

(bemoaning the lack of data about whether these statutes are effective); see also Chapin,
supra note 41, at 653-54.
266 Filler, supra note 265.

267 Harris, supra note 44, at 10.
26 See supra notes 39-40.

269Courtney L. Zolman, Comment, Parental Responsibility Acts: Medicine for Ailing

Families and Hopefor the Future, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 217, 229 (1998) (quoting a statement
by Nia Keeling, a family outreach worker) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Tyler & Segady, supra note 43, at 80 (quoting the statement "[s]how me a bad kid and I'll
show you a bad parent," made at a city council meeting in Southfield, Michigan that
ultimately authorized a parental responsibility ordinance (internal quotation marks

omitted)).
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that the threat of punishment will induce parents to adopt this government270
sanctioned model of parenting.
Critics of these statutes contend that the link between poor parenting and
juvenile crime is far less certain than proponents suggest.271 Juveniles are no
doubt also profoundly influenced by their peers, their schools, their
communities, the media, and perhaps their genetic make-up.2 72 In addition, the
threat of criminal liability might actually negatively impact parenting, rather
than enhance it. One critic suggests that parental responsibility statutes will
induce some parents to "over-parent[], that is, by either severely restricting
their child's freedom of action or by excessively punishing the child. '273 Other
parents might respond by "under-parenting," that is, distancing themselves
from their children "by filing un-governability or similar petitions in order to
transfer responsibility for their children to the state. '274 In either case, the
relationship between parent and child would become more adversarial and
275
negative, rather than more productive and positive.
3.

Gender, Inequality, and Discrimination

From the preceding discussion, one can see why we are dubious about these
statutes' capacity to reduce crime through parenting vigilance, signal
commitment to parenting values, or provide restitution not available through
other measures. Here we note that limiting vicarious liability to those parents
within a state-sanctioned family unit seems under-inclusive as well and,
therefore, discriminatory. If vicarious liability is embraced by legislatures
because of its crime-reduction promise, then it should be applied whenever
there is a relationship of asymmetrical dependency and voluntary caregiving,
and not just when there is a strictly construed version of the parent-to-child
relationship. 276 For at least in this way, more deterrence will be achieved by
270 Chapin, supra note 41, at 624.
271For a discussion of whether poor parenting is in fact a substantial contributing factor

to juvenile delinquency, see id. at 664-71.
272 See DiFonzo, supra note 41, at 44; see also Cahn, supra note 41, at 425-27
(identifying other causes of juvenile delinquency, such as "deficiencies in early childhood
education, peer pressure, and inadequate employment opportunities"); Amy L.
Tomaszewski, Note, From Columbine to Kazaa: ParentalLiability in a New World, 2005
U. ILL. L. REv. 573, 583-85 (discussing how factors like the media and biology might
contribute to juvenile delinquency).
273 DiFonzo, supra note 41, at 47; see also Cahn, supra note 41, at 416-17 (suggesting
that some parents do such a poor job of parenting, such as engaging in physical abuse, that
their children might appropriately reject their supervisory efforts).
274 DiFonzo, supra note 41, at 48.
275 Id. DiFonzo also argues that jailing a parent deprives the youthful offender and any
siblings of a parental influence in the home. Id. at 48-49. This criticism is obviously less
persuasive if the parenting at issue was truly inadequate or even affirmatively harmful.
276 Asymmetrical dependency refers to relationships where one person possesses
substantial authority and responsibility over another person who is largely dependent for his
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extending vicarious liability's ambit to same-sex or non-married-child-rearing
partners, and the importance of supervision as part of caregiving will be
communicated to those who have opted to raise or supervise minors. A
narrower structure would be to restrict the reach of parental responsibility laws
to the same class of people who constitute voluntary "primary caregivers" that
would face a duty to rescue children.
Having already considered heteronormativity concerns, here we want simply
to recognize that women will likely bear the brunt of these duties to supervise
in light of the fact that it is women who most often serve as the head of singleparent homes. 277 Based on a variety of factors, it might be difficult to conclude
that parents can effectively control their minor children, especially in the
context of a single-parent home. For one thing, the number and physical
strength of some children may prove overwhelming in particular situations; the
parent might also be a victim of a child's misconduct. Additionally, parents
might be afraid that reporting their children to the police could lead to the
involuntary termination of their parental rights.
These are additional
independent reasons to be concerned with the structure of parental
responsibility statutes or ordinances. In omissions liability, holding the parent
responsible is the last lifeline to prevent real harm to vulnerable and innocent
children; in the context of parental responsibility laws, by contrast, the children
are generally neither wholly innocent nor in danger.
4.

Summary

While the burdens associated with parental responsibility statutes attach to
voluntarily created caregiving relationships, and therefore deserve some
leeway, our view is that they fail to be fully justifiable as drafted because of
the ways in which they raise substantial concerns under our minimalism,
gender and inequality inquiries. It bears emphasis that our critique does not
affect those criminal laws that apply to any adult who commits a culpable act
or omission that proximately contributes to the delinquency of a minor or
endangers the minor's welfare, assuming the statutes and courts define those
terms with reasonable specificity.
C.

Incest
At the outset, we acknowledge that the topic of incest, like that of bigamy,
which follows, is a complicated one. Our modest goal is to contribute some
preliminary thoughts to a difficult dialogue about whether the criminal law is
an appropriate vehicle to regulate the intimate activities by mature persons. As
or her well-being on the authority-wielding person. Martha Fineman elaborates upon this
notion. See

MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY,

AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 8 (1995).

Our vision of who stands in

relationships of asymmetrical dependency does not rest necessarily upon residency, but we
recognize its general significance.
277 See Maldonado, supra note 122, at 1008-12.
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we discussed in Part 1,278 there are various kinds of incest rules: some regulate
conduct regardless of the age of the participants, some regulate conduct
regardless of the consent of the participants, and some regulate conduct among
intimates regardless of an actual blood relationship. Unsurprisingly, there is
overlap across these categories depending on the jurisdiction.
Our emphasis here is on those criminal laws that punish a person's conduct
that, but for the family ties of the defendant, would otherwise be lawful in a
given jurisdiction. We are specifically not talking about the sexual abuse of
children, which is sometimes referred to as incest but is clearly and rightly
illegal conduct regardless of the identity or family status of the perpetrator.
Indeed, as we explain below, we will focus our discussion on consensual
sexual conduct between adults, but our analysis also has potential implications
for how states regulate sexual conduct between minors and adults and between
minors and other minors, which we touch on toward the end of this Section.
Consistent with our positions developed in Part II, we think that in situations
where genuine and mature consent between the parties is possible, and where
negative externalities can be eliminated, the criminal law should prescind from
application. Where genuine and mature consent cannot be presumed or
achieved, then the sexual activity should largely be investigated and punished
the way other sexual misconduct is punished, with the important caveat
discussed below regarding the definitions of coercion associated with sexual
assault law. 279 Nonetheless, we also believe that sentencing enhancements
based on breach of trust can be justified in contexts where a primary caregiver
has abused a minor child or other person who might be incapacitated (e.g., an
280
elderly parent or disabled adult child).
Let us begin by determining the objectives articulated on behalf of incest
statutes. The most commonly cited rationale for prohibiting consensual
relations is that incestuous relationships have the potential to create children
with genetic problems if the parties reproduce. 281 Moreover, incestuous
relationships have special potential to be abusive and nonconsensual, and this
coercion may be difficult to detect, thus calling for a separate and perhaps
more severe set of penalties.2 82 Additionally, some have viewed the incest
278 See supra Part I.C.
279 See infra note 297 and accompanying text.
280 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (2007) (providing a sentencing

enhancement for abusing a position of trust). Notice that this use of sentencing enhancements
is fine under our framework: they are not family ties burdens because they apply to all
positions of trust. Professor Leib discusses how this provision can be used to protect
friendship as a caregiving relationship in Leib, Friendship,supra note 247, at 691 n.324.
281 E.g., Carolyn S. Bratt, Incest Statutes and the Fundamental Right of Marriage: Is
Oedipus Free to Marry?, 18 FAM. L.Q. 257, 259 (1984). This may help explain why
adoptive children are sometimes excluded from such prohibitions.
282 See Cahill, supra note 81, at 1569. Cahill cites a number of courts that referenced
these rationales in upholding incest laws. Id. at 1570 nn.105-06 (citing State v. Kaiser, 663
P.2d 839, 843 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983); In re Tiffany Nicole M., 571 N.W.2d 872, 878 (Wisc.
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when
taboo as a way to "prevent[] intrafamilial sexual jealousies and rivalries"
283
a parent figure has relations with both another parent and a child.
Yet, these rationales cannot account for the scope of the incest prohibition in
almost all American states. 284 For example, consensual relationships between
adult siblings who were adopted from separate birth parents raise none of the
285
concerns associated with genetic difficulties, sexual jealousies, or coercion.
It is therefore impossible to underestimate the influence of the "disgust
factor. ' 286 In large part, these relationships are criminalized because
Americans view them with distaste or because they are, in some situations,
religiously proscribed. 287 At least as to some of these relationships, we think
the state should step in to proscribe the sexual conduct; and with .regard to
others, the state should step aside in the sense of using the criminaljustice
system to sanction the conduct. We do not suggest here that the state cannot
resort to other mechanisms, such as civil law or civic education, to express its
disapproval of such relationships.
1.

Voluntary Caregiving and Liberty Interests

In most jurisdictions, incest laws apply to both voluntarily and involuntarily
created relationships; parents are prohibited from sex with their children in the
2 88
same way that siblings are prohibited from having sex with each other.
Family ties burdens placed on involuntarily created relationships fail one of
our liberal concerns, and should be regarded very carefully before legally
authorizing these burdens. However, to the extent they apply to voluntarily
Ct. App. 1997)). McDonnell cites a related concern of preventing the family from
becoming "overly-sexualized," with family members viewing other members as potential
sexual partners. McDonnell, supra note 90, at 353.
283 CLAUDE Lvi-STRAUSs, THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP 479 (Rodney

Needham ed., James Harle Bell & John Richard von Sturmer trans., 1969); Note, Inbred
Obscurity, supra note 83, at 2464.
284 Note, Inbred Obscurity, supra note 83, at 2469-70.
285 See McDonnell, supra note 90, at 352 (suggesting that states could take a narrower
approach by allowing incestuous couples to marry but making it illegal for them to have
children). McDonnell does not grapple with the question whether such a statute would be
constitutional. Id. at 353. Margaret Mahoney makes the point that the genetic issue also
cannot justify those state statutes criminalizing relationships between step-parents and step-

children. Mahoney, supra note 84, at 28. Mahoney also suggests, however, that many of
the concerns raised by incest could be present even in relationships between two adults; an
incestuous relationship could undermine family harmony no matter the ages of the two
parties involved. Id. at 32.
286 Cahill, supra note 81, at 1578-83 (discussing how disgust and revulsion drive much
of incest regulation).
287 See Mahoney, supra note 84, at 29 (describing how religious history, family welfare,
and "community norms" are invoked as potential justifications for incest bans).
288 As we noted in Part I, only three states do not punish consensual adult sibling sexual
conduct. See supra note 83.
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created relationships of caregiving, we have little problem in extending some
deference to legislative decisions to penalize these relationships.
Our reasons for doing so, however, are not predicated on the biological
issues undergirding support for most incest laws. Rather, we think a general
rule is appropriate, one that prohibits sexual relations between an adult and any
person for whom the adult provides caregiving functions, such that the other
person is involved in a relationship of asymmetrical dependency - regardless
of consanguinity. Examples of asymmetrical dependents include, on the one
hand, foster parents, adoptive parents, step-parents, and biological parents, and
on the other hand, all minors under their charge and responsibility. 289 Our
concern is that the relationship of asymmetrical dependency lends itself to
peculiar risks of abuse such that establishing a norm of protecting vulnerable
persons from coercion or improper pressure requires a rule that may be overprotective in some cases. Such a law would emit a clearer signal of which
relations are prohibited than the mishmash that characterizes current incest
laws.290

This rule ties in with our more general liberal concern that seeks to assess
whether the family ties burden in question unnecessarily infringes on one's
liberty. With respect to sex crimes, it is the lack of intelligent and mature
consent that should drive the liberal state's punishment of offenders. When a
person stands in a position of asymmetrical dependency, it is very hard to
determine whether truly voluntary consent was given.
There are also
complicated questions about whether persons who were once in relationships
of asymmetrical dependency, but now are not, could voluntarily consent to
have relations with persons with whom they were once vulnerable. Thus at a
minimum, some regulatory speed-bumps should be erected to ferret out the
291
existence of genuine and meaningful consent in those contexts.
As to relationships between independent adults, we believe that a respect for
autonomy and limited government should permit consenting individuals to
engage in the sexual relations they deem appropriate without fear of criminal
sanction. 292 That is not to say we endorse any of these relations; rather, we
simply think the state should not be using the criminal law to tread upon the
Professors Collins and Leib would add that a past asymmetric dependence
relationship would also be justifiably precluded based on concerns of vulnerability.
Professor Markel disagrees; on his view, genuine and mature consent may plausibly exist
even between adults who were once in a relationship of asymmetric dependence.
290 See Note, Inbred Obscurity,supra note 83, at 2469-70.
291 In other contexts, Professor Markel suggests possibilities including registering the
relationship with the government if it fits into a certain category of risk, and requiring
participants to the relationship to take a sex-education course. See infra note 305. These
possibilities might be appropriate in this context as well.
292 Here we largely agree with the observation in Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence v.
Texas, in which he noted that the Court's majority reasoning makes it difficult to resist the
conclusion we draw regarding consensual adult relations. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
597 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
289
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intimate associational rights of mature individuals. As they stand, the current
laws chill consensual activities by adults that should be unencumbered by
threats of arrest, prosecution, and punishment. 293 Indeed, criminal prosecution
is ordinarily unnecessary to prevent this conduct; most of these relationships
will be deterred by social stigma. 294 We recognize the concern that incestuous
relationships have the potential to be abusive and nonconsensual,2 95 and we
think these concerns are substantial and important. But in the context of
adults, these problems can ordinarily be punished through the traditional lack296
of-consent crimes: the crimes regulating sexual assault.
We acknowledge that in some circumstances those available "background"
laws may be unsatisfactory. For example, it is quite possible that the coercion
involved in an incestuous relationship would be psychological rather than
physical, and many states still do not consider psychological coercion
sufficient to satisfy the required elements of their rape or sexual assault
statutes.297 Thus, although our background laws forbidding sexual assault and
rape may be sufficient bases for prosecuting and punishing offenders in cases
involving physical coercion, the current status of rape law may leave some
non-consensual incestuous relationships outside the reach of criminal law
sanctions. Thus, reform of current rape laws continues to be an important goal.
It is also important to recognize that various gender inequities within
households raise questions about whether consent to an incestuous relationship
could ever truly be voluntary, but these are fact-bound inquiries. Assuming
there are such consensual relations between mature persons, then prohibiting
them from having consensual relations is primarily a form of squeamishness, at
least from a liberal criminal justice perspective that does not seek to impose a
298
particularly traditional sexual morality.
293

See Posting of Dan Markel to PrawfsBlawg, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/

prawfsblawg/2008/02/the-sex-ed-lice.html

(Feb. 19, 2008, 18:32) (discussing the shadow

effects of incest, adultery, and polygamy laws); see also Kay L. Levine, The Intimacy
Discount: ProsecutorialDiscretion, Privacy, and Equality in the Statutory Rape Caseload,
55 EMORY L.J. 691, 746 (2006) (lamenting shadow effects on consensual activity in the

statutory rape context).
294 Cahill, supra note 81, at 1578-83.
295 See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
296
297

See Note, Inbred Obscurity,supra note 83, at 2467-68.
See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103, 1106 (Mont. 1990) (concluding that a

principal who threatened to block a student's graduation unless she consented to sexual
intercourse could not be convicted of the crime of "sexual intercourse without consent").
298 We recognize that some proponents of incest laws may be sincerely motivated by
religious views or other comprehensive moral views, but those views, in a liberal society
sensitive to the rights of minorities, are not necessarily views that a liberal criminal justice
system must abide by. We also recognize there is an important and complicated separate
issue of whether any incestuous marriages should be permitted. Our focus here is on
whether current criminal conduct should be decriminalized or reformed, and we will restrict
our discussion to that subject.
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In the absence of consent between adults, as we have qualified it here, we
think the sexual misconduct should be punished as if the crime were
committed by an acquaintance or stranger. However, we support legislative
decisions to impose breach of trust enhancements - whether treated as
elements of a crime or sentencing factors - for crimes by primary caregivers
against persons in relationships of asymmetrical dependency, where the
299
caregiver voluntarily assumed the caregiving relationship.
2.

Minimalism and Means Analysis

In this Section, we explore the purported objectives of current incest laws,
focusing on the degree of narrow-tailoring extant in the current practices. Let
us begin with the concern of coercion. This problem, which we think is the
government's most compelling interest, can be punished through general laws
prohibiting coercive sex. Thus, the need for articulating a specific family ties
burden requires justification. One argument associated with coercion is that it
is very difficult to achieve adequate deterrence in the family context because of
the problems associated with getting minor victims to report parental
misconduct. But if that is the case, we can have, as suggested above,
heightened penalties in any context where a breach of trust with a supervisory
adult arises - whether schools, churches, or the home. It need not be delimited
as a family ties burden, and the breach of trust enhancement need not be
limited to family status, even if family status serves as a presumption to create
an inference of betrayal of trust. Admittedly, this strategy will not resolve a
minor's reluctance to report a sibling's or cousin's improper conduct, but that
same reluctance can easily arise when it is a close family friend or neighbor
who commits the sexual misconduct.
As to the sometimes-articulated goal of preventing intra-familial sexual
jealousy, there are reasons to doubt that this is the sort of governmental interest
that can vindicate the use of a criminal sanction. For one thing, it is hard to
understand why the state concerns itself with sexual jealousy as opposed to
economic disparities, parental favoritism, or other forms of jealousy and
rivalry. Second, incest laws do not currently attach to all possible relationships
that might also give rise to intra-familial sexual jealousy, thereby creating
serious under-inclusiveness relative to this goal. A heterosexual woman may
marry a man and also sexually desire his father or brother; a heterosexual man
might marry a woman and desire her mother or sister. If persons act on these
desires, they are not subject to incest laws in the vast majority of
jurisdictions, 300 but they will surely trigger intra-familial jealousies.
299 While a sentence enhancement may, to some, signal that one victim seems to be
"worth more" than another victim, we think there is less reason to be worried about it since
an offender in that context has voluntarily created the trust relationship, and the breach of it
makes the conduct more reprehensible. That seems a sufficient basis to rebut a possible
allegation of unfair treatment of the victim as signaled by the sentence to the offender.
300 McDonnell, supra note 90, at 350-5 1.
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As to the genetic concerns, there are several responses. First, for persons
not engaged in activity capable of causing genetic repercussions - gay cousins,
elderly siblings, etc. - the rules prohibiting their relationships are overbroad
and cannot be justified on this ground. With respect to those not related by
consanguinity, there is no basis for genetic fears at all. Admittedly, such fears
increase when we are talking about closely-related persons, such as brothers
and sisters. 30 1 But as others have noted, "in no other legal realm does the
government criminally prohibit two people from having children because their
offspring are more likely to inherit genetic defects. '' 30 2 Put simply, we have
long since retired the idea that eugenics preferences are a reasonable basis for
30 3
criminal justice policy.
Related to the genetics-based fears is concern for the economic costs of
allowing incestuous relationships. In other words, one might be tempted to
justify criminal incest prohibitions to reduce the costs associated with
increased medical care for children of consanguineous parents. But again, the
solution of using incest prohibitions is both over-broad and under-inclusive.
First, some couples deemed incestuous may choose not to have children or
may not be able to have children, and yet their conduct would still be subject to
criminal sanction. Second, we do not use the criminal law as a tool to reduce
potential medical costs in any other context so it would be hard to justify its
use here. When we criminalize murder or theft, it is not because we want to
keep insurance payments down; it is because murder or theft is wrongful.
Third, if we were genuinely concerned about increased medical costs, we could
test all couples contemplating having children with high risks of disease or
complications. But this would be both an offensive policy to many people and
it would sweep in far more persons than those who are blood relatives.
The preceding discussion of narrow-tailoring has largely addressed family
ties burdens in the context of relations between adults. We acknowledge that
concerns about family ties burdens on persons engaged in relationships with
minors raise weightier concerns than those arising in the context of consenting
adults. 30 4 While all of us agree that the possibility of coercion is far more

301 Note, Inbred Obscurity, supra note 83, at 2468 n.3 1.
302 Id. at 2468.
303 As to how these concerns are addressed outside the criminal justice system, we are
more ambivalent. We recognize that some might try to distinguish eugenics (which might
be thought to perfect a given gene pool) from genetics-based fears about incest, which are
trying to avoid harms to future humans, as opposed to perfecting them. The problem with
this distinction is that it assumes a moral baseline of non-incestuous relationships. If a
community had endorsed incestuous relationships historically, then efforts to ban such
relationships would be viewed by that community as "eugenics" by virtue of the goal of
trying to improve the general issue of the community.
11 It is our view that current incest laws are not terribly effective in regulating adultminor sex. To the extent that incest laws produce sentencing discounts to sexually abusive
family members, the incest regime is complicit in extending a family ties benefit with no
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significant in the adult-child context, and that it is less likely that the minor in
question is capable of truly informed consent, we disagree amongst ourselves
about how much to credit the consent of minors who choose to have sex with
adults to whom they are related, and what measures might be taken to prove
such consent to the state. 305 Although many states have a variety of statutory
rape laws available to punish and deter adult-minor and minor-minor sex, such
laws may not be sufficient to address all the possible concerns arising from
these relationships where incest is involved. Thus, we address below the use
of family ties burdens in these contexts.
As to sexual relations strictly among minors, we are not all of one mind proving the point, perhaps, that our lens of access to these laws does not
require a singular conclusion on all family ties burdens. One of us (Professor
Markel) thinks that sex with and between minors should be regulated in
family-neutral ways. This would mean that either the criminal law applies to
prohibit sexual activity for all persons under a certain age or that the criminal
law does not apply in the context of consensual relations among those credited
with the capacity to consent. This is in addition to the general rule that would
prohibit sexual activity between supervisory care-givers and dependent caretakers. Thus, there would be no categorical rules prohibiting sexual conduct

adequate justification for under-punishing those who sexually abuse their dependents. See
Markel, Collins & Leib, supra note 3, at 1190.
305 Professor Markel, for instance, holds the view that if someone aged fifteen to eighteen
invites and chooses consensual relations with another person aged fifteen or higher, that
person should be able to engage in the relationship provided certain (admittedly difficult)
conditions are satisfied. For example, we could have a policy by which sex education
courses would be a prerequisite for sexual activity in the same way that driver's education in
some jurisdictions is a prerequisite for permissible driving. On this view, all persons under
eighteen wishing to have sex without fear of prosecution would have to secure a sexeducation license, which they could get from a variety of possible private or public sources.
Posting
of
Dan
Markel
to
PrawfsBlawg,
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2008/02/is-teen-sex-lik.html (Feb. 15, 2008, 17:17) (discussing the logistics of
sex-ed licenses). The education would foster awareness of pregnancy, birth control
techniques, genetic risks, disease, and physical and psychological coercion. Additionally,
even with such a sex-education license, adult-minor or minor-minor sex (regardless of
consanguinity) would be presumptively or categorically prohibited when there is a
relationship of asymmetrical dependence, co-habitation, or a supervisorial relationship in
school, work, or extra-curricular activities. Last, in situations where there is a substantial
age difference which could imply coercion, the relationship's sexual turn would have to be
declared in advance to designated authorities to certify that these conditions have been
satisfied. Prosecution for statutory rape would be threatened in the absence of compliance.
See
Posting
of
Dan
Markel
to
PrawfsBlawg,
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/02/sex-with-minors.html (Feb. 7, 2008,
16:31) (providing hypothetical scenarios regarding sexual relations with minors); Posting of
Dan Markel to PrawfsBlawg, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/02/marriageof-min.html (Feb. 8, 2008, 12:13) (providing hypothetical scenarios regarding marriages
with and between minors).
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between, for example, seventeen-year-olds on the basis of family status alone.
Under this view, those worried about physical or psychological coercion,
abuse, or retaliation can simply rely on the laws available to punish that
independent misconduct. 30 6 If sexual relations are to be decriminalized for
those over an age of consent, then it should be immaterial from the state's
perspective whether they are brothers, first cousins, or friends. The key would
307
be to ensure an absence of coercion or abuse.
But at least one of us (Professor Collins) finds these conclusions troubling.
Sex between minor siblings, for example, does not implicate a significant
liberty interest that is worth protecting. In addition, some of the concerns used
to justify incest bans take on heightened importance in the context of minors.
For example, because the potential public health ramifications of incestuous
sex are admittedly non-negligible - and because it would be extremely hard for
minors to give meaningful consent to such complex sexual relations - there
may be sound reasons to preserve criminal statutes against incestuous sex
among minors. Minors, because of their emotional immaturity, are more
vulnerable to forms of psychological coercion. 30 8 In addition, minors in
incestuous sexual relationships may be less likely to seek outside help in
ending the relationship. It would seem far easier, for example, for a minor to
report his forty-year-old uncle to the authorities for pressuring the minor to
have sex than it would be to report the minor's brother.
One of us (Professor Leib) cannot make up his mind, though his sympathies
are largely with Collins. Indeed, not only are Collins's concerns serious, but
there are serious issues raised by the costs associated with creating new and
complicated institutions and bureaucracies - would minors be expected to use
registries too? - to channel and sanction conduct. There is also, finally, the
reality that the juvenile justice system is different from the adult system and
probably raises different concerns, which have not been systematically
examined or considered sufficiently here to reach a clear conclusion on the
merits.
3.

Gender, Inequality, and Discrimination
There are a couple of important points about gender, inequality, and
discrimination that bear mention regarding the use of family ties burdens in the

306 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.65 (McKinney 2008).

307 We could permit or require the fact-finder to infer that coercion is present in certain
circumstances; for example, do the participants live in the same home together; does one
person serve in a caregiving or supervisorial role to the other? But both those questions
would cut across family status blood lines. For Markel, concerns about medical risks and
pregnancy would be addressed through the use of a sex-ed license, which would help secure
a safe harbor from prosecution.
308 Cf Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Explaining Juvenile False Confessions: Adolescent

Development and Police Interrogation,31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 53, 62 (2007) (explaining
why juveniles are more susceptible to police coercion).
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incest context. First, as we have noted above, incest laws appear motivated in
part by concerns about genetic repercussions. That implicates both hetero- and
repronormativity, and signals to the polity that we expect couples engaged in
sex to procreate. We note, additionally, that to the extent the family ties
burden operates ex ante in a protective manner (of a particular model of family
relations), it denies that protection to those whose families do not fit the
particular model informing the contours of most incest statutes. Thus, if a
homosexual couple lives in a state where they cannot adopt as a couple
together, then the incest statute will not "protect" a child who has been adopted
by X against the sexual misconduct perpetrated by X s partner, Y - assuming
that Y has not been able to create a legally binding relationship to the child. Of
course, Y is susceptible to general statutes prohibiting sexual misconduct, but
this shows the general redundancy of most incest statutes. Last, we note the
incest statutes around the country are generally drafted and, to our knowledge,
prosecuted today in manners that do not especially and unfairly burden one sex
over another.
4.

Summary

Having applied our normative framework from Part II, we see that in many
jurisdictions, incest laws by their scope create family ties burdens not only in
the context of consensual sexual conduct between adults, but also when states
otherwise permit consensual sexual conduct between adults and minors, and
between minors and minors. In the context of adults, and subject to the caveats
above, we find this burden on intimate associational rights unjustifiable
because the interests underlying incest laws can be promoted through more
appropriate measures short of invoking the criminal law. In the context of
incestuous sex between adults and minors, and minors and minors, we are
divided about whether incest laws - which create liability where, in the
absence of a family relationship as designated by the state, none would
otherwise exist - should survive scrutiny. That said, we agree that when
sexual misconduct occurs in a relationship of asymmetrical dependency, a
sentencing enhancement is warranted for the breach of trust created by that
dependency. Those enhancements would be sensibly extended even to those
secondary caregivers who exert supervisory powers over minors - including
teachers, scout leaders, and faith group leaders.
However one redrafts criminal law in the incest arena to address the various
difficult issues surrounding adult-adult, adult-minor, and minor-minor incest,
we doubt we will gain much traction with the political community that favors
these laws in the near future. That said, the topic of consensual adult incest has
actually been the subject of some legal and political discourse of late because
of its links to the same-sex marriage debate. Some have suggested - with an
intention to alarm - that if we legalize same-sex marriage, the legalization of
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But in contrast to the issues of gay rights and same-

310

sex marriage,
there is no committed and vociferous mainstream advocacy
movement of which we are aware that is currently arguing for the liberalization
3 11
of incest laws.
Similarly, there is very little legal scholarship seeking to make an
affirmative case for greater recognition of intra-familial romantic relationships;
rather, discussions about incest usually involve simply pointing out that many
of the arguments made in favor of the criminal laws are problematic. For
example, commentators remark that the evidence related to the possibility of
genetic harm is far less certain than once believed, and in any event, many of
312
the relationships currently prohibited do not trigger this concern at all.
There are a few recent exceptions in the academic literature to this general
pattern.
For example, Christine Metteer argues that the individual's
constitutionally protected right to marry trumps the state's interest in
prohibiting incestuous marriages when the parties are related only by affinity
rather than consanguinity. 313 More provocative is Ruthann Robson's claim
that "[t]he proffered explanations for incest prohibitions should be deeply
problematic for any same-sex marriage advocate. '31 4 She argues that attempts
to justify prohibitions against incest by appealing to religion or longstanding
community mores should be soundly rejected because "tribal customs should
not govern our current cultural mores and constitutional notions any more than

309

See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)

(suggesting that the constitutionality of laws prohibiting adult incest were called into
question by the Court's decision in Lawrence); Cahill, supra note 81, at 1544; Cass R.
Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage,in
55 SuP. CT. REV. 27, 60-65 (Dennis J. Hutchinson, David A. Strauss & Geoffrey R. Stone
eds., 2003). The same slippery slope concerns about incest were also raised by opponents to
the legalization of interracial marriage. For a very interesting discussion on that topic, see
Cahill, supra note 81, at 1554-57.
310 Bigamy is also increasingly on the agenda. See Jeffrey Michael Hayes, Comment,
Polygamy Comes Out of the Closet: The New Strategy of Polygamy Activists, 3 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 99, 104-13 (2007).
311See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 309, at 62 (stating it cannot be said that incest
"prohibitions run afoul of some emerging national awareness"). One organization, however,
is seeking to liberalize cousin marriage. Cousin Couples, http://www.cousincouples.com
(last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
312 See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 90, at 352-53; Note, Inbred Obscurity, supra note
83, at 2465-66.
313 Christine McNiece Metteer, Some "Incest" Is Harmless Incest: Determining the
FundamentalRight to Marry of Adults Related by Affinity Without Resorting to State Incest
Statutes, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 262, 272-73 (2000); see also Bratt, supra note 281, at
259-67. At least one state supreme court has agreed with this general proposition. See
Israel v. Allen, 577 P.2d 762, 764 (Colo. 1978) (striking down a state statute prohibiting
marriage between brother and sister related only by adoption as unconstitutional).
314 Robson, supra note 178, at 762.
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Leviticus should prevail. ' '315 She also argues that we should reject the genetics
justification, because it "depends upon identity between marriage and
'316
procreation - the same logic that is used to resist same-sex marriage.
Our own view of the matter is, as we have said, limited to the reach of the
criminal law. We think these criminal prohibitions, regardless of their
motivation or provenance, are problematic from our liberal minimalism
perspective, as well as from the viewpoint that considers how family ties
burdens trigger concerns of inequality and discrimination, especially in the
31 7
context of mature individuals engaging in consensual sexual relations.
D.

Bigamy

Our analysis of bigamy takes some cues from the preceding discussion of
incest. The rationales for bigamy laws (by which we refer to the criminal bans
3 18
on the practice of polygamy) are familiar and, in America, deeply rooted.
They are nonetheless under-scrutinized, 319 which is something we hope to
remedy below. In describing the objectives of bigamy laws, some have
adverted to the many "[p]opular depictions of polygamists in the media and in
society[, which] generally focus on the prevalence of underage brides,
accounts of sexual abuse, and the subservient role of women in these
relationships. '320 Indeed, historically, polygamy has been decried by some as
a tool to subordinate women 321 and thus bigamy laws would presumably be
responsive to those concerns. One might also fear that polygamy raises the
costs of social welfare programs. The underlying assumption here appears to
be that if a person has eight spouses and their offspring for whom she or he
must provide care and resources, there is greater concern that these people
might become charges of the welfare state. Last, some critics of polygamy
315 Id. at

316

763.
Id. at 764.

317

Cf Lawrence v. Texas, 539

U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding

that the liberty rationale for invalidating bans on same-sex sodomy statutes entails the
invalidation of other morals legislation including bans on consensual incestuous
relationships).
318 For legal background on American bigamy laws, see generally Late Corp. of the

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890); Murphy v.
Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
319 See Shayna M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy Is Wrong, 16
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 106 (2006). Sigman's article and some others provide an
exception to this pattern of neglect. See id.; see also Emens, supra note 98, at 362; Keith E.
Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional Prohibitions
Against Polygamy Are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise Clause, 17 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 691, 737-57 (2001); Maura I. Strassberg, The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy:
ConsideringPolyamory, 31 CAP. U. L. REv. 439, 439 (2003) [hereinafter Strassberg, PostModern Polygamy].
320 See Hayes, supra note 310, at 105.
321 See Sigman, supra note 319, at 169-74.
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have stated that polygamy is especially dangerous to the governance of the
liberal state itself.322 We flesh out these claims on behalf of bigamy below.
Our perspective on how to approach this family ties burden will, we hope,
illuminate the debate and raise questions about whether the criminal law is the
proper tool with which to respond to the practice of polygamy.
1.

Voluntary Caregiving and Liberty Interests

To begin, we note that bigamy laws address our first liberal concern in that
the legal burden of a criminal penalty applies only to someone who has
previously created a voluntary caregiving relationship. Thus, when a criminal
penalty based on family status is imposed on X, who is married to Y, for also
marrying Z during an extant and valid marriage to Y, that is a burden on X that
can be regarded as one for which X was on notice. That notice of and implicit
consent to the burden partially diminishes the problem of bigamy laws, but it
does not provide an affirmative and independent justification for these family
ties burdens. They must still undergo further scrutiny.
Our second inquiry, drawing from a very basic account of liberalism, asks
whether there is some liberty at stake that a society committed to advancing
one's liberty should respect. Our view is that the act of plural marriage itself
can be expressive of one's basic rights to establish intimate associational rights
without undue intrusion by the state. We also believe that the right to
terminate those marriages is a right properly belonging to individuals within a
liberal state. So, using the terms above, if X marries Z even though Y opposes
X's second marriage to Z, Y should be able to terminate his marriage to X via
divorce. And if X and Y had signed an agreement that X would not undertake a
second marriage, then that should be enough to keep X from marrying Z while
X is also married to Y. But statutes simply and completely criminalizing
polygamy infringe on the fundamental rights of consenting mature individuals
to enter into covenants of mutual care with other persons. Thus if we are to
criminalize this behavior, the reasons should be very substantial.
2.

Minimalism and Means Analysis
a.

Coercion and Minors

Recall that the first objection to repealing bigamy laws is that polygamous
practices are thought to entail the frequent coercion of underage persons,
usually females. 323 In light of the recent events involving the Fundamentalist
322 Maura Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, 12 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 353,
405-12 (2003) [hereinafter Strassberg, Crime of Polygamy].
323 This was a particular problem with the recently convicted Warren Jeffs, who married

off barely post-pubescent girls in his community and at the same time effectively banished
teenage boys from the community to "make more girls available for marriage to the elders."
Julian Borger, Hellfire and Sexual Coercion: The Dark Side of American Polygamist Sects,
GUARDIAN (London), June 30, 2005, at 15.
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Latter-Day Saints community in Texas, 324 this is a very substantial (though
obviously contingent) consideration, especially because such girls often have
had little recourse to reach beyond the relatively insular communities in which
they were raised. To be sure, the problems that arise in prosecuting persons
guilty of misconduct - the unwillingness or inability of family members to
testify against the perpetrator, and the participation or enabling of the family
members in the abuse - arise in monogamous situations too. But the problems
are especially stark here, where an entire community may support the
polygamist adult male and not his underage wives.
There is another important consideration related to the coercion of underage
women. Some practitioners of polygamy seek to evade criminal sanctions by
simply not declaring to the state that the parties have entered into what would
otherwise be a formal marriage relationship. 325 These minors, forced into a
sexual relationship against their will yet not formally married, clearly need
protection too. Yet, bigamy laws are not always drafted or interpreted to target
this wrong. 326 Indeed, they sometimes render the coerced parties themselves as
criminals. 327 That we must vigilantly guard against harm to minors does not
mean that we must necessarily prohibit the decision of three or more
consenting adults to enter into a polygamous relationship. Using broadlywritten polygamy bans to fight coercion or exploitation of minors is overinclusive and facially discriminatory because it punishes those adults with
polyamorous desires or dispositions willing to abide by norms requiring both
consent and maturity.
There are other laws available to punish the commandeering of immature or
non-consenting minors without infringing upon legitimate associational rights
and interests. First, as suggested in connection with the incest discussion, we
should make sure the law is especially scrutinizing of, and skeptical toward,
sexual and marital relationships involving minors, especially when the
relationship involves an asymmetrical dependency. 328 A child bride could be
deemed, upon adjudication, to be asymmetrically dependent upon her adult
"husband" for care; presumptions that persons eighteen or over are not
asymmetrically dependent, and that minors are, could be rebutted by particular
circumstances. Thus, under our approach, relationships established upon

324 See sources cited supra note 176.
325 See, e.g., Geoffrey Fattah, Bigamy Law Debated, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City),

Feb. 3, 2005, http://deseretnews.com/article/1,5143,600109729,00.html
application of a bigamy law to a man with a "spiritual" third wife).

(debating the

326 But see State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 732 (Utah 2006) (holding that the bigamy
statute in Utah covers both state-sanctioned marriages and those that are not statesanctioned).
327

See, e.g., Feminist Majority Foundation, Utah: Plural Wife Is First Woman Charged
WIRE
(Oct.
16,
2002),

in Polygamy Case, FEMINIST DAILY NEWS
http://feminist.org/news/newsbyte/uswirestory.asp?id=7073.
328

See supra Part III.C. 1.
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pressure or coercion would be prohibited (though the "poly" aspect of this
prohibition is essentially irrelevant since it would apply to monogamous
marriages too).
We should also be vigilant about allowing parental
authorization of marriages below an age of maturity and consent because that
could facilitate abuse within communities committed to flouting those
normative benchmarks. This concern for coercion of minors (and adults) is,
however, relevant in the context of both monogamous marriages and
polygamous ones.
In sum, although we need laws that prohibit the coercion of persons into
marriage or sex, these laws need not be drafted in such a way that
-unnecessarily infringes upon the rights of mature persons to structure their
family lives in the way they feel appropriate. Rather, the government can
develop specific strategies for dealing with acute dangers of coercion of minors
or adult trafficking victims into marriages. In light of our commitment to
being minimalist about the criminal law's reach, if policy-makers are
determined to structure laws to incentivize particular arrangements within the
household, they should not do so through the criminal law when a panoply of
equally effective civil law options are available.
b.

Economics

Another reason some might think criminalizing polygamy is appropriate is
based on the economics of social welfare. If a person has eight spouses and
their offspring for whom she or he must provide care and resources, there is
greater concern that these people might become charges of the welfare state.
The problem with this argument is its contingent and highly speculative nature;
as scholars have shown, the economics of polygamy are quite complicated and
thus might not justify any criminal encroachments on the rights people have to
329
intimate association.
First, in any given polygamous cluster, there might be economies of scale
attaching to family units that allow for the optimization of human capital. One
polygamy activist in Utah paints her participation in a polygamous relationship
in exactly such a manner. 330 Her husband has eight other wives and children
with a number of them. One of the wives is employed by the others to tend to
the collective children for several years at a time while the other wives are free
to pursue careers of their choosing for longer periods of time. Other research
shows that women are materially better off in societies where polygamy is
allowed or encouraged.3 31 To be sure, it is not our goal to improve the lot of
women at the needless expense of any other group, but we advert to such

329 See Sigman, supra note 319, at 151-55 (considering the various economic theories
which may encourage polygamy).
330 See Emens, supra note 98, at 315-17.
331 See Sigman, supra note 319, at 152 n.430; see also ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL
ANIMAL: THE NEW SCIENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 96-99 (1994).
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studies simply to show that who benefits from polygamous arrangements is a
more complicated matter than often assumed.
Second, if an economic burden on the state were a sufficient reason to
infringe upon an otherwise important liberty in associational freedom and
privacy, the state could take a more narrowly tailored measure to ensure the
financial viability of such unions: disqualification of certain spouses from
social benefits if they fail to show that they have adequate means. 332 Indeed,
one could insist that adding more spouses is subject to higher taxes or proof of
assets - both of which are non-criminal rules that can achieve the same end of
reducing numbers on the dole. Obviously, these rules should be crafted in
gender-neutral terms.
Polygamous arrangements are not to everyone's taste, but in a world where
women empirically continue to shoulder the brunt of child-rearing at the cost
of their careers, flexibility in marital arrangements might be a way to minimize
the social and personal costs of abiding by these extant social norms.
c.

Bigamy Laws as a SafeguardAgainst Defiance of the Liberal State

As alluded to earlier, some propose banning polygamy because of the
general injuries the practice inflicts on liberal democratic states. For example,
333
Professor Strassberg argues, with respect to some polygynous communities,
that children from polygamous unions impose an unusual burden on the state
because they are often concealed; that polygamous practices conduce
theocratic communities that fail to abide by or support the government's rules;
civil
these practices create a secrecy that leads to the denial of individual
3 34
rights; and these polygynous communities fail to pay sufficient taxes.
These arguments, while well-motivated, are largely misplaced.
Concealment-based harms are only a challenge in the context of a state that
criminalizes polygamy. It is the threat of criminal liability that often drives the
parties underground. Putting aside social norms that will bend over time, and
recognizing that these norms have already changed somewhat, there is no legal
need to conceal polygamous relations if bigamy laws are repealed. If we were
worried that people were denied their civil rights, then that would be a separate
reason to intervene in any specific situation, but there is nothing inherently
denigrating of civil rights by expanding options for plural marriage. If we are
worried about concrete legitimate wrongs - such as failure to pay taxes resulting from the theocratic tendencies of certain polygynous communities,

332 We presume most people will not be comfortable with this solution. But we are not
convinced there is a problem to solve in the first place; if there is, this is one natural
conclusion among others.
333 It is important to note that the official Mormon institutions no longer support or

encourage polygamy, but there are communities that are Mormon-inspired and continue
these practices; it is largely on these off-shoots that Professor Strassberg focuses.
Strassberg, Crime of Polygamy, supra note 322, at 354.
334 Id. at 405-12.
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we have separate laws available to punish violations of any given law. It is not
as if polygamous communities are the only communities in which
fundamentalist views pose a threat to the vitality and security of a liberal state.
Using polygamy bans to remedy such harms on these grounds is essentially
335
irrational as a government policy.

3.

Gender, Inequality, and Discrimination

Some arguments Professor Strassberg mentions bear especial scrutiny
because they run parallel to arguments opposing polygamy based on cultural or
racial bias. As various scholars have shown, with ample record to support the
argument in the Supreme Court's nineteenth century cases upholding bigamy
laws, 336 opposition to polygamous practices is often rooted in prejudice against
other cultural practices. 337 While opposition to polygamy today is not usually
expressed in racial or ethnic undertones, 338 it does sometimes take on a cast of
339
hostility to religious views.

331Professor Strassberg has emphasized the harm of polygamous communities to liberal
democracies on different grounds. Drawing on a Hegelian perspective, for example,
Strassberg indicated that polygamous marriage cultivates despotism or inhibits the
development of liberal values such as equality among persons. See, e.g., Maura I.
Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex
Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1537 (1997) [hereinafter Strassberg, Distinctions]
(commenting that monogamous marriage is "peculiarly suited to cultivate the freedom to
pursue particular ends and the freedom of self-governance by rational ethical principles
which must be characteristic of citizens of a free state"). In response, Professor Sigman
persuasively notes that the social science literature does not "significantly substantiate the
theory that polygamy bars the development of romantic love within a private intimate
sphere, that polygamy causes despotism, or that monogamy causes the development of the
liberal state." Sigman, supra note 319, at 176. From a theoretical perspective, moreover,
we are puzzled why Professor Strassberg would be willing to tolerate the decriminalization
of laws limiting polyfidelity involving mature individuals if these Hegelian concerns were
paramount. See Strassberg, Crime of Polygamy, supra note 322, at 429 (concluding that
there is little evidence to justify bans on polyamory when it involves mature individuals).
Additionally, our sense is that liberal regimes retain their credibility by reducing the
instances in which they use the criminal law to interfere with the autonomous and
consenting choices of the individuals involved. Taking a firm stand against polygamy
requires liberal regimes to abandon their commitment to respect most forms of private
ordering in the absence of obvious and substantial negative externalities.
336 E.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
131See Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalizationof Immigration
Law, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 641, 648-49 (2005); Martha M. Ertman, The Story of Reynolds v.
United States: Federal "Hell Hounds" Punishing Mormon Treason, in FAMILY LAW
STORIEs 51, 54-56 (Carol Sanger ed., 2008).
338 Historical opposition to polygamy sometimes invoked explicitly racist rationales, for
example, that polygamy was something that was "almost exclusively a feature of the life of
Asiatic and of African people," not something that was appropriate "among the northern and
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A more powerful reason to be worried about decriminalizing bigamy is that
polygamy, on some views, serves to facilitate the subordination of women,
even when they are adults.

340

Although bigamy statutes are facially neutral to

women, and thus prohibit both polygyny and polyandry,3 41 we acknowledge
the sociological and anthropological evidence showing that polyandry is much
rarer. 342 Nonetheless, the research on this topic indicates that claims of
thoroughgoing subordination of women go too far in light of the diverse
reasons that polygamy erupts and the diverse forms polygamy takes under
different conditions. 343 Moreover, it is a mistake to resist polygamy (or more
specifically, polygyny) as oppressive to women without noting that the same
norms that exist within some polygamous communities also exist within some

western nations of Europe." Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164; see also Francis Lieber, The
Mormons: Shall Utah Be Admitted into the Union?, 5 PUTNAM'S MONTHLY 225, 234 (1855).
339It seems that much of the historical American animus against polygamy is rooted in
religious discrimination against the Mormon faith tradition and its adherents. See, e.g.,
Martha M. Ertman, "They Ain't Whites, They're Mormons": An Illustrated History of
Polygamy as Race Treason 2 (Univ. of Md. Legal Studies Research, Working Paper No.
2008-37, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1270023.
Additionally, many Christians traditionally viewed polygamy with disdain and continue to
do so today. Sigman, supra note 319, at 142-43.
340 Sigman helpfully explains why polygamy may be more marginally abusive to women
but also why these claims are suspect. See Sigman, supra note 319, at 172-73. She states:
(1) polygamy invites secrecy, undermining women's ability to get help if needed; (2)
the structure of polygamy suggests that the husband will not have sufficient time to
devote to each wife or their children; (3) the treatment by other wives may be abusive;
and (4) the types of people who voluntarily choose polygamy may be attracted to the
uneven power dynamic.
However, there is no evidence that polygamy per se creates abuse or neglect.
Having sister wives can be a support network. The status of senior wives versus junior
wives and the relationships among these women vary between cultures. In fact, by
banding together, women sometimes wield more power to change their husband's
problematic behavior. Yet sometimes co-wives are perpetrators [of the abuse against
women].
Id.
341 Cheshire Calhoun, Who's Afraid of Polygamous Marriage? Lessons for Same-Sex
Marriage Advocacy from the History of Polygamy, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1023, 1039
(2005) ("What these historical details remind us is that gender inequality is a contingent, not
a conceptual, feature of polygamy.").
342 Sigman, supra note 319, at 161-63.
143See id. at 163-64 ("Rather than the gender biased monolith some have made it out to
be, polygyny is a multi-faceted choice of family structure, rooted in the economic,
sociological, cultural, and biological particulars of a given society."); see also Remi Clignet
& Joyce A. Sween, For a Revisionist Theory of Human Polygyny, 6 SIGNs 445, 467 (1981)
(demonstrating the diversity of polygynous marriages).
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There is also some empirical evidence
monogamous communities. 344
indicating that abuse is no more likely in polygynous communities than in
monogamous ones. 345 Indeed, perhaps because of the marginalization of
polygamous practices, polygamy supporters argue that it is harder for female
victims or allies of victims to report abuse because it might lead to bad
consequences for the victim. 346 Of course, this same reluctance to report abuse
or coercion is a concern in monogamous relationships; but unlike in
monogamous relationships, the victims of abuse in polygamous relationships
consequences from the state, such as the
might face serious collateral
347
rights.
parental
of
termination
Consequently, we have to sift carefully among the potential causes of harms
to women. As Professor Shayna Sigman trenchantly writes:
The belief that polygyny causes gender discrimination or a low status of
women in a given society is a classic example of the fallacy of post hoc
ergo propter hoc. That polygyny can be found in societies that treat
women poorly does not mean that the practice itself causes the gender
inequality. Often, the true culprit of oppression merely lies in limitations
on property rights for women, a practice that can be facilitated through
polygamous life, but need not be. Indeed, where polygyny can help
women economically by linking them with men who can provide more
resources, it is the societies with less gender discrimination that are found
3 48
to have this arrangement.
Moreover, there is the powerful point that taking away a woman's right to
participate in a polygamous arrangement is itself a way of subordinating
Again, as Professor Sigman observes: "prohibiting polygamy
women.
infantilizes women, declaring them incapable of providing consent and
foreclosing true choice by criminalizing one of their options for family
349
living."
In response to the claim that bigamy laws support the anti-subordination of
women, we note that many of the claims regarding the subservience of women

344 E.g., Strassberg, Distinctions, supra note 335, at 1589 ("[M]onogamous marriages in
nineteenth-century America were based on the same patriarchal ideas about women's nature
and gender roles as polygamous Mormon marriages.").
141 See Sigman, supra note 319, at 173 nn.595-96; see also Hayes, supra note 310, at 107
n.47 ("If there are crimes being committed, and underage child brides, that needs to be
prosecuted .... [But,] what's the difference between that and other lifestyles with children
in them?" (citing Interview with Nancy Perkins, Reporter, Deseret Morning News (Apr. 12,
2006))).
346 See Hayes, supra note 310, at 107.
141 Cf Janet Elliott et al., CPS Calls Sect Its Largest Case Ever, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr.
8, 2008, at Al (describing the adversarial custody hearings which would begin for each
child found in the polygamous compound).
348 Sigman, supra note 319, at 164 (footnotes omitted).
149 Id. at 172.
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in plural marriages have also been made with regard to monogamous marriage
and the legal institutions accompanying it. So if anti-subordination is the goal,
then two questions arise: whether, as an empirical matter, plural marriage
prohibitions in fact achieve marginal harm reduction; or, alternatively, whether
marriage as a legal institution should be abolished. 350 In light of the fact that
many prominent feminists have over the years argued for decriminalizing
bigamy, including Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton,35 1we should
evaluate more carefully blanket claims about the subservience of women in
plural marriage made in the absence of hard empirical evidence. We also note
that empirical evidence of polygamy's harms in liberal democracies will be
difficult to come by so long as the practice remains banned.
Last, we think bigamy laws' effects on homosexual unions of two or more
persons warrant attention. Obviously to the extent homosexual couples are
denied the right to marry one partner, they are also denied the right to marry
two partners simultaneously. Bigamy laws just add further insult to injury
since whatever protective benefit or function the bigamy laws were designed to
achieve for heterosexuals is denied to homosexual families. Despite this
problematic discrimination, however, we note that the particular problem can
be solved either by leveling down (decriminalization for all) or leveling up
(expanding criminalization). 352 Thus, discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation could also be overcome by an expansion of bigamy laws, one that
would encompass and sanction the misconduct of homosexual couples who
have chosen to register their union with the state for this purpose alone, or for
other protections and benefits the state might offer to homosexual couples.
4.

A Solution

Assuming the liberty to enter multiple covenants of mutual care is morally
defensible on the grounds that the autonomous, honest choices of mature
persons deserve respect, then it seems that the state should abandon the
business of criminalizing polygamy, and let private ordering, and perhaps civil
taxes and subsidies, determine who marries whom. This would entail, of
course, that persons with same-sex or poly orientations should be able to group
together as well without fear of prosecution.
In practical terms, we propose the decriminalization of bigamy as between
mature, consenting adults. Partners who wanted to secure exclusivity of
marital relations could contract around such a rule through a private contract
calling for, if desired, liquidated damages. This would place the burden of
350 See sources cited supra note 214.
351 See Nancy L. Rosenblum, Democratic Families: "The Logic of Congruence" and
PoliticalIdentity, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 145, 162 (2003).
352 Cf Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1388, 1436 (1988) (describing similar "level-up"/

"level-down" options in the context of distribution of the death penalty based on the
victim's race).
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talking about the preference for imposing the family ties burden on the person
who wanted the family ties burden imposed. Given our general leeriness about
makes sense in light of the contract
family ties burdens, this burden-shifting
35 3
law theory of default rules.
There are several advantages to this regime. First, it encourages couples to
discuss in advance of their marriage whether both parties have a desire to keep
the union monogamous. Second, it allows couples the flexibility to work out
these issues without fear of the criminal law sanction. In other words, couples
could create agreements in which polygamy is prohibited, but without the
involvement of criminal law penalties. Third, it allows those who want the
benefits that accrue from having a penalty to opt in to a regime of regulation by
contract. To be sure, such a regime forces individuals to have conversations
that might be uncomfortable, but the statute would prove to be a powerful
information-forcing device prior to marriage. Fourth, because liquidated
damages provisions are only enforceable to the degree they are a reasonable
estimation of the damages to an individual, they can be set at a level sufficient
to communicate condemnation of the breach of trust, while still ensuring the
party in breach can remain a productive member of society and a caregiver to
any dependents. How exactly one should estimate the worth of the breach is
surely a difficult question. But we suspect a common sense judgment can be
made about what might count as an impermissible penalty clause.
That we think bigamy should be decriminalized does not mean the state
must affirmatively endorse "poly" relationships. Emphatically, the views
developed here (as in our discussion of all these family ties burdens) are
limited to the proper scope of the criminal law. Our argument does not require
that the state forbear from promoting certain kinds of relationships through the
civil system - if the state wanted to endorse those views which believe children
are better raised through stable monogamous marriages, 354 it could do so
through the use of civil subsidies and taxes, rather than criminal penalties. We
do not necessarily agree that the state should use the civil justice system in this
way, but at the very least, the civil justice system's carrots and sticks do not
trigger the most fundamental liberty interests of citizens.

353It is hard to say whether a rule that defaults to decriminalization of bigamy would be a
penalty default rule or a market-mimicking rule. Although the overwhelming majority of
Americans oppose polygamy, the pattern of non-prosecution for most instances of polygamy
over the years suggests (weakly) that there is not much support for enforcing polygamy
bans. See Sigman, supra note 319, at 140-41 (observing a lack of prosecutions over much
of the last fifty years, and general apathy among Utah law enforcement to prosecute
polygamists); Dirk Johnson, Polygamists Emerge from Secrecy, Seeking Not Just Peace but
Respect, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1991, at A22 ("[I]n recent years, as state law enforcement
officials have adopted an unwritten policy of leaving them alone, polygamists have gone
public.").
311Cf Leah Sears Ward, A Case for Strengthening Marriage, WASH. POST, Oct. 30,
2006, at A 17 (arguing that society should focus on encouraging marriage).
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Despite the appeal of some of these recent arguments in favor of
decriminalizing bigamy, opposition to the practice continues to be widespread
in American society. As of 2004, more than ninety percent of Americans still
viewed polygamy as immoral.3 55 Polygamy activists will have to demonstrate
to Americans that the parties to these unions are genuinely consenting, and that
the externalities of such practices, both on the state and on any resulting
children, will be close to trivial.
E.

Adultery

356
As we saw in Part I, almost half the states still retain adultery laws.
Adultery laws are sparingly used to prosecute individuals outside the military
context. 357 To be sure, some might view this state of prosecutorial desuetude
as a sign of progress that we are no longer interested in pursuing "mere"
morals legislation. However, there is still support in various regions to retain
these prohibitions, even if they are largely symbolic. 35 8 The reasons for this
support are worth consideration: some may view adultery's potential harm to
children, or spouses who do not consent to their partner's non-exclusivity, as
profound and worthy of criminal sanction. Indeed, a decision to commit
adultery has the potential to undermine an individual's ability to perform
necessary caretaking functions, in that one's energies and attention will be
focused outside the family unit rather than within it. Moreover, some may
view these laws as helping to further the state's interest in keeping the
institution of marriage strong and stable.

1.

Voluntary Caregiving and Liberty Interests

As with bigamy laws, the current prohibitions on adultery attach only to
voluntarily created relationships - indeed, the paradigmatic one of marriage.
In that sense, adultery laws meet the first liberal concern we highlighted in Part
II.359 However, there are still other considerations. When adultery is defined
simply as a married person's sexual relations with a person not his or her
spouse, then the question is whether there is some normatively attractive
liberty to commit adultery such that a liberal society should respect it or at
least tolerate it by not harnessing upon it the condemnatory power of the
criminal law. On the one hand, when adultery is performed with duplicity, it
hardly warrants praise. But that still leaves the question of whether it warrants
the condemnation associated with criminal sanction, especially if non-criminal
355 AEI STUDY IN PUB. OPINION, AM. ENTER. INST., ArrITUDES ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY

AND GAY MARRIAGE 51 (2004).

356 See supra note 106.
317 See supra notes 108, 110 and accompanying text.
358 See Joanna Grossman, PunishingAdultery in Virginia: A Cheating Husband's Guilty
Plea Is a Reminder of the Continued Relevance of Adultery Statutes, FINDLAW, Dec. 16,

2003, http://writ.news.findlaw.con/grossman/20031216.html.
"I See supra Part II.E.

1412

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:1327

alternatives are available, as we discuss below. On the other hand, imagine a
devoted couple wherein one person faces prolonged illness or some emotional
development precluding the desire or capacity for sex or intimate
companionship. One can easily imagine couples who might jointly authorize,
either through a prenuptial agreement, or through open or tacit consent, to a
partner's sexual relations with someone outside the marriage. It is hard to
understand why a liberal state should be opposed to that private ordering
arrangement if harms to third parties are trivial to non-existent.
2.

Minimalism and Means Analysis

The objective of preventing betrayals of the marriage bond can be achieved
through various non-criminal law norms, though admittedly it is hard to tell
whether these non-criminal means are equally effective. Even in those states
without adultery laws, however, there are still strong social norms against
cheating in one's marriage. The strength of these social norms should not
surprise us; comparable social norms against gambling, private tobacco use,
and prostitution are to be found in various liberal democracies throughout the
globe. It is hard to believe that the modem state could not adopt effective
norm-shaping and regulatory strategies that encourage and incentivize faithful
360
monogamous unions without the use of the criminal law.
3.

Gender, Inequality, and Discrimination

Because only a very few jurisdictions permit same-sex marriage, it bears
emphasis that adultery laws work primarily for the benefit of partners (and,
arguendo, children) to heterosexual marriages and not to partners (or children)
of gay unions. Although we think adultery laws should generally be abolished
based upon the very limited state interest in proscribing this conduct, we think
this added discrimination is very problematic. We note, however, as is true of
bigamy laws, the discrimination can be overcome by an expansion of adultery
laws, one that would sanction the misconduct of gays who have chosen to
register their union with the state for this purpose alone, or for other
protections and benefits the state might offer to homosexual couples. Yet this
expansion (to alleviate discrimination) sits in tension with our commitment to
minimalism.

360 Indeed, many states have a multitude of civil law mechanisms which signal

disapproval of adultery and encourage monogamy. In North Carolina, for example, spousal
support laws are used to send very powerful messages: if a judge finds that the "supporting
spouse" engaged in an act of "illicit sexual behavior," the judge must award alimony to the
dependent spouse. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(a) (2007). On the other hand, if the
dependent spouse engaged in sexual misconduct, the judge cannot award alimony, no matter
how destitute the dependent spouse may be. See id.
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A Solution

We understand the viewpoint that at least in certain contexts involving
duplicity, adultery statutes help punish and deter injury to persons who did not
consent to extramarital sex - the spumed spouse. But what adultery laws do
not permit, and what they should, is a life in which both parties consent to one
or both parties living in marriage but outside the bonds of monogamy, whether
permanently or temporarily. This would have the effect of destabilizing the
conflation of marriage with persistent sexual companionship.
As with bigamy, we view adultery laws that criminalize the extramarital sex
of married persons as facial family ties burdens warranting careful scrutiny,
despite the fact that they are triggered by virtue of a voluntarily created
relationship of caregiving. That is because, in the absence of such adultery
laws, the proscribed activity would otherwise be lawful. Given that adultery
laws are drafted in gender-neutral terms across the country, we do not believe
3 61
they inherently raise issues of patriarchy or gender bias against women.
Nonetheless, because same-sex marriage is not permitted in almost all
American jurisdictions, adultery laws protect the interests of (potentially)
betrayed heterosexual partners while not being similarly available to those in
same-sex partnerships. For us, that is a basis for rethinking adultery laws.
Assuming that adultery statutes could be made indifferent to sexual
orientation, would there be any reason to retain them in some fashion? We
think the strategy we endorsed in the bigamy context is instructive. 362 We
would begin with a statute creating a default rule that decriminalizes adultery
because of the way adultery intrudes on the choices of autonomous and
consenting individuals. But we would encourage prospective partners to
contract around that default rule if they wished by agreements that called for
liquidated damages. 363 This regime virtually mirrors the advantages we have
3 64
laid out in the discussion of bigamy.
It needs emphasis that the burden for contracting around the default rule of
permitting adultery must fall upon the individual who has information

361 Some have argued that the United States military actually has an implicitly gendered

approach to prosecuting adultery within courts-martial. See Hopkins, supra note 111, at
234-35.
362 See supra Part III.D.2.
363 See Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REv. 1758, 1779 & n.87
(2005) (suggesting that perhaps marriage one day could "mov[e] closer to a system of
default rules within which couples could structure their own lives," for example by choosing
to have "reliance or expectation damages" available for the breach of certain promises).
36 See supra Part III.D.4 (listing the advantages of having couples address the issue of
monogamy on their own without fear of criminal law sanction, regulating any monogamy
agreement by contract, and allowing couples the ability to set liquated damages so they
communicate condemnation of the breach of trust while still ensuring the breacher remains a
productive member of society).
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regarding his or her preference for monogamous relations. 365 Thus, the person
wanting the extra burden imposed has to raise the issue and force a
conversation about monogamy. In light of the difficulties raised by many
family burdens, this is where the burden should lie. This is also consistent
with our sense that if we are to have other family ties burdens like duties to
rescue or supervise, the benefits flowing from these duties should be available
for a wide range of persons who either have signaled their caregiving
commitments through parenthood or partnership, or who are not in such
relationships but who nonetheless want to create a compact of caregiving.
Admittedly, we toyed with an idea - inspired by an article by Professor
Elizabeth Emens 366 - that parties should be able to opt into a regime of
voluntary criminal law regulation, such that breach of a contract for
monogamy could lead to criminal prosecutions for bigamy or adultery. 367 But
upon further consideration, we recognized the unfairness of using public

365 It is hard to say whether decriminalization of adultery works to create a penalty

default rule or a market-mimicking default rule. It is a penalty default rule if we assume
most people want their marriages to look more like "covenant marriages," which require
higher entry and exit costs. See generally Steven L. Nock et al., Covenant Marriage Turns
Five Years Old, 10 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 169 (2003) (describing the terms of covenant
marriage and analyzing satisfaction rates of those who have chosen them). If couples want
exclusivity, the law will force them to take active steps to communicate and discuss that
preference. On the other hand, it may be possible to infer (based on patterns of nonprosecution for adultery, and assuming prosecutorial responsiveness to majoritarian will)
that most people do not want to have the criminal law enforce these matters, even if they
view adultery in low regard. In that respect, the statute serves as a market-mimicking
default rule. One flag of caution we want to raise is that if a jurisdiction adopted a default
rule of decriminalization, it has to be aware of how default rules can be "sticky," and how
such stickiness might affect the prospect of law's ability to affect behavior. For example, if
we create a rule that defaults to allowing extramarital sex without any legal stigma, it might
actually encourage that behavior even if the goal of the default rule is simply to encourage
partners to have conversations and agreements about the scope of their relationship to each
other. Of course, this result might occur if we simply decriminalized adultery without
giving the opportunity for partners to secure promises of exclusivity through marital
agreements. On "sticky" default rules, see generally Ronald J. Mann, Contracts- Only with
Consent, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1873 (2004); Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering
Rules in CorporateLaw, 60 SMU L. REv. 383 (2007).
366 Emens, supra note 98, at 361-75.
367 Id. at 365. We note that Professor Emens, after weighing various costs and benefits,
ultimately preferred simple decriminalization of adultery statutes, noting the possibility that
these statutes might be unconstitutional after Lawrence. Id. at 374-75. On the particular
issue of post-Lawrence constitutionality, our sense is that if adultery statutes are drafted to
be more respectful of the autonomous choices of individuals opting into a regime of
regulation to prevent the kinds of harms that might materialize both to betrayed spouses and
to any children of such a marriage, then it is likely they would survive constitutional
scrutiny. Nonetheless, we too prescind from "contractual criminal law regulation" but
principally for reasons having to do with fairness and externalities.
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resources to investigate, prosecute, and punish conduct that amounted to a
breach of private promises to each other. The notion that average people
would have to pay more taxes or suffer the effects of diverting scarce
prosecutorial resources to prosecute the failure of a private party to live up to
its contractual sexual expectations seemed ultimately unsupportable. By
contrast, even in the absence of "contractual criminal law regulation" of
adultery or polygamy, parties of any sexual preference can contract for
monogamous commitments on pain of liquidated damages, and private
ordering could thus be made to supplant the clunky machinery of the state's
3 68
prosecutorial apparatus.
In sum, because we believe the protections of the criminal law should not be
arbitrarily denied to couples of different stripes, and because we think there are
serious minimalism concerns and some liberalism concerns with categorical
rules against adultery, we support the decriminalization of adultery laws. This
would put everyone on the same footing. At the same time, it would permit
parties of all sorts to contract around a world without criminal penalties. 369 As
we explained above, we would prefer to set the default rule in a way that
incentivized the person wanting the family taxes imposed to ensure the
agreement of the other spouse.
Thus far, we have not said much about what criminal law consequences, if
any, should be visited upon a person who has sexual relations with a married
person. 370 (Recall that in some jurisdictions, adultery statutes encompass the
"outside" person who intrudes upon the marital relationship.) 371 We think the
reach of these statutes goes too far, violating our second liberalism principle,

One way to reduce the externality, however, would be to have the social cost of the
sanction placed on the contracting parties. Thus, if the sanction was capped as a
misdemeanor punishable only by a sentence of community service with no collateral
consequences, it would dramatically reduce the concern of a socially costly punishment.
The imposition of that penalty could be permitted by statute to vest in those civil or family
courts adjudicating the breach of the contract. We also note that there are some cases that
have invalidated various contracts made between spouses, but the agreements we are
discussing here are antenuptial; those are usually enforced if both parties are informed by
counsel and reflect a basic fairness in exchange between the parties.
369 The family law implications of these proposals for property distribution or other
issues are matters beyond the scope of our criminal law focus here. However, our libertyrespecting framework for polygamy raises important and interesting questions about the
reach of family ties benefits, such as whether a person with several spouses should be
entitled to spousal privileges with all of them, etc. This is a topic we hope to take up in our
book, where we can better juxtapose these issues for the reader.
370 The "outside" person, X, is (knowingly or unknowingly) intruding upon the marital
space between Y and Z. Our analysis of what penalty should attach to X is contingent upon
X's marital status. IfX is unmarried, no penalty should attach, in our view, assuming Xis a
competent and mature individual. IfX is married, his treatment at the hands of the criminal
law should be contingent upon what kind of exclusivity his marital contract calls for.
368

371 See supra note 104.
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and that such adultery statutes should also be modified to end criminal liability
for those persons. But note that when the adultery statutes extend criminal
liability to those third persons, there is no family ties burden imposed on the
basis of that person's familial status or familial connection to the crime.
Properly understood, those provisions of adultery laws are not family ties
burdens as we define them.
Nonpayment of Child Support

F.

As we described in Part I, criminal sanctions have been adopted across the
country to ensure that parents do not flout their obligations to provide material
support for the well-being of their children. 372 This development has occurred
for a few reasons. First, it is politically attractive for politicians to stand
against parents who neglect their children. 37 3 Second, and more importantly,
374
It
the nonpayment of child support is a serious problem in our society.
subsistence.
payments
for
on
support
obviously harms children, who rely
Moreover, it harms the single parents left to struggle alone for the care of their
children. Because more single-parent households are headed by mothers, it
ultimately leaves women to bear most of the brunt of parenthood and its unique
challenges. 375 It also harms society at large, in that taxpayers may be forced to
shoulder the burden of financially supporting those children who end up on the
welfare rolls as a consequence of the nonpayment of child support. It is,
accordingly, unsurprising that our criminal justice system takes special interest
in child support debts. Although all unpaid debts risk harming classes of
creditors, when the classes of creditors are especially vulnerable children with
very little recourse to self-help options, we can see why it would be appealing
at first blush for policy-makers to look to the criminal justice system to help
make sure these debts gets paid. Let us see if these reasons stand up to
scrutiny.
1.

Voluntary Caregiving and Liberty Interests

Criminally punishing parents for debts to their children and former spouses
clearly triggers the concern that most family ties burdens do: it punishes the
same conduct - failure to pay a debt - differently based on the familial status
of the debtor. For the reasons adverted to earlier in Part I1, we can explain why
these family ties burdens continue to have some appeal: parents can plausibly
be deemed to have consented to assume certain obligations and responsibilities
by having their children. The family ties burden here is one that is imposed on
persons voluntarily creating these caregiving relationships.
372 See supra Part I.F.

373 Cf William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv.

505, 529-30 (2001) (stating that legislators have a great incentive to appeal to voters by both
generating outcomes and taking symbolic stands).
371 See Maldonado, supra note 122, at 1008-12.

"' See id.
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But the case of a criminally punished obligation to support one's children
may reveal a limitation of our approach, because one could plausibly retort that
it is too facile to say that the nonpayment of a contractual debt to a phone
company, for example, is the same conduct as the nonpayment of child
support. In other words, one could argue that our society has differential views
about the blameworthiness of these two forms of nonpayment precisely
because we see them as different sorts of conduct, not as the same conduct
treated differently on the basis of status. We cannot deny that this redescription of the burden has some rhetorical force; however, we still think our
organizing method of scrutiny helps expose something deep and pervasive
about how the criminal justice system interacts with a normative conception of
the family.
Our first liberal concern focusing on autonomy seems met by these laws.
Our second liberal concern asks whether there is some underlying liberty
worthy of respect to the act of not satisfying one's obligations to support one's
child. Our short answer is that it depends. As discussed in Part II, there are
some situations where the obligation should not attach. A sperm donor may be
the genetic parent but if he disclaims, prior to the donation of the sperm, all
future rights to the resulting offspring, he should not be held to pay child
support. Similarly, a couple who gives a child up for adoption, and thus
terminates their parental rights, should not be on the hook. But someone who
has voluntarily entered into a parenting relationship should not be able to enjoy
the benefits associated with parenting without also facing the obligations to be
a minimally competent and supportive parent. The question is whether those
obligations should be fixed by criminal law, and if so by what kinds of
sanctions.
2.

Minimalism and Means Analysis

The use of the criminal sanction should be used sparingly if there are noncriminal alternatives that might be equally effective at satisfying the goals
here. Using the criminal justice system with respect to this particular duty to
support is not likely to be an effective use of criminal sanctions. First,
depending on the penalty imposed, criminal sanctions might risk putting
"deadbeat" parents in prison, where they certainly will not be able to earn
money to help support their children. Prison or other forms of forced
separation also prevents the debtor parent from having meaningful
relationships with their children - even if their only failure as parents was
being too poor to pay support. If the sanction is a fine that goes to the state,
then that is money that might otherwise be needed to go to the child.
But these criticisms of imprisoning or fining "deadbeat" parents do not close
the debate. As earlier acknowledged, the ability of the criminal law to have an
educative or expressive effect is worth careful attention. Having a criminal
statute apply in a way that does not itself make matters worse for the child may
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be possible through alternative or intermediate sanctions. 376 For one thing, in
these contexts, the adjudication alone may be valuable for both general
deterrent and specific communicative purposes. When a public body declares,
"you have flouted one of your most pressing obligations, the support of the
children, and you warrant condemnation," that can be a powerful tool in
shaping attitudes. But it might be that alternative non-criminal measures can
also bring home that message to the offender in question, and to the public at
large. Moreover, our anxiety about using the criminal sanction promiscuously
here is that it focuses attention too narrowly on the economic aspects of
parenthood, devaluing other important contributions to parenthood. When
applied mostly to fathers, as it is, it further reinforces outdated views about
fathers discharging their parental obligations through money rather than direct
caregiving.

377

Our minimalist approach would try to ensure that we have considered how
else to reduce the incidence of nonpayment of child support. It is worth noting
that a number of other non-criminal enforcement mechanisms already exist to
induce individuals to comply with their mandated child support payments.
Wages can be garnished, tax refunds can be intercepted, and licenses and
passports can be suspended. 378 Further, these remedies can often be pursued
outside the criminal courts, such as through state administrative agencies or
through mediation. These civil proceedings can potentially promote the
important ends that animate the current laws with more sophisticated, more
sensitive, and less troublesome or stigmatic means. And without the stigma of
criminal conviction, debtor parents can more easily get the jobs, education and
housing needed to meet their obligations. Primarily, these other enforcement
mechanisms might be sufficient to keep "deadbeat" parents in their children's
lives while at the same time ensuring that children receive the funding to which
they are entitled.
We cannot avoid the core question, however: when these mechanisms fail,
say with repeat offenders, should enforcement through the criminal justice
system, and in particular the use of incarceration, be an option of last resort?
There is at least one study, albeit somewhat dated, that suggests that criminal
sanctions can be effective in reducing the incidence of the problem. Professor
David Chambers "found a close parallel between payments and jailing: the
counties that jailed more did in fact collect more. '379 But other mechanisms
376 See generally

Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive?

Retributivism and the Implicationsfor the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV.

2157 (2001) (discussing the use of guilt punishments as alternative sanctions not involving
public shaming).
377See Maldonado, supra note 122, at 1000.
378 See, e.g., WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 246, at 700-01 (describing various
enforcement mechanisms).
179 DAVID L. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT

84 (1979). Chambers studied enforcement efforts in Michigan between 1972 and 1975. Id.;
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have been shown to be even more effective than incarceration, with suspension
Generally then,
of driver's licenses being the most effective stick. 380
incarceration should not be an available sentencing option for this offense,
because, among other reasons, incarceration affirmatively impedes caregiving
rather than fostering it. More empirical evidence would be helpful in coming
to final resolution on this issue since ifjailing were the most effective means of
making deadbeat parents pay support, we would have to concede that the case
for criminalization would be stronger.
3.

Gender, Inequality, and Discrimination

Although the statutes that criminally punish "deadbeat" parents are drafted
in gender-neutral ways, fathers are most often the ones imprisoned under these
laws. 381 It is undeniable that punishing mostly men for failing to pay child
support contributes to a gender stereotype that assumes that men are supposed
to be breadwinners and women are supposed to be caregivers. This system
contributes to and reinforces gender hierarchy in our society - and it therefore
382
raises our general concerns about family ties burdens.
Although we applaud the drafting of these laws in gender-neutral language,
more work can be done to take focus off the family in particular, so as to focus
more on voluntary caregiving relationships. 383 Again, our general approach is
to deflect attention away from state-sanctioned families and promote the
reorientation of family ties burdens to target relationships of voluntary
caregiving. We suggest broadening the ambit of whatever approach the law
takes to the punishment or treatment of nonpayment of debts of child support
to include all nonpayment of debts of support to those in asymmetrical
relationships of voluntary caregiving. That would avoid the discrimination
typically occurring ex ante against persons in same-sex or polyamorous
relationships and at the same time would extend to the children of such unions
the "protective" benefit these burdens are supposed to achieve.

see also Drew A. Swank, The National Child Non-Support Epidemic, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL
L. REv. 357, 375-78.
380 See Swank, supra note 379, at 378.
381 A woman has been jailed for failing to pay child support in at least one case. See
David Stout, In Rare Role Reversal, Mother Is Jailedfor a Failureto Pay, N.Y. TIMES, July

26, 1995, at B5.
382 It is critical to remember that in thinking about these burdens from an ex ante/ex post
perspective that we be especially mindful of how gender affects this particular context. See
discussion supra Part II.A.3. Assuming a veil of ignorance in designing these policies, no
one knows what gender they will be; and these policies quite clearly impact the genders
differently, however facially neutral they are drawn.
383To the extent that nonpayment of child support can be thought of as a form of
omissions liability, we have already acknowledged above that omissions liability can be
justified under several circumstances; these justifications could also apply in this context as
well. See supra Part III.A.
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A Solution

We cannot deny that there are countervailing values that justify these laws
in many people's minds. As we suggested, these debts, when unpaid, can
largely harm vulnerable children and even primary caregivers themselves. So
what does our particular framework offer to the public policy community on
the issue of nonpayment of child support? Must the legal system get out of the
business of these prosecutions?
Based on what we noted above, we would favor a solution that minimizes
the use of the criminal sanction to ensure these obligations are met, including
perhaps the processes of restorative justice to communicate the nature of the
wrong to the debtor parent but also to give a forum in which the debtor can
explain to the relevant persons and stakeholders why the debt is not paid. In
those cases where the criminal sanction is used to condemn unjustified selfish
behavior by the debtor parent, it should be applied to only and all those persons
who have undertaken a voluntary caregiving role towards the child, thus using
a sanction that actually promotes or is consistent with the caregiving
obligations of the offender.
G. Nonpayment ofParentalSupport
In Part I we described the family ties burden created by criminal statutes that
punish adult children who fail to provide financial support to their indigent
parents. 384 Because of the rarity with which prosecutions are made under these
laws, 385 we will be relatively brief in our assessment, which is, on the whole,
negative.
The plain objectives of these laws are: first, to ensure aid to those who are
vulnerable in old age; and second, to educate the public and reinforce an
obligation through the criminal law to parents based on gratitude or a notion of
unbargained-for reciprocity. 386 Do these laws pass muster under our normative
framework?
1.

Voluntary Caregiving and Liberty Interests

These laws fail our concern with voluntary caregiving because it creates a
family ties burden on a person who did not voluntarily establish a relationship
with the indigent parent. The adult child is penalized simply by virtue of being
the indigent parent's child and, in many cases, the beneficiary of the parent's
past support and care.
From the perspective of our concern with liberty, should an adult retain the
liberty to support only those he volunteered to support? The answer to this, at
least from a liberal legal perspective, is yes. Obviously, it is appropriate and
praiseworthy for an adult with means to support his parents, whether based on

"' See supra Part I.G.
385 Kline, supra note 127,

386

Id. at 205-06.

at 196.
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love, reciprocity, or gratitude. But it is not the business of the criminal law to
require that support, and when it does, it violates a basic precept of criminal
law by condemning a person for failing to act grateful. This seems too slender
a reed to justify criminal sanctions.
2.

Minimalism and Means Analysis

We begin by looking at the first objective of these laws. Here it is to ensure
necessary aid to indigent and vulnerable persons, usually when they are elderly
and without physical means to help themselves. To our mind, the obligation to
help such persons is one that is agent-neutral, and thus, if it is to be undertaken,
it should be undertaken and funded by the public at large; otherwise, it
discriminates against those indigent elderly persons without children or those
whose children predeceased the parents. In any event, there is no special need
for using the criminal sanction to ensure support when social services funded
out of taxes could more readily ensure that the public interest in protecting the
indigent elderly is satisfied.
As to the second objective, given our liberal orientation, we are doubtful
that the state has an important public interest in vindicating norms of care
based on gratitude. Assuming arguendo that we stipulate to the compelling or
important nature of the second goal - of educating the public and reinforcing
an obligation to parents based on gratitude - we do not understand why the
civil remedies available to enunciate this obligation would be insufficient.
As with duties to support children, if the goal is ensuring norm projection
and compensation, the goal can be expressed and the money can be obtained
through civil actions or garnished through wages and tax refunds. If a criminal
penalty were to attach, such that the person went to prison or had to pay a fine
to the state, that sanction would usually impede the first goal of ensuring
adequate resources to the vulnerable elderly parent ex post, even if it might
achieve some marginal deterrence ex ante against the prospect of adult children
walking away from their parents. We would invite empirical scholars to weigh
this cost based on existing data, but we would not really seek out new
legislative experiments based on our view that imposing this obligation on
children is improper.
3.

Gender, Inequality, and Discrimination
Regarding the concerns about gender, inequality, and discrimination, we
note first that imposing criminal liability on those violating filial responsibility
norms discriminates ex ante against children raised by parents in those gay or
polyamorous unions that are not recognized by the state. These children are
told, effectively, that they are not viewed as children of the person they
properly regard as a parent. The discriminatory injury to the child is
admittedly quite slight. But these laws also have the effect of denying to gay
and polyamorous parents the "protective" benefit these burdens are supposed
to achieve.
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While the urge to promote an ongoing ethos of reciprocal care between
parents and children is a powerful one in some cultures, we must bear in mind
a child's relationship with his parents is not voluntary in the same sense as a
parent's relationship to his children; after all, no child asks to be born, let alone
to these parents. Thus, it is no surprise to us that many jurisdictions are
reluctant to impose such liability now, even when that position leads to
seemingly harsh results.3 87 Because of the voluntariness problem, an opt-in
registry makes sense in the context of adult children who wish to signal their
compacts of care with their parents. And if they want, parents can opt to signal
their ongoing commitment to their children by agreeing to face liability for
failing to protect or support them as adults.
But in the end, the current state of affairs, where about a dozen states use the
criminal sanction to establish filial responsibility norms, 3 88 violates our
normative framework on every dimension. We therefore think these laws
should be abandoned. If the criminal laws are to be retained for their
expressive and/or compensatory purposes, however, they should at least not
involve fines or incarceration, and the reach of the law should be expanded to
include under its umbrella persons who would otherwise be excluded.
Last, we think it bears mention that although there was once wide legislative
support for filial support laws in both civil and criminal form, these rules do
not act with much force. The reason for that desuetude, we think, is an
increased appreciation for the voluntarist basis for holding people criminally
liable. We also think the significance of that norm helps explain why, for
example, we almost never see family ties burdens prominently used against
persons - siblings, grandparents, or aunts, for example - who did not
themselves voluntarily undertake to create that relationship of caregiving. That
norm of promoting voluntarily caregiving illuminates much of the terrain we
have surveyed here, and it lends promise to the project of how better to reform
our existing laws.
CONCLUSION

We hope to have accomplished three things in this Article. Most concretely,
we have demonstrated that there are a series of burdens that defendants face in
the criminal justice system on account of their family status, when that status is
recognized as part of a state-sanctioned family unit. Although our previous
work on the range of family ties benefits might suggest that family status could
only help a defendant,38 9 our exploration here reveals that that picture is
incomplete. There are many ways that the criminal justice system goes out of
its way to punish persons on account of their family status. The pervasiveness
387 Cf

Billingslea v. State,

780 S.W.2d 271, 276

(Tex. Crim. App.

1989) (holding that an

adult child's failure to seek medical care for an ailing live-in parent does not constitute
criminal negligence because there was no statutory duty to act).
388 Rickles-Jordan, supra note 123, at 199 n. 136.
369 See generally Markel, Collins & Leib, supra note 3.
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of this phenomenon has not, to our knowledge, been previously explored and
we encourage scholars and policymakers to take interest in these findings.
Second, we made an effort to organize a normative framework for thinking
through whether special penalties should attach to family status. What we
discovered is that these sorts of penalties are more palatable when they are
efforts to reinforce relationships of voluntary caregiving. Indeed, drawing on
and adapting the normative framework we used in our earlier study, we
developed a set of tests or questions that we used to assess these family ties
burdens. First, did the burden fall on persons who had voluntarily created a
relationship of care? Second, did the burden impinge on some liberty that
should be recognized as deserving of protection in a liberal society? Third,
were the laws drafted in such a way as to be narrowly tailored to the
governmental objectives? Fourth, were there non-criminal measures that could
be equally effective in achieving the government objectives, assuming the
government objectives were sufficiently compelling or important to be
vindicated through law? Finally, in what ways do the existing family ties
burdens contribute to concerns about gender inequality and discrimination?
Finally, we tried to spell out how our normative framework might contribute
to thinking through each of the family ties burdens we were able to identify
here. We recognize, however, that ultimately we cannot hope to have analyzed
each family ties burden exhaustively - for they are each embedded within a
policy space of their own and each burden functions differently to control
different kinds of conduct. Nevertheless, our hope has been to respond to older
debates and start new ones through the framework we have adopted and the
policy choices we have suggested. Indeed, we hope that looking at these
burdens synthetically will illuminate how the criminal justice systems are
tempted to use each particular family ties burden to punish family status in
several ways - and how we might reorient these burdens in a more normatively
attractive light.
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